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ABSTRACT 
 
Nepal is a small country in size that lies between India and China. This small country 
experienced a Maoist insurgency, known as the People’s War that started in 1996 and ended 
in 2006. Different social, political and individual factors caused this war that saw massive 
human rights violations from both the rebels and the government. Between 15000 and 16000 
Nepalese were killed, made homeless/displaced and disabled, abducted and/or disappeared; 
and thousands of properties were stolen or destroyed (Dhruba, 2005; Gyawali, 2009; Hada, 
2001; Himalayan Times, 2005; Shakya, 2006; Thapa, 2004).  
 
The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) ended the People’s War in 2006; however, the 
peace process has not been completed. Nor have the massive human rights violations, causes 
and effects of the war been addressed. In 2015, 10 years after the CPA, a Nepali Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was formed. The aim of this commission was to deliver justice to 
those who had experienced human rights violations during the insurgency and to create an 
atmosphere of reconciliation in Nepali society (Kantipur, 2015).  
 
This thesis examines the causes of the People’s War in Nepal. It then presents case studies of 
the processes and outcomes of TRCs in Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa. These TRCs 
completed their functions in facilitating peace and delivering justice by providing the 
suggestions and recommendations. The special case studies provide significant guidance to 
the TRC of Nepal and suggest important recommendations such as reconciliation, 
rehabilitation and reparation procedures to complete the peace process (TRC, 1995, 2004, 
2009). 
 
Key Words: insurgency, causes, effects, TRC, reconciliation, reparation, rehabilitation 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
1.1 Introduction 
The People’s War (Maoist insurgency) in Nepal started in 1996 and ended in 2006 with the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord between the Maoist leader (Prachanda) and the 
Prime Minister of the Nepali Government (Girija Prasad Koirala). The People’s War brought 
social chaos and disorder to Nepal. During this time, between 15000 and 16000 Nepalese 
were killed, 1350 were abducted and/or ‘disappearanced’; nearly 6000 were left disabled and 
thousands of properties were stolen or destroyed. Theft, rape and abduction multiplied, 
infrastructure was destroyed and children were coerced into fighting for the insurgents 
(Dhruba, 2005; Gyawali, 2009; Hada, 2001; Himalayan Times, 2005; Nepal et al., 2011; 
Sapkota, 2004; Shakya, 2006; Thapa, 2004).  
While the insurgency formally ended in 2006 with the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), 
the peace process is still incomplete. In line with the CPA, a fundamental part of the peace 
process, a Constitutional Assembly (CA), was formed, Popular elections were held in 2008 
and again, in 2013, but neither assembly could deliver an acceptable constitution for guiding 
the re-structuring of Nepalese society. However, each assembly was able to complete one 
significant part of the peace process. In 2012, 15,602 ex-Maoist insurgents voluntarily retired 
into Nepalese society with a smaller number, 1,444 being integrated into the re-organized 
Nepalese Army (Hamal, 2013; Shah, 2012; Subedi, 2012; Upreti, 2011). And in February 
2015, nine years after the official end of the emergency (Kantipur, 2015), the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and The Commission on Enforced Disappearances were 
established. The aims of these commissions were to deliver justice to those who had 
experienced human rights violations during the insurgency and to create an atmosphere of 
reconciliation in Nepali society (Kantipur, 2015).  
The focus of this thesis is an examination of the role of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in Nepal’s peace process. Specifically, it will analyse and compare case 
studies on the role and successes of previous TRCs in South Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
to examine the role the TRC might play in finalising Nepal’s peace process. 
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1.2 Background 
Before examining the peace process and the role of TRCs in implementing and facilitating 
peace processes, the causes and effects of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal must be explored 
as they have had a direct impact on the peace process in Nepal.  
 
The armed struggle by the Maoists against the democratic government (it was still called His 
Majesty’s Government even though the democracy was revived in 1990) began on February 
13, 1996, when the Nepali Congress (NC) led coalition government failed to respond to the 
Maoists’ 40-point demands concerning nationality, people’s democracy and livelihood 
(Thapa, 2006, pp. 48, 53, 71). The Maoists demanded that a democratic, federal, secular state 
- free of discrimination and oppression - be established; that royal privileges be abolished; 
that the laws of the country be changed democratically; and that an extensive program of 
social and economic reforms in favour of the poor be enacted (Thapa, 2006, pp. 211-216). 
The ensuing insurgency disrupted the country and human rights violations were extreme. 
 
According to the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, 89,571 people were internally 
displaced during the conflict and found refuge in the slums of the capital, Kathmandu (Hada, 
2001; Sapkota, 2004). Abductions, disappearances, the targeted killing of civilians and the 
destruction of civilian property multiplied as the insurgency continued (IRIN, 2006). 
Approximately 1772 buildings belonging to Village Development Committees (VDCs) – the 
governmental local offices in the villages where social facilities like official recommendation 
letters and pensions were distributed to the local people by government representatives - were 
severely damaged; and 2,646 development structures were destroyed (Dhruba, 2005; 
Gyawali, 2009; Nepal et al., 2011). The Nepalese education system deteriorated, as its 
services were disrupted or discontinued as a consequence of the insurgency (Shakya, 2009) 
and investment in Nepal’s private sector steadily declined throughout the insurgency 
(Acharya, 2005; Upreti, 2010). Many investors, including joint ventures and multinational 
companies working in Nepal like Dabur Nepal, Surya Nepal, United Telecom Limited, 
Colgate Palmolive Nepal, Jyoti Spinning Mills, Unilever Nepal, and the Coca-Cola Company 
stopped production and sacked workers (Jha, 2011). External investors were unwilling to 
invest in Nepal and abandoned projects, for example, Norway withdrew from the Melamchi 
Drinking Water Project (Upreti, 2006). 
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10 years after the signing of the CPA, the hope and aspirations of the Nepalese people for 
peace and progress remain largely unfulfilled. The Nepalese people are frustrated with the 
delays that are primarily due to the conflicting interests of the major political parties; political 
mistrust, the absence of constitutional habits, the failure to enforce party laws and codes of 
conduct, and the formation of cross-coalitions of leaders to remain in power. The 
involvement of party leaders in corruption has further destabilised and delayed the peace 
process (Bhatta, 2012). The leaders of different parties like Jhalanath Khanal (Unified 
Marxist Leninist-UML), Sushil Koirala (Nepali Congress-NC), and Prachanda (Communist 
Party of Nepal-Maoist) have been publically rebuked by their own cadres because of their 
lack of responsiveness to Nepal’s problems and in facilitating the peace process (Bhatta, 
2013). Until these issues are resolved neither the peace process nor the human rights 
violations which occurred during the conflict will be effectively progressed or addressed.  
 
1.3 Aim of the study 
This research explored the causes of the 10 year People’s War in Nepal that disrupted the   
peace in peoples’ lives. It   also examined the continuing impacts on Nepal and assessed how 
a TRC could play an active and influential role in completing the country’s peace process. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this research were: 
• to examine the background of the conflict in Nepal and identify  key impacts  of the 
conflict;  
• to explore and analyse the role of the TRCs in other countries to assist in 
understanding the role of the TRC in Nepal so the Nepali TRC can facilitate and 
establish peace  
 
1.5 Rationale and significance of the study 
Conflict refers to the struggle between two or more usually opposing parties pursuing 
divergent goals and limited resources to attain their respective goals. The struggle is normally 
aggressive and leads to violence. Such struggles break down interpersonal relationships 
between parties and commonly lead to destruction, loss of property and life. Thus, the 
restitution of relationships between disagreeing parties and addressing the causes of the 
conflict are two of the many challenges faced in post-conflict peace building.  
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There are a number of studies and reports on the conflict in Nepal. They include Nepal 
country study on conflict transformation and peace building (Eschborm, 2002); The Maoist 
insurgency in Nepal, 1996-2008: Implications for U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine 
(Kreuttner, 2001); The Maoist insurgency of Nepal: Origin and evolution (Muni, 2010); and 
The Nepal conflict report (United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR), 
2012). According to these studies, and others, the consequences of the conflict in Nepal were 
overwhelmingly destructive (Baral, 2006; Hutt, 2004). But the insurgency also empowered 
the Nepalese people and ended monarchic rule. The empowerment of the people was not 
sufficient however to drive the peace process to completion so Nepal remains paralysed by 
the competing interests, indecision and inadequacies of the different political parties and this 
makes the country increasingly unstable. This research contributes further insights into the 
People’s War in Nepal and the findings are of value to policy makers, administrators and 
scholars; policy makers may be guided to making more equitable policies, administrators 
may be assisted in implementing government programs and scholars may be further informed 
of the facts for educational purposes and future references. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
This is a qualitative research project.  It primarily utilised published materials such as TRC 
reports, and Nepalese Government reports to obtain data.  Content analysis was used to 
critically examine the role of TRCs in the peace process of previous conflicts in South Africa, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.  The research drew on extensively from sources on the war, the 
causes and effects of the insurgency and the role of the TRC in facilitating Nepal’s peace 
process.  
A non-probability sampling method was followed in the information selection process. As the 
research area was limited, the purposive sample was chosen.  The content analysis identified 
the initiatives taken by the conflicting sides; the sacrifices made and the benefits realised 
during, from and after the conflict; and how previous and successfully completed TRCs may 
inform and progress the peace process in Nepal. 
1.7 Limitations 
No proposed research project is without limitations. Patton (1990, p.162) argues there is no 
perfect research design and this means there will be compromises and limitations in any 
research. Acknowledging this, the scope and findings of this research were limited by several 
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factors, primarily, the number of existing case studies on previous TRCs, the time duration of 
the research and the lack of sufficient authoritative texts or scholarly research on Nepal’s 
peace process and the role of the TRC after the Maoist insurgency.  
 
1.8 Overview of the study 
This thesis is presented across 10 chapters. Chapter One establishes the research context, 
including a background to the Maoist insurgency and the beginning of the peace process in 
Nepal. The chapter also outlines the objectives of the research, its significance and potential 
limitations. The research methodology and conceptual framework are also detailed in this 
opening chapter. 
Chapter Two presents the background of the conflict in Nepal, its causes and impacts. 
Chapter Three discusses the development of the peace process in Nepal, focusing on the 
ceasefires that occurred during the insurgency.  
Chapter four provides an overview of the characteristics and roles of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions in the peace process. It details the functions, powers and rules 
that guide a TRC.  
Chapters Five, Six and Seven critically discuss the case studies of the TRCs from Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and South Africa respectively. Each chapter provides the background of the 
particular conflict/context and identifies its major consequences. Each analysis presents the 
objectives of the TRC, its findings and the recommendations made to address the problems. 
The strength and limitations (weaknesses) of each TRC are included in each chapter.  
Chapter Eight analyses and compares the TRCs of the three countries.  Specifically, the 
comparisons focus on the TRCs, their findings, and recommendations to facilitate the peace 
and reconciliation process in those countries.  
Chapter Nine illustrates the TRC of Nepal with its objectives and situations. It details why the 
establishment of the Nepali TRC was delayed, why it is slow functioning and its progress to 
date. 
Chapter 10 summarizes the discussion of the previous chapters and presents the major 
findings and objectives of this research that aim to provide suggestions to progress the 
functioning of the TRC of Nepal in establishing peace. 
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1.9 Contribution to Knowledge 
The research is intentionally focused on the TRC and peace process of Nepal. Thus this 
research study aims to contribute to the following areas: 
•    The research study is basically fruitful for the TRC of Nepal as the study explored other 
TRCs formed in different countries namely Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa and their 
success stories. 
•    The study discussed causes and effects of the conflict and role of the TRC which revealed 
the ideas on the transformative peace process. Thus, the study is also productive for political 
parties to take part in the peace process. 
•    The study aimed to contribute Government of Nepal as research is an in-depth study of 
the TRC’s peace process, its hindering factors and suggestions for well functioning of it. 
•    Finally, the study is useful for peace seekers, media persons, research students, related 
stakeholders and all interested readers. 
1.10 Conceptual framework 
The research project primarily focused on the role of TRC in Nepal to recommend the 
government of Nepal ways the human rights violations, including the causes and effects of 
the ten years People’s War (Maoist insurgency) could be addressed to play a vital role in 
establishing peace in the country. The study comprised two major studies i.e.; the role of 
Nepali TRC and the role of the TRCs from Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa in 
addressing the major causes and consequences so that the peace process could be completed. 
 
The conceptual framework of the research is- 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the research project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of the role of 
TRC in peace process 
arising out of causes and 
effects of conflict: through 
literature, reports, etc. of 
Nepal 
Analysis of the role of TRC 
in peace process arising out 
of causes and effects of 
conflict: through secondary 
sources case studies from 
other countries (Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, S. Africa) 
Establish the role of the 
TRC in Nepal: Explore 
the role of TRC from 
case studies of other 
countries in peace 
process and establish the 
role in Nepal. 
Study and analysis of role of TRC in peace process 
arising out of causes and effects of conflict: Through 
previous research, articles and related documents, 
and case studies from other countries (S. Africa, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone) 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT  
 
The nature of conflict varies relative to context and society. There are multidimensional ways 
of defining and analysing the nature of the conflict in Nepal, for instance, its political nature 
as evidenced by the clash between the current government regime and the armed opposition; 
as a social phenomenon where social structure is founded on a form of feudalism in the caste 
structure, as determined by the hegemony of tradition and religious beliefs; and as an  
economic phenomenon where specific groups of people dominate Nepalese  society to the 
detriment of others in society (Baral, 2006, Hutt, 2004; Pathak, 2005). 
2.1 Causes of the Conflict in Nepal 
The present situation in Nepal is the result of a long and disastrous People’s War (Katsiaficas, 
2013). Pathak (2005) argues that the People’s War initiated in Nepal in 1996 is an outcome of 
complex socioeconomic, legal and politico-ideological problems. The Maoists identified 
these problems and presented a list of demands that aimed to address the identified 
imbalances, specifically, the inequitable socioeconomic situations of the population, the 
confused political ideologies and the entrenched discrimination against the poorest Nepalis 
(Karki & Bhattarai, 2003). These problems reflected the different social, ethnic, economic 
and political dimensions of the country and sparked the insurgency (Hachchethu, 2005). The 
individual’s consciousness played a vital role in understanding these complex problems 
(Thapa, 2004), as depicted by the energy and spread of the insurgency. Thus, the contributing 
factors can be divided into two categories namely socio-cultural and others such as individual 
and political factors. 
 
2.1.1 Major: The socio-cultural factors 
Nepal is a multi-dimensional country because of its multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-
religious and multi-lingual systems. Despite having 125 dialects and 61 ethnic groups 
(Bhattachan, 2001), the country's social, cultural, political, economic and educational 
structures are dominated and shaped by Hinduism, feudalism, and the Nepali language. The 
Hindu and “upper caste/class” people control most of the social and political sectors by 
occupying the highest ranks in the government sector thereby influencing and suppressing the 
minorities.  
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According to Deraniyagala (2005), economic aspects combined with social and political 
aspects played important roles in the growth and sustenance of the war in Nepal. 
Unemployment, insecurity, social discrimination and the dominant feudal structure of poor 
communities in Nepal contributed to the frustration of the people in remote areas and 
villages. Such discriminatory social practices, in place for 235 years since the unification of 
Nepal at the beginning of the Shaha dynasty and the late King Prithvi Narayan Shaha, were 
main causes behind the People’s War (Upreti, 2004). The governing system of promoting and 
providing protection to the elite, as evidenced by the Land Reform Act in 1964 to establish 
tenancy rights also provided protection to the elite classes by the government and made the 
poor people poorer (Pathak, 2005). As a result, poverty is common in most of rural Nepal and 
this further contributed to the People’s War. 
 
According to Pandey (2005), the ethnic factor is an important element of the Maoist 
movement as changes in 1990 gave the Janajati ethnic group a new sense of identity and legal 
ground to appeal for their demands (Pandey, 2005 cited by Tiwari 2007). After a prolonged 
period of indifference, neglect and refusal, the oppressed ethnic groups began to demand their 
rights but their grievances were not heeded (Katsiaficas, 2013). The extreme economic 
disparities experienced by the majority of Nepalis motivated individuals to participate in the 
insurgency to overthrow the unequal socio-cultural system. Social and structural factors such 
as culture, religion, norms, rules and regulations also played a role or compelled people to 
engage in the armed insurgencies (Galtung, 1969; Galtung & Tschundi, 2001). The special 
attention the Maoists gave to the issues of non-discrimination and the rights to self-
determination, particularly aimed at ethnic groups further fuelled the People’s War (Maoists’ 
40 points demand, Demand No 20; Pathak, 2005; Yadav, 2016). 
 
The structural perseverance of poverty, the continuing marginalization of ethnic minority 
groups and their increased inability to access state power and resources and the socio-
economic inequality in Nepali society are widely recognised as catalysts for the People’s War 
(Hutt, 2004; Joshi and Mason, 2007; Lawoti, 2005; Lawoti and Pahari, 2009). In the Nepali 
caste system, the indigenous and ethnic minorities were viewed as impure, inferior, dirty, 
ignorant, stupid and powerless; this stereotype contributed to and fuelled the structural 
violence. This is also why the Maoists strategically targeted the Dalits, the infamous 
“untouchables” that were most disadvantaged in caste- high illiteracy levels, landlessness and 
lack of political power (Mahat, 2005).  
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The untouchability of Dalits (so-called untouchable lower caste) still exists as a pervasive 
socio-cultural phenomenon in Nepal and there is a history of profound structural violence 
against them (Mahat, 2005). Dalits’ life expectancy, literacy and income are far below the 
country’s average (HDR, 2004). Dalits are discriminated against in employment and the 
government often fails to prosecute those who discriminate against them (DHRO, 2005). In 
an International Labor Organization (ILO) study on Nepal, approximately 48 % of Dalits 
were denied employment due to their caste status and 21% had been refused jobs based on 
their caste status (ILO, 2005). In addition, approximately 71 % of individuals were paid 
lower wages and salaries in both the private and informal sectors (ibid). Due to this 
marginalization and disempowerment in political and civil services, the Dalits and other 
minority groups were ready to support the People’s War.  
 
The Maoists understood this oppression and channelled it into the insurgency as an 
expression of ethnic power. The ethnic groups were easily integrated into the Maoist 
insurgency both as an expression of their collective identity and as a way of breaking their 
subservience to the long historic mistreatment experienced under the socio-cultural 
hegemony of the high caste land-owning Hindu elite (Shakya, 2006). The Maoists considered 
the root causes of the social problems in Nepal to be the constitution and the palace so they 
targeted them to help unify the rest of the country. In this way, they were able to attract many 
frustrated people, mainly from rural areas, and this helped the growth of the ongoing 
rebellion. 
 
Rogers (1960) posits that changes that have the potential to alter the practises of a society are 
often caused by outsiders; these outsiders, on their own or as representatives of a program of 
planned change, introduce new ideas to achieve definite goals. In Nepal, the Maoists represent 
the outsiders due to their political ethics that brought both new ideas (rejecting democratic 
politics for violence) and definite goals (social justice) that captured the imagination of the 
people, especially of the peasants, ethnic groups of people, Dalits and the youth of their 
respective societies.  
 
The minority groups felt there was no other choice for them to show their existence after the 
ruling government’s refusal to heed their demands. Pyakurel (2001), quoting William 
Zartman's conclusion, emphasises this point “if a group, community or a party feels that its 
existence and identity are in crisis, it is forced to make tough choices” (p.112-113). Thus, the 
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persistent oppression drove the indigenous and Dalits to choose insurgency to escape their 
threatened existence.  
 
The Maoist insurgency (People’s War) was thus driven by the convergence of socio-cultural 
factors present in Nepali society (Venhaus, 2010), ethnic exclusion, as discussed above, and 
gender inequality (Gautam, Baskota & Manchanda, 2001; Gurung, 2005; Gautam, Leve, 
2007; Parvati, 2003).  
 
Nepal is a patriarchal society. In the Hindu patriarchal value system, man is placed at a higher 
stratum, while a woman is given a very low status in the society. Moreover, women from the 
indigenous and Dalit groups are more discriminated against, constantly being reminded and 
made to realize that they are from the inferior group and being subjected to gender-based 
violence such as sexual abuse and child marriage, limited access to and control over 
resources, unpaid and low wage few job opportunities (Shakya, 2006). 
 
Although Nepal ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) in 1991 without reservation (BBC, 2014; Government of Nepal, 
2011), Nepali society discriminates against women in the areas of social, economic, political 
and family life, including citizenship, inheritance, marriage, adoption, and domestic and 
foreign employment (GoN, 2011). Gender discrimination against women is very high in 
Nepal and this was a major contributing factor for so many women participating as 
combatants in the Maoist insurgency (People’s War). According to the United Nations, of the 
19,602 people making up the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 3,846 were women (United 
Nations (2007) cited by Arino, 2008). 
 
Although all the national political parties had given priority to gender issues they had failed 
to implement practically. For instance, there was not a single woman included in Constitution 
Recommendation Committee and National Planning Commission until the insurgency. So, 
the demands for gender equality, justice and non-discrimination made by the Maoists 
attracted the rural women (Pathak, 2005). Among the Maoist’s 40 point demands, one was to 
stop the patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women, for example, by allowing 
daughters to inherit parental property. However, this could only be achieved if gender 
equality was advocated in this area. The Maoists widely explained this ideology to Nepali 
women through political gatherings, cultural programs, the party media and mass print media. 
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Many women were influenced and interested to achieve their rights and became active 
participants in the Maoist insurgency (People’s War) as combatants. As Thapa (2005) 
explains: 
 
 Another notable characteristic of the Maoist insurgency is the degree of women’s 
participation in guerrilla ranks. Women’s political participation in the past had 
been limited to electoral areas, especially in voting and occasional candidacy in 
elections. It is a big surprise that Nepali women now have joined a guerrilla 
organization under arms (p.11). 
 
The individual factors which led women to join the war included women’s liberation, 
equality of opportunity within Maoist organizations and the Maoists’ social reform programs. 
These included campaigns against alcohol, gambling, sexual violence and exploitation. 
According to International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), for example, (2010):  
 
In areas where Maoists exercised effective control, they prohibited domestic 
violence, child marriage or abuse, prostitution, extra-marital affairs, alcoholism 
and gambling. They started to enforce these policies through “people’s courts”, 
imposing punishments including imprisonment, which was sometimes 
accompanied by labor and fines (p. 11).  
 
The issues raised by the Maoists, thus, attracted women to fight for equal access to 
inheritance rights, the elimination of patriarchal exploitation and discrimination, equal 
payment for equal work, and an end to the sexual exploitation of low caste women. Other 
factors that motivated many women to join the insurgency included poverty, unemployment, 
low success in national level school exam and the low social status and condition of widows 
(Pyakurel, 2006). 
The emancipation of bonded laborers was another social cause that fuelled the People’s War 
in Nepal, particularly the emancipation of at least 16,000 bonded laborers (Kamaiya) in 
western Nepal by the Nepali government on 17 July 2000 (Fujikura, 2007, p.329). As the 
state was unable to settle their issues after declaring their emancipation as they were left 
without houses or land, they began to confiscate land from the landlords, according to the 
instructions of the Maoist party (Shahu, 2013). 
Adams and Bradsbury (1995) assert that culture and religion have been the greatest causes for 
the protracted conflict in Nepal. Although many religions like Buddhism, Bon and Kirat are 
practiced in Nepal, Hinduism was the official state religion until the Interim Constitution of 
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Nepal 2007. There was a tendency to subsume other religions into Hinduism however which 
meant people were not free to practice their own religions (Shakya, 2006). The suppression of 
people’s culture and religion of the majority by the upper class minority thus exacerbated and 
protracted the conflict (Shakya, 2006).  
 
The People’s War was largely based on class and caste/ethnicity (Bhattachan, 2000). As 
Sharma (2002) states, Nepali upper classes had a long time practised oppression, 
discrimination and exploitation against other nationalities, religions and tribes. The 
consolidation of elites in the management of the country, as well as in the civil services, 
exacerbated this discrimination. Since the mid 1980’s, the number of civil service employees 
from the most economically and politically powerful ethnicities in Nepal has risen from 69% 
to 98% (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). The lack of political representation in the government was 
also one of the causes in the participation of lower caste (Dalit), ethnic people in the Maoist 
insurgency (People’s War). In general election of 1999, not a single member of the House of 
Representatives was a Dalit (Bhattachan et al, 2009). Dalits are also significantly under-
represented in the civil service and judicial system. As Baniya (2007) indicates, 
As 1854 survey revealed that 98 precent of all civil services posts were held by 
“upper-caste” Brahmins and Chetris. Over a century later, 1991 survey indicates 
that 93 percent of these posts are still held by upper-caste Brahmins and Chetris. 
Within a 137-year period, there was only a five percent increase in Nepal’s 
political diversity (p.49). 
According to a 2001 census, while Brahmins constitute only 16 percent of the population, 
they represent 57 percent of parliament and 89 percent of the judiciary (Dalit NGO 
Federation Nepal, 2001). This pattern of exclusion is repeated at the local government level, 
where Dalits and other minority groups are severely underrepresented in the administrative 
system (HRW, 2010). Of the more than 3,000 Village Development Committees chairmen, 
only a handful are Dalits (Baniya, 2007; ILO, 2005) and this discrimination also persists in 
the (then) Royal Nepal Army (Baniya, 2007). 
Accordingly, the inequality the majority of the population experienced undoubtedly 
contributed to their willingness to accept the call for radical, violent action that would 
dramatically disrupt the social, political and economic order. As Thapa and Sijapati (2003) 
observe, this “hope in a radical solution,” was a function of poverty rather than a 
consequence of Maoist ideology and the Maoist insurgency (People’s War) can be considered 
14 
 
as a “rage against a long legacy of oppression based on caste and ethnicity” (Sengupta, 2005 
cited by Do & Iyer, 2007, p.3). 
 
2.1.2 Other factors: 
2.1.2.1 Political factors 
Political ideologies were another cause of the People’s War in Nepal and they became a key 
factor for participating in the insurgency (Hudson, 1999; Bandura, 2003). The varied 
elements of politics within a country influence the ideologies of people; political strategies as 
well as governance play a role in the development of an insurgency. In Nepal, parliamentary 
politics and the politicians were corrupt. The competition to grab power and position in the 
government by the competing political parties made the political situation increasingly 
unstable (Hachhethu, 2005, p. 11). Nepal’s many minority populations were effectively 
excluded from parliament as they had no political representation, few expectations and little 
autonomy (Gersony, 2003; Gurung, 2005; Hossain, Siitonen & Sharma, 2006; Hutt, 2004; 
Leve, 2007; Parvati, 2003; Pettigrew & Shneiderman, 2004; Thapa, 2004). Because the 
indigenous and marginalized groups had minimal or no political representation, their 
grievances increased yet participation in policy making, as well as decision-making 
processes, were not considered because of their suppression by the government (Do & Iyer, 
2007). The worsening political situation caused by poor governance strategies and the 
personal pre-occupations of politicians resulted in bad governance and inequitably distributed 
development (Hossain et al, 2006; Kumar, 2003; Leve, 2007; Pathak, 2005) which frustrated 
the people, actively pushing them into rebellion.  
 
The regressive characteristics and criminalization rife in Nepali politics made the ground 
fertile for the People’s War. As the NC was in power, its cadres were more irresponsible and 
severe against their opponents, like the UPF, forgetting the reality that all have equal rights in 
democracy. Passing the IMT with a sharp contradiction, dispatching parliamentary members 
to minimize the vote against themselves (the NC Prime Minister Ser Bahadur Deuwa), voting 
against their own government during the no-confidence motion in 1997 are examples which 
made the general people rally against the incumbent political leaders and institutions (Pathak, 
2005). Thus the government’s failure to address these issues and represent the problems of 
Nepali society the People’s War and provided the circumstances for the Maoists to mobilize 
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the marginalized and oppressed populations to join or support the insurgency (Joshi & 
Mason, 2007).  
 
Hachhethu (2005) observes that: 
The post-1990 politics were characterized by anarchy as depicted by several 
events. The parliamentary elections were called off four times; recommendations 
for dissolution of the House of Representatives (HOR) were made six times; 
special sessions of the HOR were attended seven times; and the government 
changed thirteen times due to power games. The Maoists have constantly gained 
the strength exploiting the weakness of its opponent, the state (p.11). 
 
Despite the transition to democracy in 1990, traditional elites and upper castes continued to 
dominate the state apparatus and left wing parties were marginalized within the political 
process (Deraniyagala, 2005, p.56). Pervasive control of local and national leadership posts 
by “upper-caste” members of the same feudal figures resulted in wholesale disregard for 
Dalit issues, while attempts at building effective Dalit political movements were met with 
punitive violence (JUP, 2001). This resulted in political instability and conflict because the 
political parties could not make clear and far-sighted visions, programs and decisions about 
the development of the country. Sedan and Hussein (2002) mention that; 
 
[After] a short period of considerable optimism, it became increasingly evident 
that the new political order was characterized by instability, corruption and 
patronage (a crisis of governance) and that a rapid succession of governments was 
unable to achieve any real headway in addressing Nepal’s continuing economic 
underdevelopment and deep-seated social inequalities. In this already unstable 
context – and ostensibly in response to it – an armed insurgency began in 
February 1996, led by Nepali Maoists (p.9). 
 
The extremely poor performance of the government, the lack of institutionalized bureaucracy, 
and the frequent changes and lack of direction created an environment where people were not 
represented by a real democracy and did not feel safety. History also shows many hidden and 
neglected aspects that fostered the People’s War in Nepal. Seddon and Hussein (2002) clearly 
and strongly argue that: 
 
A historical perspective reveals that a failure of development and of governance 
created the pre-conditions – poverty, inequality, social discrimination and lack of 
social justice and democracy – for widespread discontent, and ultimately for the 
Maoist insurgency. Not only has the government been ineffective in providing for 
the needs of the poor, it is generally seen and experienced as corrupt, repressive 
and as working against, not for, the interests of ordinary people. International and 
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national development agencies have also failed to strengthen the capacity and 
commitment of state structures or to change practices at local level to any marked 
degree (p.8). 
 
The misuse of international donations through International Non Governmental 
Organizations (INGOs)/Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) also frustrated the poor, 
disadvantaged, marginalized and vulnerable people as the elites or feudal people benefited. 
The Rapti Rural Area Development Project (RADP) by USAID that was in place 
(USAID/Nepal, 2000) for 15 years only reached the elites due to bad politics (Pathak, 2005).  
 
The outcome of such events was to enable the Maoists to source many Nepalis as the 
manpower to instigate their insurgency while the Nepalis found in the Maoists, a platform 
from which to fight against the government for their basic rights. 
 
The people’s uprising during the 1990s developed from the push for the rights of ethnic 
identity and civic consciousness. During this period, the dominance of the so-called upper 
class (Brahmin and Chhetri) was questioned (Bista, 1991). 
 
 
2.1.2.2 Individual factors 
Different causes such as social injustice, oppression, greed, exploitation, and economic 
necessity contribute to an individual performing different, drastic actions such as looting 
and/or joining a rebel group to kill other people to take revenge. The lack of fulfilment of 
needs may drive an individual to join an armed insurgency because the individual feels that 
the insurgency is the only way to achieve fulfilment and end their problems (Mitchell, 1981; 
Venhaus, 2010). Collier and Sambanis (2002) and Weinstein (2002) further support this 
notion and use economic endowment, or materialistic gain theory, to explain possible 
motivations for individuals to join a rebellion.  
 
In Nepal, 31% of people live below the poverty line, as indicated by the Human Development 
Record (HDR-2015). Poverty diminishes people’s capacity to satisfy their own needs as well 
as those of their families. It may lead them to engage in any activity which promises high 
returns for gratification of needs, such as insurgency. Many individual Nepalis lived with the 
reality of shattered dignity, ideology, religion and economic inequality in a society dominated 
by a high caste, privileged social elite and a royalist state that oppressed them. Poverty was 
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one of the contributing factors to the Maoist insurgency (People’s War) (Devarajan, 2005; 
Leve, 2007; Macours, 2010; Parwez, 2006), with most of the Maoist insurgents being young 
men from the poorest rural districts of Nepal (Sharma, 2006). They joined the insurgency 
with a view to end fundamental social and economic problems.  
 
The Maoists thus identified and used the social problems of inequality, exclusion and 
discrimination based on gender, caste, class, and ethnicity to accelerate their insurgency 
(Marks, 2007; Sharma, 2004). According to Marks and Sharma, 
The goals of the CPN (M) were to establish a Maoist people’s republic, end 
Indian imperialism in Nepal, eliminate the caste system, and stop ethnic, religious, 
and linguistic exploitation. Following Maoist doctrine, the CPN (M) established 
support in the remote, impoverished areas where poor infrastructure limited 
government reach (pp. 303-304; 42-49). 
 
The activities and behaviour of the Nepali police and army towards the people also played a 
major role in continuing the insurgency. Police violence and repression turned many people 
into insurgents to protect themselves from such abuse, as well as to take revenge (Hossain, 
Siitonen and Sharma, 2006; Singh, Dahal and Mills, 2005). The rape and sexual abuse of 
girls and women by the police during their operations to suppress the insurgency led to 
people supporting the insurgency for revenge and to prevent further violations. Pathak (2005) 
reports that human rights violations by the army drove men to flee from their homes to hide 
in the safety of the jungle. The police then described these men as wanted fugitives (pp; 123, 
137);  such abuses of power by the legal authorities, the violations and criminal behaviours of 
those in positions of authority  caused many ordinary Nepali  men and women to join the 
insurgency. 
 
 
2.2 Impacts of the conflict in Nepal 
Any form of violence or social conflict leaves behind physical scars, not only on the people, 
but also on the whole country evidences by damaged buildings; the displacement of 
individuals and families; disrupted public services (Pathak, 2005).  The Maoists' 'People's 
War’ brought different painful effects to Nepal. During the conflict, the nation’s most 
important economic sectors, tourism and agriculture, were severely disrupted. Although it is 
10years after the CPA, the lack of development of Nepal’s political economy reflects an 
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uneasy social peace that can be attributed to a peace process which is effectively paralyzed by 
a number of factors, as discussed below. 
 
2.2.1 Socio-cultural impacts 
The Maoist insurgency (People’s War) affected the lives of 23 million people directly in 
Nepal (Himalayan News Service, 2003). The continued violence resulted in the breakdown of 
social and communal bonds as the kinship networks and neighborhood relationships that 
bound communities disintegrated because of fear, distrust and loss of self-confidence (DTIC, 
2005).  
 
The decade-long Maoist insurgency (People’s War) destabilized Nepal’s socio-cultural 
structures causing widespread terror and insecurity. This affected people’s basic rights and 
livelihoods and increased the population of widows, orphans and internal refugees. The 
police, the army, and the Maoists were responsible for thousands of deaths (murders), as well 
as numerous abuses of human rights during the conflict (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Jha 
(2011) indicates that,  
"As many as 16,000 people were killed by the rebel Maoists and the security 
forces… 5,800 people were left disabled, 89,571 people were internally displaced, 
25,000 children were orphaned, 9,000 women were widowed and 1350 people 
disappeared" (p.14).  
 
The death toll included children, teachers, students, social workers, civilians, politicians, 
farmers, lawyers, health workers, laborers, businessmen, army, police, armed police, civil 
servants and 341 children less than 17 years of age (INSEC, 2005). 
 
The social and traditional ways of life of the people were deeply disrupted, or, in many cases, 
ruined. The indigenous Nepalis and Dalits were mistreated, abused and trapped by both the 
government forces and the Maoists during the insurgency. The Maoists forced Dalits to make 
homemade guns (Khukuri) and sew combat wear. The State tortured them for aiding the 
Maoists and barred them from their professions as tailors, cobblers, blacksmiths (Shakya, 
2006). According to DTIC (2005),  
 
Maoists interfered in cultural affairs, for example, by banning the performance of 
the last tribute ritual function (Kriya) by the people. They have brutally arrested 
people (Kriya Putri) individuals taking part in the rites. They stopped other 
traditional celebrations in the countryside as well. Maoists also did not allow 
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teaching Sanskrit as the Brahmin language. Such activities carried out by the 
Maoist have caused widespread social disruption (I-49). 
 
The frequent strikes, security checks, blockades, shutdowns, beatings, threats, humiliation, 
forced prostitution, social isolation, rape and sexual harassment, made life in Nepal hard, 
hazardous and unpredictable during the insurgency. Women, especially those who were 
young and unmarried, were the most vulnerable in the rural areas. Many fled from their 
villages to avoid the atrocities committed by the opposing forces (Upreti, 2010, p. 260). As 
Upreti (2010) indicated: 
In order to avoid atrocities in the villages, over 70,000 of the girls aged between 
15 and 30 years were compelled to leave their homes and join restaurants as 
dancers and waitresses. The situation turned to be so precarious that many of them 
had no choice but to enter into immoral practices like prostitution in major 
townships of the country (p. 260).  
 
The insurgency forced almost 300,000 people to leave their native places (Annapurna Post, 
2005; Caritas Nepal, 2005). About 90,000 people who lived in slums of Kathmandu were 
internally displaced (Hada, 2001) and about 2 million people out of the total population 25 to 
29 million Nepalis (NBS, 2005) fled to overseas countries mostly to Gulf countries and India 
for employment and to save their lives (irinnews.org). The Relief and Rehabilitation Division 
of Peace and Reconstruction Ministry in 2011 recorded that 89,171 internally displaced 
people (IDP) applied for relief packages from the government (GoN, 2011).  
Shakya (2006) also describes that: 
During the conflict many people were displaced. Some of the groups who were 
displaced were VDC secretaries, teachers, political cadres, and youths. People left 
their homes and communities for their security. The first targets of Maoist were 
the feudal landlords. Many of them were either killed, tortured or displaced. 
However, their displacement, on the contrary had negative impacts on poor people 
as the local people could not get jobs. Those who were not ready to give forced 
donations, too had to flee (p. 7). 
 
According to Gyawali (2009), the armed conflict severely affected the educational system, 
especially in some rural areas. In  Rolpa and Rukum where the Maoist party had grown, the 
schools were targeted and school pupils were used as human shields, porters, housekeepers, 
cooks, sex slaves or/and abducted for ransom (Gyawali, 2009). Nearly 3,000 teachers stopped 
teaching and 700 schools were closed (ibid). Maoists killed 60 teachers and 66 students for 
not providing physical and economical help, caused the ‘disappearance’ of 151 teachers and 
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abducted 516 students and 62 teachers. The Nepali state forces killed 44 teachers, 172 
students, detained 158 teachers and 115 students; and had 14 teachers ‘disappear’ (Himalayan 
Times, 2005; Gyawali, 2009). This affected the education of children in major ways both in 
terms of access and reintegration in education (Shakya, 2006).  
 
2.2.2 Physical impacts 
The infrastructure of the nation was severely damaged during the insurgency. Maoists 
destroyed drinking water systems, telecommunication towers, barracks, suspension bridges, 
and hydro power plants, the electrical grid, transmission lines and power substations, 
historical monuments, government offices including Village Development Committee 
Offices and adjacent health posts (clinics), police posts and agricultural training centres. In 
this way, rural people were deprived of many basic social needs (Shakya, 2009; Gyawali, 
2009).  
 
According to the Ministry of Local Development (2002) and National Planning Commission 
(2003), an estimated 177 private houses, 33 heath centres, 12 telecommunication towers, 31 
school buildings, 100 police posts, 18 post offices, 93 government offices, 29 private offices, 
1300 Village Development Committee (VDC) buildings and 31 electricity related centres 
were destroyed. Similarly, there was damage to Jhimruk hydroelectricity installations 
(12MW), Adhikhola hydroelectricity (5MW) and Modi hydroelectricity (14MW) during 
2003. About 14 domestic airports in remote areas also  suffered substantial damage (ibid) as 
did 112 telephone stations and substations in 45 out of 75 districts in Nepal (Nepal Telecom, 
2004); 26 bridges, public buses (no statistics available), private vehicles (no statistics 
available) were also attacked and destroyed during the Maoist insurgency (People’s War) 
(Department of Road, 2005).   
 
The rebel forces targeted banks; particularly the state-owned banks as well as the micro 
financial institutions and even the local Small Farmer Co-operatives were not spared 
(Hofmann & Grossmann, 2005). The destruction and looting of bank buildings after May 
2002 was estimated at US$ 11.5 million in cash, jewellery and gold (ECON, 2002). As banks 
were being looted and robbed, any situated in remote and rural areas were withdrawn which 
directly impacted the economic development of the nation. 
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A problem created by the armed conflict (People’s War) was landmines and Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs) in rural areas which were used by government and Maoist forces 
during the Maoist insurgency (Upreti, 2006). Children and women are the most vulnerable to 
these hidden devices. In 2006, 98 adults and children, and in 2007, 169 adults and children 
were injured by these weapons (Shakya, 2009). Until these weapons are located and 
destroyed, the peace and peace process will not be completed. 
 
2.2.3 Political economy impacts 
The armed conflict caused devastating economic consequences in Nepal. Agriculture, 
industry, employment, and foreign aid - the major economic sectors – were severely 
disrupted or discontinued (Pradhan, n.d.; Jha, 2010). Nepal’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
dropped to 0.8 percent in 2001/2002, was 4.8 percent in 2001 and 2.6 percent in 2005. Private 
sector investment in agriculture, carpet, garment, textile, tobacco, beverage, declined from 
15.4 percent to 12.6 percent between 1996 and 2004 (Acharya, 2005; Upreti, 2010; Jha, 
2010). As Nepal is an agriculture-based country, two-thirds of the labor force are engaged in 
this sector and contributed one-third of Nepal’s GDP (Karkee, 2008). The budget in the 
agricultural sector dropped to 1% of the GDP between 2001 and 2004 when the insurgency 
was at its peak (Jha, 2010). According to the Ministry of Finance (2008), this sector’s growth 
rate had been 2.7 percent per annum in the 1990s and 2.8 percent from 2001 to 2006. In 1991, 
agriculture’s share in GDP was 45 percent, 37 percent in 2001 and 33 percent in 2007 (ibid). 
 
The development activities declined significantly during the conflict period. Between 
2001/02 and 2004/05, the development expenditure of the government declined from 
Rs.50.47 billion to Rs.47.20 billion (National Planning Commission, 2005). In most of the 
Village Development Committees (VDCs) and District Development Committees (DDCs), 
development activities were halted as the resources for the development were diverted to 
other sectors, mainly to the army and police. Many of the farmers in different parts of the 
country left agricultural land uncultivated and investment in the agricultural sector declined 
to as low as 1 percent (Jha, 2010) 
 
The lack of economic opportunities within Nepal caused the younger generations to migrate 
overseas. The recent trend shows a steady flow of Nepalis to Asian, European, American and 
Golf countries, and many more, for skilled and unskilled jobs (Gautam, 2008: Journal of 
sociology). This was accelerated by unemployment as well as high under-unemployment and 
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later conflict (1996 – 2006) in Nepal (Sharma Paudel, n.d.). Unstable government, repeated 
strikes and closure and investment unfriendly environment in Nepal cause further loss of 
confidence in Nepali youth. 
 
Tourism is the backbone of Nepal’s economy and it has been affected heavily by the 
insurgency. The reduction of foreign investment in tourism industries has seriously threatened 
Nepal’s  economy ( Gyawali, 2011; Upreti, 2006) with the political turmoil triggered by the 
violent revolution seeing the number of visitors in 2002 (275,468) falling to the level of 1990 
(254,885) (Bhattarai, Conway, & Shrestha, 2004; GoN, 2015). Moreover, because tourism is 
strongly linked with other Nepali industries, the downturn in the tourism negatively impacted 
up to 80 percent of other industries in the country (Pradhan, n.d.). In terms of lost output, 
between 1996 and 2006, Nepal lost US$315 million (Pradhan, n.d.). According to IDA,  
Roughly 3.9 million tourists arrived in Nepal by air in 1996 bringing with them 
foreign exchange worth 119 million in US dollars. Since then the tourist inflow in 
Nepal has declined steadily from one year to next. Since the 1996/97 tourist 
seasons, tourist arrivals have decreased by one-half, largely due to the insurgency. 
The flow of foreign exchange into Nepal has likewise decreased (I-46). 
 
The political arena in Nepal after the Maoist Insurgency (People’s War) has also significantly 
changed as successive post-2006 governments have failed to win people’s confidence. As 
Bhatta (2013) explains, the underlying causes of 10 years of Maoist insurgency (People’s 
War) remain unresolved and partly because time has generated more losers than winners. 
There might be many reasons behind this and one of them is that the new social contract 
constructed after 2006 political change could not embrace a common national identity. The 
old political class, for their part, has been abolished and the new political class has not been 
able to win people’s confidence.  
 
Since the insurgency some positive changes have occurred; the oppressed ethnic, indigenous, 
Dalits and women have gained some position in the society. Nepal functioned under the caste 
system for centuries but the insurgency helped lower caste people rise up to claim their social 
rights. As a result, the domination of upper caste over lower castes has been minimized and 
special quotas have been provided in every sector by the Government, as well as in the 
private sectors, to enhance their level of life (Gyawali, 2009).  
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There has been a radical increase in the representation of the women in the Constitution 
Assembly. This has risen  from around 7%, 18 out of 265, in the 1999 elections to 32.27%, 
197 out of 601, in the CA elections in 2008 and 30%, 172 out of 575, in the CA elections in 
2013 (NEC, 1999, 2008, 2013). 
 
Nepal, as a patriarchal society allowed men to marry another woman if the first one died or 
did not give birth to children. In contrast, widows had to wear a white dress without any 
ornaments for the rest of her life, irrespective of her age. Since the uprising, traditional 
assumptions have shifted; widows can now wear colourful dresses and ornaments and 
remarry (Gyawali, 2009). The traditional assumptions that girls and women should be coy, 
docile, shy and fearful have faded away; their self-confidence and self-expression conveys 
that the ‘culture of silence’ has been broken to a large extent. As Shakya (2009) observes, 
Nepali women have succeeded in breaching the traditional patriarchal value system. The 
People’s War has thus contributed to eroding the hackneyed stereotype of women as passive 
and defenceless victims of armed violence (Arino, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND OF THE PEACE PROCESS 
 
3.1 The Ceasefire: The beginning of the Peace Process 
The People’s War was concluded in different steps through peace talks and the signing of the 
peace agreement. However, while the insurgency has ended and significant changes have 
occurred in Nepalese society through the dynamic of the peace process, peace has not yet 
been established.  
 
The restoration of peace required the resolution of conflict. The Government and Maoists had 
met, discussed and declared a ceasefire twice before beginning a negotiated peace process in 
2005; in 2001 and 2003 during the insurgency period (Pathak, 2005; BBC, 2006). The peace 
talks were facilitated and supported by internal as well as external powers including 
international government, non-governmental organisations (Mishra, 2004; Kelly, 2009; 
Lawoti and Pahari, 2009; Thapa, 2004; Ghimire, 2006; Vaughn cited in Kreuttner, 2013) 
India (Mishra, 2004; Dhungana, 2006) the United States of America (Meheta, 2004) and 
China (Hutt, 2004; Vaughn, 2006) were the  external powers as the mediators involved in the 
peace talks between two warring parties,  the Government and the Maoists (Communist Party 
of Nepal-Maoist). When the insurgency began, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
India supported the Nepalese government by providing helicopters, training and moral 
support to the Royal Nepal Army. (Kreuttner, 2013) These countries reduced their support 
and acted as the peace mediators after the King’s coup in 2005 (Upreti, 2010; Kreuttner, 
2013) claiming they opposed the King’s anti-democratic action (Vaughn cited in Kreuttner, 
2013). The Maoist and the main stream political parties then joined forces to oppose the 
King; this helped to bring about the peace talks, the signing of the peace agreement and the 
abolitions of the Constitutional Monarchy (Surhke, 2009).  
 
The peace talks occurred in different stages which ultimately brought the ceasefire and end of 
the insurgency in Nepal. 
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3.1.1 Stage I 
As the Chairman of the Maoist Party, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) stated on the 6th 
anniversary of the People’s War in February 2002, “We are ready to be involved in talks, 
dialogue, fronts or show some flexibility .... We have never closed the door for talks to find a 
political solution, and we will never do so in the future” (Thapa cited in Surhke, 2009, p.5). 
The Government and the Maoists declared a joint ceasefire on 23 July 2001 to discuss the 
establishment of peace. At the same time, Mr. Deuba, a senior leader of the Nepali Congress 
(NC) party, became the Prime Minister. Deuba, supported the talks and the Maoists 
welcomed him positively. Upreti (2006) argues that the Maoists declared a ceasefire when the 
new government led by Deuba was formed. They believed that they could use the ceasefire to 
negotiate their grievances with the new government.  The government and the Maoists held 
three meetings on 30 August, 11 September and 13 November, in 2001 (ibid).  
Table: 3.1 First Ceasefire Meeting  
 State Maoist 
Dialogue Team Mr. Chiranjibi Wagle- 
Coordinator 
Mr. Mahesh Acharya 
Mr. Bijaya Gacchedar 
Mr. Narahari Acharya 
Mr. Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara- Coordinator 
Mr. Top Bahadur Magar 
Mr. Agni Prasad Sapkota 
First Meeting 30 August 2001, Place: Godavari 
Second Meeting 11 September 2001, Place: Bardia 
Third Meeting 13 November 2001, Place: Gidavari 
Facilitators Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana 
Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar 
Break down By attacking on Army Barrack by Maoists 
(Source: IDA, 2005) 
 
The first meeting on the 30 August discussed the creation of a new constitution and the end 
of Constitutional Monarchy. The Maoists were ready to compromise on the question of the 
monarchy because of its popularity with the Nepalese people. The meeting concluded without 
any decisions made. At the second meeting on 11 September nothing was resolved except 
that a third meeting would be convened. In the third meeting on 13 November, the Maoist 
members were again ready to compromise on the issue of monarchy but they demanded that 
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an interim government be established and elections for a Constituent Assembly be held to 
draft a new constitution (Dahal, 2006, p. 9). The government wanted royal power to remain 
dominant but the Maoists rejected such an outcome. The Maoist talked about a multiparty 
parliamentary democracy which was non-negotiable for the existing government. These first-
stage negotiations failed because the parties could not reach a compromise on the future 
governance of Nepal (Shimkhada et al, 2005). 
 
3.1.2 Stage II 
Sagar Chettri representing the Maoists and Minister Narayan Singh Pun on behalf of 
Government signed a ceasefire agreement on 29 January, 2003 (Thapa, 2005) that initiated 
the second stage for the establishment of peace in Nepal. In this stage; four dialogues were 
held in April, May (twice) and August 2003. During these talks, the United Nations (UN) and 
some (I)NGOs- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Amnesty Nepal, Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue, Carter Centre, The European Union (EU) worked as facilitators 
and mediators to help in establishing the peace (Upreti, 2006).The UN official, Tamrat 
Samuel, an American was central to these negotiations (Whitfield, 2008) to communicate the 
conditions of the ceasefire and peace process between the Maoists and the Government.  
 Table: 3.2 Second Ceasefire Meeting 
 State Maoist 
Dialogue Team Mr. Narayan Singh Pun 
Dr. Upendra Devkota 
Mr. Badri Prasad Mandal 
Mrs. Anuradha Koirala 
Mr. Ramesh Nath Pandey 
Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani 
Mr. Kamal Thapa 
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai 
Mr. Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara 
Mr. Ram Bahadur Badal 
First Meeting 27 April 2003, Place: Kathmandu 
Second Meeting 9 May 2003, Place: Kathmandu 
Third Meeting 24 May 2003, Place: Dang 
Fourth Meeting 17-19 August 2003, Place: Dang 
Facilitators Mr. Karnadhoj Adhikari 
Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar 
Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana 
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Mr. Sailendra Upadhyaya 
Break down By killing high ranking Army official by Maoists 
(Source: IDA, 2005) 
 
During the ceasefire, both warring parties broke the codes of conduct. The state killed 80 
people and the Maoists killed 47 people (IDA, 2005). As a result, the Maoists ended the 
ceasefire in August 2003, stating that the Government failed to consider their demand of a 
new Constitutional Assembly. “The process was additionally complicated..., the position of 
the Maoists on their fundamental political issue of the Constituent Assembly had already 
become a make-or-break issue, comparable to the end of negotiations in November 2001” 
(Thapa, 2005, p.8).  
 
On the failure of the second stage peace talks, the political, social and economical situation 
worsened as resources were utilized to strengthen the military capacities of the opposing 
combatants (Simkhada et al, 2005) 
The Government utilized the ceasefire period to strengthen its military 
capabilities in terms of arms, intelligence, training and the physical 
identification of the Maoist leaders and cadres. In turn, Maoists utilized 
the opportunity to gain the release of their cadres from jail, force 
withdrawal of cases filed by the government against them on the court of 
law, expand public contact, promote their political agenda and recruit, 
train and mobilize additional militia (p.61). 
 
3.1.3 Stage III 
The third stage of the peace talks took place in 2005 when the Maoist called for a three month 
ceasefire from 3 September to 2 December. During the year, the King had seized all the 
powers of the state and the Maoist and parliamentary political parties united against the 
monarchy demanding a reconstruction of the country’s political order. As Surhke (2009) 
determined: 
On 1 February 2005, the King dissolved the parliament, imprisoned 
politicians, cracked down on the media, and declared an emergency... the 
Maoists and the mainstream political parties – now in opposition to the 
King ... Both stood to gain from a restructuring of the state. (p. 6) 
 
 A 12 point understanding, mediated by India, was finally agreed upon and signed by the 
Maoists along with seven participating political parties and the Nepali government on 22 
November 2005 in New Delhi, India (Thapa, 2005). It was supported by 
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International/National Non-Government Organisations ((I) NGOs) such as UN, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Amnesty International, Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue and Carter Centre, as well as Amnesty Nepal (Upreti, 2006). As this agreement says 
“it has become the need of the hour to establish peace by resolving the armed conflict being 
for the past 10 years through progressive political outlet……….the understanding has been 
reached…” (12 point understanding, 2005, p.1).  
 
The 12 points understanding included:  
 
1. The democracy, peace, prosperity, social advancement and independent, sovereign 
Nepal is the principal wish of all the Nepali people 
2. The agitating parties are fully committed to the fact that the existing conflict in the 
country can be resolved and that the sovereignty and the state powers can be vested 
completely in people only by establishing full democracy by restoring the parliament 
3. Firmly committed to establishing permanent peace by bringing the existing armed 
conflict in the country to an end through a progressive political outlet of the 
establishment of the full democracy by ending the autocratic monarchy and holding 
the constituent assembly election 
4. Commitment in institutionalization of governance, human rights and rule of law 
5. Commitment to create an environment to allow to return the displaced people 
6. Self-assessment and self-criticism of the past mistakes and weaknesses 
7. Not repeat such mistakes and weaknesses 
8. Respect the human rights and press freedom 
9. Election of municipality 
10. Commitment to protect the independence, sovereignty, geographical integrity and 
national unity of the country 
11. Invite all Nepali people to make the movement successful 
12. Investigate the inappropriate conduct that took place in the past by political parties 
 
The agreement clarified the issue of constituent assembly election, formation of a multiparty 
parliamentary system and the creation of a democratic constitutional monarchy. Wakugawa at 
el (2011) explained that "The parties had arrived at general principles of restructuring, issued 
in the form of a 12-point understanding that embraced constituent assembly elections, 
multiparty democracy and an end to autocratic monarchy".  The 12-point understanding 
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created the path for a final peace agreement:  the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) which 
provided a roadmap for further developments in the peace process. The 12 point 
understanding also fixed conditions between the insurgent parties and eased 
misunderstanding during the peace process (Capoccia &Daniel, 2007).  
 
The CPA that was signed on 21 November 2006 to  end  the People’s War proposed the 
following  objectives: a  constituent assembly, an  interim constitution, an  interim legislature,  
an interim government, local administration and policing,  a democratic constitutional 
monarchy,  the establishment of  human rights and transitional justice,  the management of 
arms and armies, and  principles of social and economical transformation (CPA Article, 
2006; Crisis Group, 2006).  The CPA also brought the Maoist rebels into the political 
mainstream (Pokhrel, 2015). 
 
3.2 Comprehensive Peace Accord and Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The 
Peace Process 
3.2.1 Comprehensive Peace Accord of Nepal: 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 21 November 2006 between the 
Nepal Government and the Maoists commited all signatories “to create an atmosphere where 
the Nepali people can enjoy their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and … 
to ensuring that such rights are not violated under any circumstances in the future” (CPA 
Article7.1.2). This includes political-economy andsocial transformations in the development 
of country as well as in peace building (CPA, 2006). 
 
The CPA 2006 states in its preamble that its aim is “Reaffirming full commitment towards 
the 12-points Understanding, the 8-points Agreement reached between the Seven Political 
Parties and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN Maoist), the 25-points Code of 
Conduct agreed between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist), the decisions of 
the meeting of high level leaders of the Seven Political Parties and the CPN (Maoist) held on 
November 8, 2006 including all agreements, understandings, code of conducts concluded 
between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist)”.  
 
The CPA committed to end the war and establish long term peace in the country. As it states 
in the End of War section: 
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6.2 The decision taken by the meeting of high level leaders of the Seven Political 
Parties and the CPN (Maoist) on November 8, 2006 shall be the main policy basis 
for long term peace. 
 
According to the CPA, the interim government established the Interim Constitution Draft 
Committee in 2007. It consisted of Nepalese experts in constitution, democracy and 
parliamentary laws who were appointed by the interim government and drafted the Interim 
Constitution of Nepal 2007 (ICG, 2007). This was the first step in the peace process 
following the CPA.  The Interim Constitution and its amendments established a federal state 
with a president, as head of state to replace the monarch and a transition from a Hindu state to 
a secular one. The interim constitution provided for formerly marginalised groups to be 
represented on a proportional basis in the new political and state institutions (Tamang, 2012). 
 
The CPA was also crucial in developing other agreements such as those monitoring the 
management of weapons of the state and the Maoist insurgents, and the establishment of the 
constitutional assembly election. The discussion on the monitoring and management of arms 
was held on 8 December 2006 in presence of the UN representative, Mr Tamrat Samuel 
(Whitfield, 2008). The Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies 
(AMMAA) was signed by the Maoist leadership and the Government on 26 Nov 2006 and 
was witnessed by the UN representative Ian Martin. This agreement gave the UN oversight in 
the monitoring the management of weapons and was a guarantee for the fundamental right of 
Nepalese people to live in peace and to vote in the Constituent Assembly (CA) election 
(www.southasiaanalysis.org).  Temporary 28 cantonments were built for 19,602 former 
Maoist combatants (People’s Liberation Army) in southern Nepal and were monitored by the 
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) until the former combatants were integrated into 
society and the Nepal Army (GTZ, 2010). In total, 17,052 insurgents actually participated in 
this UNMIN and the Army Integration Special Committee (ASISC) process for the 
verification.  1,444 Maoist combatants were incorporated into the national Army while 
15,602 ex-combatants voluntarily “retired” (Upreti, 2011; Shah, 2012; Hamal, 2013; Subedi, 
2013). Although only a few Maoist combatants were incorporated into the Nepal Army, it 
was an achievement of the peace process. After the cease fire agreement, most of the Maoist 
insurgents voluntarily retired and were given a cash payment (Subedi, 2013). Officially, the 
formal process of integration and reintegration was concluded in 2013.                       
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Another fundamental aspect of the CPA program was the first election of a constitution 
assembly with First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) method which was held on 10 April 2008. The 
Maoist party candidates won 220 out of the 606 places on the assembly. This represented the 
largest number of places of any of the parties in the assembly (Newman, 2008). For the first 
time, this constituent assembly was to draft a constitution in Nepal (CCD, 2009). However, 
the constitutional assembly failed to deliver a new constitution and was dissolved because of 
political differences over the delineation of a federated state, which included questions 
around identity politics and communal tensions (Hachchethu, 2014). Another constitutional 
assembly election (II) was held on 19 November 2013 to prepare a new constitution. In this 
election, "... the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) remained in the third position with 26 seats 
under the FPTP category" (NEOC, 2013, p.43). 
  
The CA (II) established five committees on Friday, 28 March 2014 to expedite the drafting of 
a new constitution.  They were divided into the Constitutional Political Dialogue and 
Consensus Committee, the Constitution Documents Study and Determination Committee, the 
Constitution Drafting Committee, the Civil Relations and Constitution Suggestion 
Committee, and the Capacity Enhancement and Resources Management Committee 
(Gorkhapatra, March 29, 2014; Ranjitkar, 2014).  Disagreement over issues relating to 
federalism, such as the number, name and demarcation were not resolved (Tiwari, 2014). In 
the mean time on 8 June 2015, the major four political parties- NC, UML, UCPN (Maoist) 
(United Communist Party of Nepal) and Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (Democratic) 
finally struck a deal on post monarchy constitution drafting, deferring some of the 
contentious issues to be decided later. Ending years of political uncertainty, they agreed to 
federate the country into eight provinces and promulgate a constitution, leaving the issues of 
names to be decided later by a two-thirds majority of the state assembly of respective 
provinces. They also agreed to form a Federal Commission to delineate the boundaries of the 
federal provinces; of the 30 parties in the alliance, 17 different parties as well as the Rastriya 
Prajatantra Party (Nepal) and the fractions of Maoist party were against these decisions so 
was not passed by the constituent assembly (Setopati, 2015).  
 
3.2.2 Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Nepal: 
 
The establishment of TRC in Nepal was a long process. According to the CPA 2006, Article 
5.2.5, the TRC was to be established (Government of Nepal, 2006) in 2007. Despite the CPA 
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advocating for a TRC, various political power struggles, Nepal’s culture of impunity, the 
rejection of international criticism terming it as foreign interference, and the military 
contravening the Supreme Court orders have delayed its establishment (Anderson, 2014).   
The evolution of Nepal’s TRC has been described as: 
 
The genesis of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is less clear. Some fairly 
close observers were surprised to see the provisions for a truth commission in the 
CPA, not having heard of extensive discussion on the subject. Moreover, a senior 
advisor to the peace secretariat noted that there was no mention of a TRC in the 
first four drafts of the CPA. However, national members and international 
advisors to the peace secretariat recalled that forming a TRC had been informally 
discussed by both the peace secretariat and its task force. This discussion was 
initially fuelled by the interest of the [National Congress party] members of the 
government in forming a long-term mechanism to address past violations— which 
they assumed had been largely committed by the Maoists. In the beginning, the 
Maoists did not easily accept the suggestion to form a TRC, maintaining that the 
names of the disappeared should first be published. (Farasat & Hayner, 2009, 
p.20) 
 
The summit meeting on 8 November 2006 was the first to mention a high-level commission 
to investigate disappearances (Torne, 2013) and a TRC. According to this summit agreement: 
  
I.2 A high-level commission shall be constituted to investigate and make public 
the whereabouts of citizens reported to have been disappeared by the State and the 
Maoists in the past. 
 
IV.4 A high-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be constituted on 
the basis of consensus for establishing the facts on those involved in gross 
violation of human rights and those who committed crimes against humanity in 
the course of the armed conflict and for creating an environment of reconciliation 
in society. 
 
The commitment to resolve questions surrounding the disappeared was set out under the 
heading “Situation Normalization Measures” in the “Ceasefire” section: 
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5.2.3 Both sides agree to make public within 60 days of the signing of the 
agreement information about the real name, caste and address of the people 
‘disappeared’ or killed during war and inform the family about it. 
 
5.2.5 Both sides agree to set up a High-level Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission through mutual agreement in order to investigate truth about people 
seriously violating human rights and involved in crimes against humanity, and to 
create an environment of reconciliation in the society. 
 
 
7.1.3 Both sides express the commitment that impartial investigation and action 
would be carried according to law against people responsible for creating 
obstructions to the exercise of the rights envisaged in the letter of agreement and 
ensure that impunity will not be tolerated. Apart from this, they also ensure the 
right of the victims of conflict and torture and the family of disappeared to obtain 
relief. 
 
7.3.2 Both sides, fully respecting the individual’s right to freedom and security, 
will not keep anyone under arbitrary or illegal detention, commit kidnapping or 
hold captive. Both sides agree to make public the status of every individual 
“disappeared” and held captive and inform about this to their family members, 
legal advisors and other authorized people. 
 
The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007) obligated the government to set in place a 
relief program for the families of victims of enforced disappearance. According to Interim 
constitution 2007, article 33, the responsibilities of the state in the sector of TRC included: 
 
(p) To make arrangements for appropriate relief, recognition and rehabilitation for 
the family of the deceased persons, the disabled and helpless persons due to injury 
during the course of armed conflict. 
 
(q) To provide relief to the families of the victims on the basis of the report of the 
Investigation Commission constituted to investigate the cases of disappearances 
made during the course of the conflict. 
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(s) To constitute a high-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate 
the facts regarding grave violations of human rights and crimes against humanity 
committed during the course of conflict, and create an atmosphere of 
reconciliation in the society. 
 
In June 2007, a decision of the Supreme Court of Nepal ordered the government to enact 
special laws to criminalize enforced disappearance, to form a commission to determine the 
whereabouts of disappeared persons, and provide interim relief to victims’ families (Writ No. 
3575, Supreme Court decision (June 1, 2007); none of these were implemented. In May 2007 
the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction formed a Working Group mandated to draft 
legislation necessary to establish a TRC according to CPA 2006, Article 5.2.5.(Amnesty, 
2007) A Bill  “The TRC Bill” was made for making provisions relating to Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and was finalized in July in the same year. Similarly, the act was 
also prepared as TR Act 2007 (TRC Act 2064, section 3, 27). 
 
Around the same time, in mid-2007, the Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation (MoPR) 
circulated a first draft of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Bill, 2064 (2007). 
Under that draft legislation, the TRC was to examine human rights violations that had 
occurred between 13 February 1996 and 21 November 2006 (TR Act, 2007). The 
commission was to have the power to recommend amnesties if the perpetrator submitted an 
amnesty application showing regret for “the misdeeds carried out” during the armed conflict 
(ibid). A person who was “found to have committed gross violation of human rights or crime 
against humanity” could receive an amnesty recommendation if those crimes were committed 
“in course of abiding by his/ her duties or with the objective of fulfilling political motives.” 
Although the amnesty provision had caveats that amnesty could not be recommended for 
murder, inhumane treatment, torture, or rape, their inclusion created enormous mistrust and 
resistance among civil society and victims’ groups (Amnesty, 2007; ICTJ, 2011).  
 
The language on amnesties in the first draft, and future variations reflects the text of the 
legislation that established the South African TRC (Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation, 1995) but in a simplified manner, omitting the requirements set by the South 
African law for the consideration of an amnesty petition. In particular, the South African law 
is meticulous in the definition of what a “political objective” may be and what conditions 
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could become grounds for an amnesty; these definitions were not included in the Nepali TRC 
drafts. 
 
In November 2008, a Maoist-led government made public a bill on Enforced Disappearances 
(Crime and Punishment), and then issued it unilaterally as an ordinance in 2009 while 
parliament was in recess. Nonetheless that ordinance expired before implementation, due to a 
lapse of time. Various additional drafts of separate bills on a Commission on Investigation of 
Disappeared Persons (CIDP) and a TRC followed, but none became law. According to the 
proposed TRC Act-2008, its aim was to investigate the truth about grave human rights 
violations, bring the facts to the public, bring the perpetrators of such incidents to justice, 
rehabilitate and compensate victims of such crimes, end impunity, ensure that such acts did 
not happen again in the future, and prepare an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation by 
encouraging goodwill, cooperation and fraternity between the perpetrators and victims. The 
process of establishing a TRC in Nepal was begun as per the provision in Article 5.2.5 of the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord through the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act”. 
Similarly a parallel commission related to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission but more 
specifically dealing with the finding of disappeared individuals was provisioned for in Article 
5.2.3 of the CPA. The time duration was provisioned to be two years from the date of the 
creation of the commission which could be extended by one year (NSNM, 2011). 
 
In August 2012, the President promulgated an ordinance on the recommendation of the 
Council of Ministers as there was no legislature- parliament, pursuant to sub-clause (1) of 
article 88 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007. This promulgation was to establish a 
“Commission on the Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation,” and to 
merge the functions of both the TRC and the COID (Ordiance-8, 2013). This combined 
approach suffered from the “the same critical problems from the original bills and in some 
aspects, like the amnesty provisions, worsened them” (ICTJ, 2014, p.82). Civil society 
advocates resisted the move and litigated before the Supreme Court against its 
implementation, citing constitutional grounds (Supreme Court order 069-WS-0057, 2013).  
On 14 March 2013, President Ram Baran Yadav passed an ordinance creating a TRC. On 1 
April 2013, the Supreme Court suspended the ordinance from taking effect Commission due 
to numerous problems with the mandate and the structure of the Commission (ijrcenter.org, 
2013).  
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In 2013, ordinance was again given to establish the CIDP and TRC. The Ordinance invoked 
considerable criticism from Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNOHCHR), (OHCHR, 2012, 2013) national and international NGOs (Human 
Rights Watch, 2013) for its failure to comply with international legal standards and was in 
part, struck down by the Supreme Court of Nepal in January 2014 (Supreme Court, 2014). In 
its judgement, the Supreme Court ordered the establishment of two commissions, on truth 
and reconciliation and on enforced disappearances, with the enactment of new laws to 
exclude the possibility of amnesty for serious human rights violations and the criminalization 
of serious human rights violations as specific offences within domestic law (ibid). 
On 25 April 2014, more than seven years after the People’s War, the Supreme Court of Nepal 
passed a decree to establish the TRC (Anderson, 2014) that was first proposed in 2006. The 
Bill was presented to and passed by Nepal’s Parliament for the Commission on Investigation 
of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Act 2014. 
The Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Act 
2014 is Nepal’s latest attempt to establish a transitional programme to respond to conflict and 
human rights abuses that occurred during the People’s War. In part, the Act remedies the 
inadequacies of the 2013 Ordinance. It creates two commissions, on truth and reconciliation 
and enforced disappearances, makes provision for the establishment of a Special Court to try 
past abuses and incorporates systems to enable vulnerable witnesses to participate in truth 
seeking (Bisset, 2014). According to this Act-2014, the commission has powers: 
 To find out and publish the incident of the grave violation of human rights committed 
in the course of the armed conflict between the State Party and the then Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist) from 13 February 1996 to 21 November 2006 and of the 
persons involved in those incidents upon realizing the essence and spirit of the Interim 
Constitution of Nepal, 2007 and the comprehensive peace accord 
 To create an environment conducive for sustainable peace and reconciliation by 
enhancing spirit of mutual good faith and tolerance in the society upon bringing about 
reconciliation 
 To provide for reparation to the victims 
 To make recommendation for legal actions against those who were involved in the 
serious offence related with those incidents. 
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The CIDP and TRC Act, 2014, under Section 13, stipulate the functions, duties and powers of 
the Commission as follow: 
 Investigate incidents of gross violations of human rights, find out and record the truth 
and public it for the general public 
 Identify victims and perpetrators of conflict 
 Endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators with 
their consent and bring about reconciliation 
 Make recommendation on reparation and/or compensation to be provided to the 
victims and their families 
 Make recommendation for legal action against perpetrators to whom amnesty is not 
granted and in cases where reconciliation is not reached 
 Provide the victims with identity card as prescribed and also provide them with 
information after completion of investigation. 
The term "gross violation of human rights" is defined in section 2 (j) of the CIDP and TRC 
Act, 2014 as follows: 
"Gross violation of human rights" means the following acts committed during the conflict 
targeted against unarmed person or civilian population or the following acts committed in a 
systematic manner: 
 Murder, 
 Abduction and taking of hostage, 
 Enforced disappearance, 
 Causing mutilation and disability, 
 Physical or mental torture, 
 Rape and sexual violence, 
 Looting, possession, damage or arson of private or public property, 
 Forced eviction from house and land or any other kind of displacement, and 
 Any kind of inhuman acts inconsistent with the international human rights or 
humanitarian law or other crimes against humanity. 
In February 2015, the long awaited TRC and CIDP in Nepal were finally formed nine years 
after signing the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), but upon shaky grounds. Section 22 
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gave the TRC powers to mediate between the victims and the perpetrators on the request of 
either party - the perpetrator or the victim. In addition, Section 26 stipulated that "the 
Commission shall not recommend for amnesty to the perpetrators involved in rape and other 
crimes of serious nature in which the Commission follows the investigation and does not find 
sufficient reasons and grounds for amnesty.” Therefore, the Commission could recommend 
amnesty for all crimes under its jurisdiction if sufficient reason and grounds were found. 
These provisions have now been annulled by the Supreme Court on 26 February 2015. This is 
a promising step forward in the delayed process of recognition of the victim’s concerns (Jha, 
2015). The commissions are expected to deliver victim-centric justice but such outcomes 
remain undecided. In the nine months since being established, interaction programs on the 
activities of the TRC with representatives of Government offices, civil society and 
journalists, and conflict victims have been undertaken in 20 of 75 districts in Nepal, and 
separately conducted by the office bearers of the Commission (www.trc.gov.np). 
 
According to CPA-2006, the peace process was to complete three major tasks; reintegrate the 
Maoist ex-combatants, construct a federated secular state and draft a new constitution 
(Subedi, 2013).  Of these tasks, only the reintegration of the Maoist ex-combatants had been 
achieved by 2015. The other tasks remain unaccomplished despite nine years passing since 
the signing of the CPA.  
 
Successive post-2006 governments have failed to win the Nepali people’s confidence (Bhatta, 
2013). The 12 point understanding has, paradoxically, only deepened the instability and 
uncertainty in the country (Ghimire, 2012). Points like a new constitution, construction of a 
federated secular state, development of the country’s political economy and the Nepalese 
people’s welfare have been bypassed in the peace process (Marquette & Beswick, 2011). 
Bhatta (2013) states, there has been a remarkable increase in other countries’ influence on 
Nepalese politics after the insurgency and the palace coup. As a result, current Nepali 
political leaders are influenced especially by India (Muni, 2012). India provides scholarships 
to the children of political leaders including the Maoists (Irrespective of their competency) as 
well as those of high profile bureaucrats and, civil society elites; they will act in India’s 
interests in Nepal (Bhatta, 2013).  No current political parties and/or leaders are focussed on 
the peace process in Nepal and at present the parties involved in the peace process are 
unwilling to find any resolution to the ongoing problems through negotiation. There should 
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be a comprehensive outline to guide and enact an egalitarian peace-making process. The 
unstable Nepalese government is unable to maintain peace in Nepal and the negotiations of 
the peace process are protracted if not paralysed. 
 
Scholarly research has examined the causes and effects of the conflict in Nepal but the peace 
process and/or why it remains unfinished as well as the role of institutions like TRC has been 
little examined. This thesis identifies the peace process in Nepal as a gap in the existing 
scholarly research. This study attempts to examine the role of TRC for social peace and the 
peace process in Nepal from case studies of S. Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone. It suggests a 
more suitable and acceptable role for the TRC in the peace process for the future of the 
Nepali people which is essential for a permanent peace and social betterment.  
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CHAPTER 4: An overview of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
the peace process 
 
4.1 Introduction of the TRC 
 
Throughout history, people of the world have been inflicted and witnessed atrocities against 
one another. In response, international governments have demonstrated a preference for war 
tribunals such as those at Nuremberg in Germany following World War II. After the 1950s, 
the retribution and war tribunals shifted toward truth and reconciliation commissions to 
facilitate restorative justice with this shift being most common among transitional 
governments (DeMinck, 2007). The first such commission was Argentina's National 
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, created by President of Argentina Raúl 
Alfonsín on 15 December 1983 that documented human rights violations under the military 
dictatorship. The report was delivered to Alfonsín on 20 September 1984 and opened the 
door to the Trial of the Juntas, the first major trial held for war crimes since the Nuremberg 
trials, and the first to be conducted by a civilian court (El Pais, 1985). 
 
Since 1973, more than 20 “truth commissions” have been established around the globe with 
the majority, 15 in number, created between 1974 and 1994 (Avruch & Vejarano, 2001). The 
term “truth commission” has come to be generally applied to bodies that officially investigate 
a past pattern of abuses (Hayner, 2001) while the term “truth and reconciliation commission” 
is a recently developed notion that has gained popularity based on the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (ibid). Truth commissions are different from other forms of 
transitional justice as they have certain characteristics that make them unique. These include 
i) focusing on the past and the future instead of the present in the potential development of 
the society; ii) investigating a pattern of abuses over a particular, defined period of time, 
rather than a specific event or a state’s entire history; iii) are temporary in nature, most 
typically lasting only six months to two years; iv) culminate in the submission or publication 
of a report documenting its findings; and v) are officially sanctioned, authorized, or 
empowered by the newly formed and developing state, and occasionally also, by the armed 
opposition if such an arrangement is negotiated in the peace or transition agreement (Hayner, 
2001). 
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In the history of TRC, the naming is dependent on the country’s circumstances as well as the 
functions of it. TRCs in different countries have had different name and functions. For 
example; 
Table 4.1 The TRC from different countries with functions 
S.N. Country Name of TRC Functions 
1 Argentina National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons 
(Comisión Nacional sobre la 
Desaparición de Personas) 
Investigating the human 
rights violations, forced 
disappearances 
2 Brazil The non-punitive National 
Truth Commission (Comissão 
Nacional da Verdade) 
victims or people accused of 
violations 
3 Canada The Indian Residential 
Schools Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
investigating the human 
rights abuses 
4 Colombia The National Commission for 
Reparation and 
Reconciliation (Comisión 
Nacional de Reparación y 
Reconciliación) 
help victims to recover from 
the armed conflict 
5 Chile The National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
(Comisión Nacional de 
Verdad y Reconciliación) 
investigating deaths and 
disappearances 
6 Czech Republic The Office for the 
Documentation and the 
Investigation of the Crimes of 
Communism (Úřad 
dokumentace a vyšetřování 
zločinů komunismu) 
investigating criminal acts 
from the period 1948-1989 
7 Ecuador The Truth Commission (La 
Comisión de la Verdad) 
investigating the violation 
of human rights 
8 El Salvador The Commission on the Truth 
for El Salvador (Comisión de 
la Verdad para El Salvador) 
investigating murders and 
executions committed 
9 Fiji Reconciliation and Unity 
Commission. 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
10 Ghana National Reconciliation 
Commission 
Investigating the human 
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rights violations 
11 Guatemala Historical Clarification 
Commission (Comisión para 
el Esclarecimiento Histórico) 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
12 Haiti The Haitian National Truth 
and Justice Commission. 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
13 Kenya Waki Commission; The 
Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission 
of Kenya 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
14 Liberia Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
15 Morocco Equity and Reconciliation 
Commission (IER) 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
16 Nepal Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
Finding truth and helping in 
reconciliation 
17 Panama Truth Commission (Comisión 
de la Verdad). 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
18 Paraguay Truth and Justice 
Commission (Comisión de 
Verdad y Justicia). 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
19 Peru Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Comisión de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación). 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
20 Poland Institute of National 
Remembrance. 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
21 Philippines Philippine Truth Commission 
of 2010 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
22 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
23 Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Solomon 
Island) 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
24 S. Africa Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
25 S. Korea Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
26 Sri Lanka Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation Commission. 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
27 East Timor Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation in 
Investigating the human 
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East Timor (Comissão de 
Acolhimento, Verdade e 
Reconciliação de Timor 
Leste; 2001–2005); 
Indonesia–Timor Leste 
Commission of Truth and 
Friendship (2005–2008). 
rights violations 
28 Tunisia Truth and Dignity 
Commission (2014) 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
29 Uganda Uganda Commission of 
Inquiry into Violations of 
Human Rights (1986-1994) 
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
30 Ukraine Ukrainian National 
Remembrance Institute  
Investigating the human 
rights violations 
(Source: Robert & Thompson, 2000) 
 
Most commissions have been named Truth and Reconciliation but some have not. Czech 
Republic, for example, named the commission “The Office for the Documentation and the 
Investigation of the Crimes of Communism”, Guatemala the “Historical Clarification 
Commission”, Poland the “Institute of National Remembrance”, Sri Lanka the  “Lessons 
Learnt and Reconciliation Commission”, Uganda the “Uganda Commission of Inquiry into 
Violations of Human Rights” and in the Ukraine the “Ukrainian National Remembrance 
Institute” (Table No. 4.1). 
The term truth and reconciliation commission has increasingly been used to generically 
describe all truth commissions (Hayner, 2001). Some scholars argue however that the term is 
misleading and inaccurate because many truth commissions have not held “reconciliation” as 
a primary goal of their work and have not assumed that reconciliation would result. 
Reconciliation has been an explicit goal in several truth commissions (Chile, South Africa, 
Peru, and Sierra Leon), an implied goal in most others, and deemed “impractical and 
unattainable” in a few states (Argentina and Sri Lanka) (Connolly, 2006). However, some 
sort of reconciliation or restorative truth-finding has been central to the majority of these 
bodies and has been used as a justification for implementing a truth commission instead of 
other types of transitional justice (ibid). In fact, the possibility of holding a truth commission 
is often one of the terms discussed and brokered in the peace negotiations leading up to 
societal transitions (Hayner, 2001). A truth commission is not however, a substitute for 
formal justice. Rather it is a complementary initiative (CIDA, n.d.). As such a truth 
commission is one of the larger programs of justice that is widely perceived as essential and 
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important for effective peace building in a transitional or post-conflict environment of a 
country.   
Truth commissions are generally established to investigate a past history of violations of 
human rights in a particular country. These might include violations by the military, other 
government forces or armed opposition forces/ rebellions. Generally, a truth commission is 
established soon after the governmental transition in order to aid this process because with 
the passage of time witnesses and evidence will only become more difficult to find 
(Migyirka, 2008).  
 
Truth commissions can be established by different types of authorities.  Sometimes they are 
created by the new executive branch of government or by an executive order of the state’s 
President (Bronkhorst, 2006), for example, the National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation in Chile was created by presidential decree and completed its work in 1990-
1991.  In other states, such as South Africa, the country’s legislative body voted to establish 
the truth commission which worked from 1995 to 1998 (ibid). Still other truth commissions 
have been created under the auspices of an intergovernmental organization, such as the UN in 
El Salvador (1992-1993) and Guatemala (1997-1999) (ibid).  
 
The usual philosophy behind establishing a TRC is a belief in the healing power of truth, as a 
tangible report of the history of abuses is published and disseminated widely for people to 
understand (Aning & Jaye, 2011). It is considered that a massive violation of human rights is 
more than a crime - it is an abuse of human dignity therefore it needs resolution that the 
courts alone cannot provide. The TRC process therefore contributes to finding justice for the 
victims and their families by publicly admitting the atrocity in all its detail while allowing 
room for those involved to give their testimony and help them move forward. It is when truth 
is acknowledged and justice is sought that reconciliation within a society can occur (Clark, 
2008).  
The concept of reconciliation adopted by TRCs is that ultimately, reconciliation is the work 
of civil society, not the government or the courts. As such, there is no defined format that 
truth commissions must follow; the committees can conduct closed-door interviews, or public 
hearings, which everyone can attend. There can be a formal courtroom-like atmosphere, or a 
much more casual, informal setting resembling a round table discussion. Further, and unlike a 
court of law, the truth committee accepts the victims’ story as truth without requiring further 
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inquiries or evidence, or conducting thorough investigations into each case brought before 
them (Migyirka, 2008). 
In the most general sense of the term, a TRC is an official body set up to investigate a pattern 
of past human rights abuses (ibid) and mandated to produce a formal record of past violations 
of humanitarian and/or human rights law committed by a previous regime and/or non-state 
actor(s) in a defined period of recent passed time. A TRC holds that the exposure of the truth 
regarding human rights abuses, as perpetrated by the previous regime, may help to 
psychologically heal the victims and their families of such abuses and assist with the process 
of reconciliation (Laakso, 2003). It is only after psychological healing takes place that 
previously warring parties can come together in a spirit of reconciliation (Mendeloff, 2004). 
Reconciliation, meaning the bringing together of previously opposing parties, is a recognized 
means of reckoning with state‐sponsored atrocity (Sarkin & Daly, 2004), the success of 
which might be measured by an overall feeling of peace amongst a nation’s citizens 
(Gentilucci, 2005).  
 
Although TRCs investigate the past, they are as much about looking forward as back because 
they are part of an attempted social transformation to bring about a more peaceful society in 
the near future. They complement, but do not substitute, courts of law, and primarily, they 
focus on the most serious human rights violations such as "disappearances," extra judicial and 
summary executions, and torture (CIDA, n.d.). Tina (1995) points out that truth commissions 
are usually established by transitional governments who have replaced repressive regimes 
after a period of widespread violence, state terror, or ethnic conflict. Transitional here is in 
the case of democracy and rule of law. Hayner (2001) adds that after war nothing less than a 
focus on the future peace and democracy of a country is needed. This can be facilitated 
through the impartial and good work of a TRC although the extent of their success can be 
limited, for example, while societal reconciliation is an often-professed goal of truth 
commissions, it is almost always beyond the reach of a TRC on its own (Brahm, 2004). 
 
Many legal institutions can play a central part in dealing with past atrocities in newly 
established democracies. Besides criminal trials, TRCs have become a frequently used tool to 
investigate past human rights abuses (Hayner 1994). Although they are not the institutions of 
law enforcement, most have quasi-judicial functions. For example, the most sophisticated 
TRC to date, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, can be compared with 
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a court that cannot pass sentence, but can grant or refuse amnesty to perpetrators of gross 
human rights violations (Theissen, 1999). Instead of making recommendations for 
prosecution, a truth commission does not normally have the power to prosecute. Usually, a 
TRC does not even identify the witnesses. Often, the perpetrators of the abuses can be 
granted amnesty by a truth commission. Consequently, there can be a conflict between 
finding the truth and administering justice. The ability of a truth commission to conduct and 
complete its mission successfully depends on the resources at its disposal (Brahm, 2004). 
 
4.2 Characteristics and objectives of the TRC: 
Effective truth commissions are based on certain principles and possess core characteristics 
that are common across all contexts. The three major principles on which truth commissions 
are based are: 
 
They are considered a neutral enterprise by all stakeholders. 
They conduct their activities impartially. 
They only focus on past abuses and violations (CIDA, n.d.).  
 
Similarly, TRCs have four main goals:  
 they seek to contribute to transitional peace by creating an authoritative record of 
what happened;  
 providing a platform for the victims to tell their stories and obtain some form of 
redress;   
 recommending legislative, structural or other changes to avoid a repetition of past 
abuses; and  
 establishing who was responsible and providing a measure of accountability for the 
perpetrators (Popkin & Arriaza, 1995).  
Most truth commissions produce a public report containing information gathered from 
victims, and in some cases perpetrators, as well as recommendations to enhance justice and 
reconciliation (Bronkhorst, 2006). Additionally, many truth commissions are created to 
examine relatively recent events or a period of events ending in the recent past; usually occur 
at the point of or just after a full-scale political transition; typically investigate politically 
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motivated acts, such as politically targeted human rights abuses and repression that was used 
to obtain or maintain political power and discourage potential political challenges; and 
examine widespread abuses, usually including thousands of cases or a large section of the 
state’s population  (Hayner, 2001). Many truth commissions are also intentionally designated 
to be a central feature of the state’s transition program from one form of government to 
another or from a period of violence, such as civil war, to a period of peace (ibid). 
 
In history, the majority of truth commissions have been established by the national 
government of the affected country. A number of other bodies have also been created to serve 
similar functions of investigating past human rights violations. In some instances, NGOs have 
created their own truth commissions where governments have failed to create one. The 
Archbishop of Sao Paulo, for example, with the support of the World Council of Churches, 
investigated human rights abuses under Brazil's military regime when the government refused 
to act on their calls for a formal inquiry (Brahm, 2004). Further, truth commissions need not 
be national in scope. The Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project in North 
Carolina created a TRC in May 2004 to examine racially motivated killings by the Ku Klux 
Klan and the American Nazi Party in 1979 (Magarrell & Gutlerrez, 2006).   
Some “Commissions of Inquiry” with “Truth and Reconciliation” commissions are as 
follows:  
 
Table 4.2 The TRC from different countries with their dates and some references 
S.N. Country Established in Sponsored by Reference 
1 El Salvador 1992-1993 UN  
2 Rwanda 1993 NGO  
3 Paraguay 1976 NGO  
4 S. Africa 1992 African National 
Congress (ANC) 
During anti-Apartheid struggle 
  1993 ANC  
  1995 Parliament After Apartheid, report in 1998 
5 Argentina 1983-1984 Government Published in UK and USA too 
6 Bolivia 1982-1984 Government Disbanded without issuing a 
final report 
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7 Uruguay 1985 Government  
8 Zimbabwe 1985 Government Report never publicly released 
9 Chile 1990-1991 Government  
10 Chad 1991-1992 Government  
11 Germany 1992-1994 Government  
12 Guatemala 1997-1999 Government  
13 Haiti 1995-1996 Government  
14 Nigeria 1999 Government  
15 Philippines 1986 Government Report never completed 
16 Sierra Leone 1999 Government  
17 Uganda 1974  Government  
  1986-1995 Government  
18 Brazil 1986 Government  
19 East Timor 1999-2000 Government  
20 Ethiopia 1993-2000 Government  
21 Honduras 1993 Government  
(Source:  Hayner (1994, 2001), Kritz (1995), Popkin (2000), Popkin and Roht-Arriaza (1995) 
  
The sense of justice facilitate is one of several forms of “transitional justice” often employed 
soon after a nation has changed governing regimes, most often from some form of tyranny to 
some form of democracy.  
Different TRCs have been mandated for different durations of time to run and complete their 
task throughout the history. Some of them are as follows: 
Table 4.3 The TRC from some countries with their duration 
S.N. Country Duration 
1 Argentina 2 years 
2 Bolivia 2 years 
3 Chad 1 year and 5 months 
4 Chili 9 months 
5 El Salvador 8 months 
6 Peru 2 years and 1 month 
7 Rwanda Since 1999 to present  
8 Ghana 1 year and 9 months 
9 Haiti 11 months 
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10 Liberia 3 years and 4 months 
11 Nigeria 2 years and 11 months 
12 Sierra Leone 2 years 
13 South Africa 7 years 
14 Timor-Leste (East Timor) 3 years and 9 months 
15 Uruguay 2 years 
(Source: USIP, 2011) 
4.3 Functions of the TRC: 
To achieve its objectives, a TRC shall: 
 facilitate, and where necessary initiate or coordinate, inquiries into: 
o gross violations of human rights, including violations which were part of a 
systematic pattern of abuse; 
o the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights, including the 
antecedents, circumstances, factors, context, motives and perspectives which 
led to such violations; 
o the identity of all persons, authorities, institutions and organizations involved 
in such violations; 
o the question whether such violations were the result of deliberate planning on 
the part of the State or a former state or any of their organs, or of any political 
organization, liberation movement or other group or individual; 
o accountability, political or otherwise, for any such violation; 
 facilitate, and initiate or coordinate, the gathering of information and the receiving of 
evidence from any person, including persons claiming to be victims of such violations 
or the representatives of such victims, which establish the identity of victims of such 
violations, their fate or present whereabouts and the nature and extent of the harm 
suffered by such victims; 
 facilitate and promote the granting of amnesty in respect of acts associated with' 
political objectives, by receiving from persons desiring to make a full disclosure of all 
the relevant facts relating to such acts, applications for the granting of amnesty in 
respect of such acts, and transmitting such applications to the Committee on Amnesty 
for its decision, and by publishing decisions granting amnesty in the Government 
Gazette; 
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 determine what articles have been destroyed by any person in order to conceal 
violations of human rights or acts associated with a political objective; 
 prepare a comprehensive report which sets out its activities and findings, based on 
factual and objective information and evidence collected or received by it or placed at 
its disposal; 
 make recommendations to the President with regard to: 
o the policy which should be followed or measures which should be taken with 
regard to the granting of reparation to victims or the taking of other measures 
aimed at rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of victims; 
o measures which should be taken to grant urgent interim reparation to victims; 
 make recommendations to the Minister with regard to the development of a limited 
witness protection programme for the purposes of the Act; 
 make recommendations to the President with regard to the creation of institutions 
conducive to a stable and fair society and the institutional, administrative and 
legislative measures which should be taken or introduced in order to prevent the 
commission of human rights violations.  
(Greiff, 2006) 
Truth and reconciliation commissions, unlike trials and historical commissions are the 
institutional models best equipped to promote reconciliation in a fractured society, if for no 
other reason than the fact that they are usually set up for this express purpose (Daly & Sarkin, 
2001). Although criminal trials may offer a significant sense of healing and satisfaction to 
victims, (Goldstone, 1996), their utility for reconciliation is doubtful. In fact, reconciliation 
may be the antithesis of prosecution (Daly & Sarkin, 2004). 
Daly and Sarkin (2004) claim that: 
[T]he relevance to reconciliation of trials, generally, is questionable, but the impact on 
reconciliation of international trials is surely minimal. The primary reason for this is 
that trials that take place outside the country are likely to have little effect on relations 
among people within the country. Even when international trials take place within the 
country, as in Sierra Leone, they are, by definition, conducted by foreigners – people 
who were not involved in the actual events (p.723). 
Moreover, truth commissions are far superior to private environs for the exchange of 
confession and forgiveness; as such an exchange takes place in a non‐confrontational and 
non‐dangerous environment (Schalkwyk, 2004). 
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The idea behind the truth commission is that after a period of severe human rights abuses, 
such as enforced disappearances or massacres, abductions and rape during civil war or 
military repression, a society needs a forum in which victims and their families, and 
witnesses can share their life experienced stories and begin the healing process. Furthermore, 
findings of truth commissions can become a permanent record of investigation, evidence and 
testimony that can later be used in courts and elsewhere as a reminder of the events of an era 
of human rights abuses (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2000). 
 
4.4 Composition of the TRC: 
The functions of a truth commission are highly dependent on the appointed commissioners 
since the primary objective of such a commission is to investigate the truth and provide 
justice according to its mandate and to preserve the evidence relating to human rights abuses. 
According to Migyikra (2008), to build credible evidence, a TRC must be independent and 
comprise competent and credible personnel or officials if a truth commission is to have moral 
authority (ibid). 
 
The issue of constructing a commission depends upon several factors like whom, who and 
how should commission members be appointed and what qualities they should possess. These 
selection criteria directly affect the functioning of a TRC hence; there are different 
possibilities to consider. For example, a commission can comprise solely of nationals of the 
country in question, as in the case of Bolivia, Argentina and Chile (Kritz, 1995). It can also be 
made up solely of foreigners who are well-known international figures as in El Salvador 
(Brahm, 2004). Alternatively, it can consist of both foreign personnel and nationals of the 
country in question, as happened in Haiti and Guatemala (Steiner, n.d). 
 
Whether the committee is formed by national or international characteristics, there are 
advantages and disadvantages to each approach. According to Migyikra (2008), an 
international commission may appear to be more objective and impartial than a national 
commission. This is due to the distance of its members from the events and the interests at 
stake, usually involving the participation to varying degrees, of an international organization, 
such as the UN, and the fact that the terms of its mandate have also been debated under the 
auspices of the UN (Hayner, 1994). In fact, the international nature of a commission may 
alienate some sections of society, who may see the commission’s activity as foreign 
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intervention or at least use it as an argument to discredit it. A criticism is that foreign 
commissioners are far less likely to have the same in-depth knowledge of the events to be 
investigated as commissioners from the country itself (APT, n.d.). Thus, there has been less 
truth commissions established with international assistance (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004).  
 
International support can be helpful however, particularly when domestic civil society and 
the government is weak. The Guatemalan and Salvadoran peace accords called for truth 
commissions under the auspices of the UN. The government of Burundi asked the UN to set 
up a commission of inquiry in 1995 because it did not feel strong enough to do so itself. In 
some cases, an international element has been necessary in situations where the state that 
previously existed has disintegrated, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia (Hayner, 1994). 
Commissions established by national government or the civil society can experience 
complete or partial failure, for example, Chad, Uganda, Philippines, and Bolivia did not have 
the necessary human and material resources and, in particular, did not have an adequate 
budget (Hayner, 1994). This was not the case for international commissions set up under the 
auspices of the UN (Avruch & Vejarano, 2001). However, whenever possible, setting up 
commissions which are wholly or partly national appears to be the best solution since it is a 
way of encouraging those engaged in establishing the rule of law and addressing impunity to 
assume their responsibilities and start making decisions for them (Migyikra, 2008). 
 
TRCs composed and established by the national government with civil society include those 
in Argentina, Bolivia, Chad, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, East Timor and 
Uganda-1986. The commission of Argentina was composed of thirteen commissioners: 
twelve men and one woman. Of them, ten were non-legislative members appointed by 
President Alfonsin and three were elected by Argentina’s legislative Chamber of Deputies of 
Congress (TRC, 1986). The Bolivian commission had an eight person panel which was 
headed by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior whereas the commission’s vice-
president was a representative of the legislative power. The commission also included 
representatives from the Human Rights Permanent Assembly and the “Association of 
Relatives of the Disappeared Detainees and Martyrs for National Liberation of Bolivia” 
(ASOFAMD). It had six additional staff, Carmen Loyola Guzman, head of the ASOFAMD, 
was the commission’s executive secretary (Hayner, 1994). The decree of Chad created the 
Chad’s commission of ten members and two secretaries as the members of the commission of 
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inquiry where one commissioner was female. It was chaired by Chad’s Chief Prosecutor 
Mahamat Hassan Abakar (INSEC, 2013). 
 
The National Reconciliation Commission of Ghana was comprised of nine Ghanian 
commissioners i.e.; six men and three women. It was chaired by Former Chief Justice K. E. 
Amua-Sekyi (Attafuah, 2004). In Morocco, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission was 
comprised of sixteen commissioners appointed by the king, but included only one woman. 
Driss Benzikri, a former political prisoner and human rights activist, chaired this commission. 
Five of the commissioners were former political prisoners, including two who had been 
exiled (Amnesty, 2004). The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission in Nigeria 
was comprised of eight commissioners where six men and two women. It was headed by 
Justice Chukwudifu Oputa and all the members were appointed by the President (Lamb, 
1999). The Peru TRC was comprised of twelve Peruvian commissioners which included ten 
men and two women, and chaired by Salomon Lerner Febres. All the members were 
appointed by the President with the approval of the Council of Ministers. The commission 
opened five regional offices to carry out its work (Cuya, 2008). 
 
According to Amnesty report (2009), the South African TRC was comprised of seventeen 
commissioners where nine men and eight women were participated. Anglican Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu chaired this commission. The commissioners were supported by 
approximately 300 staff members, divided into three committees as Human Rights Violations 
Committee, Amnesty Committee, and Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee (Amnesty, 
2009; Boraine, 2000). The East Timor commission was comprised of seven members of five 
men and two women. It was divided and included twenty-nine regional commissioners. A 
lawyer and human rights activist Aniceto Guterres Lopes chaired the commission (CAVR, 
n.d.). The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights of Uganda in 1986 was 
comprised of six commissioners, all male, and chaired by Ugandan Supreme Court Justice 
Arthur Oder (Quinn, 2004). 
 
Commissions established with international support were El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Uganda in 1974. The commission of El Salvador was comprised of three 
international commissioners, all men, appointed by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. The commission was chaired by former Colombian president Belisario Betancur 
(Thomas, 1994). Another commission composed of international persons was the Haiti TRC. 
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This commission was composed of seven members with five men and two women, including 
four Haitians and three internationals. It was chaired by Haitian Sociologist, Fracoise 
Boucard (Amnesty, 2004). 
 
The Liberian human rights activist and environmental lawyer Jerome Verdier chaired the 
Liberian commission which consisted of nine commissioners of four women and five men. A 
three-member International Technical Advisory Committee was provided for by the TRC Act 
i.e.; nominated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN 
high commissioner for human rights (TRC Act, 2006). Sierra Leone’s TRC comprised of 
seven commissioners: four men and three women, of whom four were Sierra Leoneans and 
three were internationals. It was chaired by Bishop Dr. Joseph Humper (ICTJ, 2002). The 
commission of Uganda in 1974 was comprised of four Ugandan nationals who were all men. 
It was chaired by an expatriate Pakistani judge, and included two Ugandan police 
superintendents and a Ugandan army officer (Carver, 1990; Hayner, 1994). 
 
4.5 Immunity, Power and Rules of Procedures of the TRC 
Most truth commissions have had the powers they needed to carry out their mission 
established, to some extent, through a series of guarantees contained in the enabling 
legislation (ICTJ, 2014). These guarantees include immunity for commissioners and 
protection for commission files, the power to request reports and testimony related to the 
investigations undertaken and the power to request or adopt preventive measures, either to 
protect victims or witnesses or to safeguard evidence (ibid). The most far-reaching powers 
existed in the South African TRC, where the Commission's report had concrete legal 
consequences in terms of whether the individuals investigated were amnestied or prosecuted 
(Hayner, 1994). 
 
The guarantees or the powers are important in determining if the commission can produce 
positive results, even in the most difficult situations. During establishing the investigative 
powers of any commissions, considerations should be given to contextual factors and 
situations. The Sábato Commission for example, had to do a great deal of its work abroad, 
receiving testimony from victims living outside of Argentina who, despite the return to 
constitutional government, had decided to remain in exile because they did not feel safe in 
their country (Cuya, 1999). 
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In order to carry out the functions entrusted to it, a truth commission needs to have some 
common powers. These include: 
 
 The power to summon persons, including government officials, to appear before the 
commission and to produce articles or documents. 
 The authorization to conduct inspections in places of interest, such as prison facilities 
and military barracks, and initiate exhumations in accordance with the law and in 
coordination with law enforcement. 
 The authorization to obtain official cooperation to ensure the security of proceedings, 
offices, and persons related to the commission (Gonzalez, 2013). 
 
However, power is not enough to carry out the tasks of commissions because members of the 
commission, staff, and persons cooperating with the inquiry must be protected against 
physical threats or any kind of reprisal resulting from their work or participation. In Ghana, 
the commission was guaranteed which reduced the possibility of frivolous legal harassment 
(Ghana TRC, 2002). Similarly, The East Timor mandate provided fairness guarantees, though 
they were not exhaustive. Some other guarantees have included the right to legal 
representation for defendants or the right to respond to allegations or adverse findings 
(Gonzalez, 2013). 
 
4.6 Resources and Reports of the TRC 
4.6.1 Resources of the TRC: 
 
In order to complete their task, TRCS must be granted sufficient resources or funds. But for 
many transitional states, it is difficult to access and/or manage the resources. Consequently, 
in many cases, the truth commissions have faced shortages of resources. Some however have 
not, for example, the South African TRC had a staff of 300 and a budget of $18 million per 
year for its two-and-a-half year existence (S. African TRC, 1999). The South Korean 
commission was reported to have 240 staff members and an annual budget of US$15-20 
million (Dong-Choon & Selden, 2010). On the other hand, Chad's truth commission had to 
establish its office within the former secret detention centre of the security forces due to 
limited space and resources (Brahm, 2004).  
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In the case of Uganda in 1987, the Ford Foundation donated US$93,000 to the Ugandan 
government to allow the commission to continue its work. Despite other international 
donations, the truth commission faced continuous financial problems further delaying its 
work (Weaver, 2016). According to a recommendation of the TRC in Paraguay, 
approximately 400 individuals received financial compensation totalling US$20 million but 
the lack of resources was a major problem throughout the commission’s work, especially in 
its early stage when the Paraguayan parliament cut its budget by half. In December 2007, the 
government stopped the funding of the commission and it had to suspend investigations for 
several months (Florentin & Manuel, 2006). 
 
The Equity and Reconciliation Commission of Morocco, the first truth commission in the 
Arab world, distributed US$85 million to approximately 16,000 individuals who were 
victimised at the end of 2007 (Amnesty, 2004). Rwanda which is another country that 
respected the truth commission’s recommendation of reparation had to depend completely on 
foreign governments for the annual budget of UD$300,000 (Fombad, 2008). 
 
4.6.2 Reports of the TRC: 
 
The most important task of a commission is to publish the report with its findings and 
recommendations. According to Brahm (2004), the commission's final report is its legacy. It 
is a summary of the key findings. Patterns of abuse are outlined. Most importantly, the 
commission's report provides recommendations for rebuilding society. 
 
Recommendations often centre on judicial, military, and police reform. The commission of 
Ghana recommended reforms within the prisons, the police and the military (Ghana National 
Reconciliation Commission, 2004). Likewise, the Nigerian commission recommended the 
fragmentation of the police system (Nigeria Human Rights Violations Investigation 
Commission, 2002).  
  
Importantly, the Truth commissions also make recommendations for reparations to victims. 
Although this compensation is incomparable to the suffering the commissions can 
recommend reparations as a different means to healing wounds for the families of the 
disappeared, continuing prosecutions and for follow-up investigations concerning persons 
who remain missing (Argentine National Commission on Disappeared, 1984). In 2004, $3 
billion was provided for the reparations to victims in Argentina. The report on El Salvador 
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indicated the reparations for victims included memorials and monetary compensation (Naidu, 
2004). A comprehensive reparation program, including apologies, a memorial, and monetary 
compensation was recommended by the Ghana commission. For this, the amount paid to 
victims was to be based on type violations suffered for approximately 3,000 victims of 
repression under Rawlings’ rule (Ghana NRC, 2002). 
 
Although, every report includes adequate investigations and solid conclusions, some of the 
most valuable reports, and the conclusions within it, have been somewhat brief, as in 
Argentina, while in others – Chile, Guatemala or even Haiti – they have been lengthy 
(Avruch & Vejarano, 2002). However, According to Mygikra (2008); 
 
It should not be forgotten that the most important thing is the dynamic aspect of a 
report in terms of what impact it will have on society and whether or not justice and 
reparations will follow it. It is also important for the report to provide the impetus for 
reform of the State, and especially of the justice system and the armed and security 
forces and police, so that democracy and the rule of law can be established on solid 
foundations (p. 45). 
 
The truth commission can make a specific proposal about follow-up in its report as in Haiti 
(Hayner, 2001). For example, it might propose a specific body to be set up or entrusted to a 
national human rights commission such as the Ombudsman's Office or the National Human 
Rights Commissions. The question of follow-up has been given greater attention in the 
reports of some recent commissions such as the CEH in Guatemala and the Commission of 
Inquiry in Sri Lanka (Popkin, 1999). 
 
Looking at the different types of truth commissions that have been established, most of the 
commissions worked for a limited timeframe, although those of Chad and Uganda are to run 
for an indefinite period (Sarkin & Daly, 2004). The commission’s terms of reference may 
allow it to look at a pattern of abuses over a number of decades (Chile and South Africa), or 
instead focus on specific crimes or specific groups of perpetrators (ibid) where some revealed 
the identities of perpetrators as in Timor‐Leste and some did not as in Chile, Guatemala 
(Pathak, 2016). However, some attempted a massive exercise in public participation and 
mobilisation like in South Africa, Sierra Leone whereas other commissions are smaller and 
more secretive like in Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Haiti (Rotberg, 2000). Similarly, some 
commissions have had broad powers of subpoena, search and seizure as well as to make 
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recommendations, whilst others do not have (Sarkin & Daly, 2004; Stahn, 2001). Indeed, the 
truth commission is a flexible institution, capable to adapt different national circumstances. 
 
It is very much important to have appropriate rules regarding procedure and evidence to 
guide the investigations and all other tasks of a TRC so that all circumstantial, documentary 
and material evidence available can be properly used meaningfully and appropriately. For 
this, the commissions should have experienced staff in gathering documentary evidence, 
particularly as Truth commissions seek to collect evidence from a variety of sources such as 
taking witness statements and inspecting sites including detention centres, mass graves, etc 
(Brahm, 2004; Migyikra, 2008). This requires good relationships and cooperation between 
different bodies like government, military, police, human rights commission, courts, and 
victims as well as perpetrators.  Sometimes, for a particular investigation, a researcher will be 
assigned to investigate; once their investigations are completed, findings are presented to a 
panel. Then the panel will decide for further investigation or finalization. Usually everything 
relating to rules of procedure and evidence is detailed within the working rules, regulations, 
and mandates of the commission (Migyikra, 2008).  
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CHAPTER-5:   Case study of the Liberian civil war and Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
 
5.1 Background of the conflict 
Liberia is located on the Atlantic coast of West Africa and comprises an area of 43,000 
square miles. Liberia has a population of approximately 3.3 million and its neighbours are 
Sierra Leone to the northwest, Guinea to the northeast, and Côte d’Ivoire to the southeast. 
Historically, 15 counties, each claimed by particular indigenous ethnic groups made up 
Liberia. English is the official language however more than 20 indigenous languages are in 
daily use. Although it is a country rich in natural resources like timber, gold, diamonds and 
rubber, Liberia is a low human development country, ranking 177th in the world (HDR, 
2016).  
 
Liberia’s political history is replete with conflicts. During the pre-colonial period, there were 
many conflicts and wars frequently occurred between Liberians from 1822 to1847. Liberia 
became a sovereign country under Americo-Liberian rule in 1847 but continued to face 
conflicts about border legitimacy, inclusion and identity, land, and a struggle for supremacy 
(Liberian TRC, 2009). Between 1822 and 1867, more than 13,000 freed slaves were sent to 
Liberia (Bascom, 2009). For 133 years Liberia was rules by a small elite composed of 
Amrico-Liberians, freed slaves of African descent from slave ships known as ‘Congos’ 
(Ojielo, 2010) who settled in Monrovia, Liberia’s capital in 1822. They comprised only five 
percent of the total population but they dominated the majority indigenous populations and 
the government, economy, security, commerce and social advancement.  
 
Between the 1800s and mid 1900s, Liberia developed into a stable oligarchy (Foster et al 
(2009). Over 100 years, the Americo-Liberian political party, the True Whig Party, ruled 
Liberia. In 1943, William V.S. Tubman, an Americo-Liberian, became President and ruled 
until his death in 1971. During the Tubman presidency, 3.5per cent of the Liberians held 
60per cent of the nation’s wealth while the rest lived in extreme poverty (Liberian TRC, 
2009). After Tubman, William R. Tolbert became President; Tolbert’s rule, like his 
predecessor’s, was marked by a further exclusion of indigenous representation in 
government. In April 1979, riots involving about 2000 people broke out and escalated in the 
capital city, Monrovia. The riots, known as the ‘rice riots’ because they were triggered by 
hunger, were suppressed. The following year, an army master sergeant and an Indigenous-
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Liberian, Samuel Doe led a group called the ‘People’s Revolutionary Council (PRC)’ and 
attacked then President Tolbert and key members of cabinet. The President was killed in this 
attack. Samuel Doe took power and became Liberia’s new national leader. This event ended 
133 years of settler oppression and began the era of Indigenous rule (Dolo, 1996).  
 
Under Doe’s rule, many injustices took place (Foster et al, 2009). These included the public 
execution of most of the officials of the Tolbert government, alignment – then evaporation of 
Liberia’s relationship with the United States of America (USA), a fraudulent election in 
1985, and atrocities on his own ethnic group in 1990. The construction of a range of 
government ministries was one of Doe’s achievements, with his ethnic politics marking the 
beginning of civil war in his period of nepotism and corruption (africanarguments.org, 2015). 
Doe was enriching himself (Abiodun, 1998:10) and his nationalism gave way to 
ethnocentrism and military repression (Nass, 2000), leading to further division in the country, 
further decline of the Liberian economy, and even lower living standards for the majority of 
the population (Harsh, n.d.).  
 
Charles Taylor was half Liberian; his mother who belonged to ethnic group in Liberia had 
earned a degree in the USA (Burlij, 1977). Taylor however returned to Liberia and supported 
the 12 April 1980 coup led by Samuel Doe. For this, he was appointed the Director-General 
of the General Services Agency (GSA) in Doe’s government. In 1984, Taylor fled to the US 
amid charges of embezzling US $1 million in public funds. As Doe requested, Taylor was 
arrested and imprisoned in Boston. In 1985, Taylor escaped from prison and his whereabouts 
were unknown (Aboagye, 1999). Later, it was discovered he had undertaken guerrilla training 
in Libya (Ohaegbulam, 2004). 
 
On 24 December 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a rebel group of 
15,000, invaded Liberia from the neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire (Adekeye, 2002). The NPFL 
was headed by Charles Taylor (Omonijo, 1990) and was formed with the stated objective to 
remove Samuel Doe from office, arguing that Liberians had suffered too long under his 
regime. This was the first Liberian civil war and it raged until 2003 (Cook, 2003). The NPFL 
encountered little difficulty and started to recruit more members, especially from among two 
particular ethnic groups, the Gio and Mano. Doe’s regime had massacred many Gios and 
Manos and anyone else who opposed him, resulting in the mass murder of innocent men, 
women and children as entire villages were set ablaze (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994). Equally 
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disturbing were the reports of hundreds of babies and children being thrown into wells to 
drown after their parents had been killed (William, 2002). These groups were therefore easily 
recruited due to the atrocities they had suffered under the Doe regime and their desire to take 
revenge on Doe and his government. During the early stages of the civil war many atrocities 
were committed by both the NPFL rebels and on the orders of Doe. 
 
Other internal and external factors also significantly contributed to the outbreak and 
continuation of the civil war. The social and economical conditions of the country such as 
mass illiteracy and poverty, corruption, selfishness, greed and economic disparities were 
major factors in the conflict. Similarly, discrimination against women and the denial of their 
rightful place in society as equal partners, the over centralization of power and wealth in the 
country and the unwise distribution of land, combined with growing disunity and ethnic 
rivalries, increased tensions in Liberia (Foster et al, 2009).  
 
The U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, James Bishop, criticized the Doe government and called for 
an end to the hostilities. He asked the Doe government to declare a county named Nimba as a 
disaster zone but Doe declined the request (William, 2002). Doe continued to stand his 
ground; he refused to resign as the NPFL demanded and threatened that more lives would be 
destroyed if the NPFL did not surrender to the government. This stalemate between the 
fighting parties made the country more unstable. 
 
By April 1990, five months after their initial invasion, the structure of the NPFL was 
beginning to fracture. Commander Price Yormie Johnson had split from the NPFL and 
formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia because Taylor had executed 
some of his soldiers for being defeated by government forces in Ganta (Aboagye, 1999). The 
split between Taylor and Johnson created a second war front, as both fought against each 
other, as well as the government. However, both rebel groups made their way toward the 
capital Monrovia and their forces began to weaken Doe and his government (Abrokwaa, 
n.d.). Over the next 12 months, Taylor rose to power, murdering Doe on 10 Sept 1990 and 
declaring himself President; this exacerbated the civil war in Liberia (Gerdes, 2013). 
 
The war in Liberia also had international dimensions and trans-border repercussions. In the 
beginning of war, many Western African nationals were involved as fighters and many 
African states provided different forms of support to different actors. The African states 
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provided support to the rebels from Libya, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Guinea and Sierra Leone. On the other hand, Sierra Leone provided sanctuary to Liberian 
rebels to overthrow the Taylor regime. Additionally, other non-state actors and/or arms 
dealers like Victor Bout, a Ukrainian national, became involved in the war (Aning & Jaye, 
2011).  
 
The USA supported Tubman’s rule of a virtual police state for 27 years and the authoritarian 
rule of American Colonization Society (ACS) (Wallton, 2014). This undermined Tolbert’s 
non-alignment policy and further influenced the people to fight against the government. 
Similarly, despite condemnations from Congress regarding the conduct of the 1985 elections, 
the USA continued to recognize Doe as the legitimate leader of Liberia and continued to 
provide him with support (Liberian TRC, 2009, vol 2, p. 306). The USA’s support of Samuel 
Doe Junta in Liberia in acquiring military weapons to suppress and violate human rights also 
motivated the rebels to fight. On all occasions and in all instances, the USA acted first and 
foremost to foster its economic, commercial and political interests in Liberia rather than 
protecting the rights of the Liberian people and enhancing their development. This made the 
Liberians more determined to fight against the government (Liberian TRC, 2009, vol 2, p. 
308). 
 
In 1991, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in Liberia, 
both diplomatically and militarily, to stop the war. Despite 14 peace accords being negotiated 
by the ECOWAS with the warring parties between June 1991 and August 1996 (Aning et al, 
2010), the country remained unstable. In 1997, Taylor was elected President but his 
government faced armed opposition from several significant violator rebel groups, as shown 
in Table 1(Aning & Jaye, 2011). 
 
5.1.1 The warring parties: 
The warring parties in Liberia during the 15 year civil war numbered more than a dozen – 
this is more than any other country that has suffered a civil war. The armed groups, rebel 
groups or warring factions and their financiers, leaders, commanders, combatants and 
advisors associated with and responsible for the conflict in Liberia can be categorized into 
three groups; significant violator groups, less significant violator groups and military 
institutions (Liberian TRC, 2009). They were as follows: 
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Table 5.1: Warring parties in Liberia 
S. N. Significant Violator Groups 
1 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
2 Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 
3 Liberian Peace Council (LPC) 
4 Militia, Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) 
5 United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) 
6 Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 
7 United Liberation Movement-K (ULIMO K) 
8 Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) 
9 United Liberation Movement-J (ULIMO J) 
10 Anti-Terrorist Unity (ATU) 
 Less Significant Violator Groups 
1 Vigilantes 
2 Lofa Defense Force (LDF) 
3 Liberian National Police 
4 Special Operation Division of the Liberian National Police (SOD) 
5 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
6 Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU) 
7 Special Security Unit (SSU) 
8 Special Security Service (SSS) 
9 National Security Agency (NSA) 
10 National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) 
11 Criminal Investment Division (CID) 
12 Rapid Response Unit (RRU) 
 The Military Institutions 
1 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) 
2 Black Beret 
Source: Aning & Jaye, 2011; Liberian TRC, 2009 
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5.1.2 Consequences of the conflict 
The lengthy civil war had many consequences for the country.  The massive and flagrant 
human rights abuses led to the death of more than 250,000 people and the collapse of the 
state and society. The United Nations/Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UN/OHCHR) Assessment Mission to Liberia (2007) reported that the human rights situation 
in Liberia was extremely precarious on several fronts. The major issues were widespread 
poverty and lack of food security, massive unemployment, no access to health care and 
education, few basic services and a collapsed economy. The civil war disrupted livelihoods, 
disintegrated state structures, shattered the economy and unbalanced cultures, traditions and 
religions. People fled their homes and families separated as poverty increased and they 
became vulnerable to predation, hunger, disease, rape, sexual abuses and abduction (Mission 
to Liberia, 2007).  
 
Twenty-three types of human rights violations were recorded and among them forceful 
displacement accounted for 36 percent which made the people refugees and 2.5 million were 
displaced (Liberian TRC, 2009, p. 282; BBC, 2009). It is estimated 60 to 70per cent of the 
population suffered some form of sexual violence (BBC, 2009). Men were the major victims, 
accounting for 47 percent of all violations. Many women and girls were sexually assaulted by 
gender-based violations such as rape, sexual slavery and sexual abuse which accounted for 28 
percent of all violations (Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, pp. 9-11). Abduction, assault, 
forced displacement, killing, looting, torture, forced recruitment and forced labour were also 
common. Barbaric practices like eating the enemy’s heart or blood to strengthen the 
conqueror also developed among the warring combatants (Liberian TRC, 2009). One of the 
most harmful long-term aspects of the conflict however was the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers (Deng, 2001). 
 
The country was also abused and exploited. Liberia’s timber forests, diamond mines, 
infrastructure and telecommunications were ransacked. For example, the University of 
Liberia granted 284,000 acres of its forest to an offshore company (Oriental Trading 
Company) for US $2 million but the payments were never made (Liberian TRC Report, 2009, 
p. 290).  Roads were damaged and destroyed and the hydro-electric plant which provided 
electricity to Monrovia and its environs, but never to villages, was deliberately vandalized. 
Similarly, the water treatment plant was also damaged. Public offices and facilities including 
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ministries, agencies, sport stadiums, radio stations, hospitals, and systems experienced were 
significantly damaged and rendered ineffective (ibid, 2009).  
 
5.2 The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  
After 15 years of war in Liberia, a special court indicted former Liberian President Doe and 
the warlord Charles Taylor. A comprehensive peace agreement (CPA, 2003) was signed 
between the government of Liberia and the Liberians Unite for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and political 
parties in Accra, Ghana on August 18, 2003. Within the framework of the ECOWAS peace 
process for Liberia, the different parties and people who had pursued peace throughout 
Liberia’s civil war were well represented (Steinberg, 2009, p. 137). The Accra agreement 
called for the establishment of an independent national commission on human rights, and the 
creation of a TRC. The signing of the comprehensive peace agreement thus opened the way 
for the establishment of a TRC in Liberia under the general outline of the TRC’s mission, as 
included in Part Six, Article XIII of this Peace Accord (Accra, 2003; ICG, 2009). As such the 
Commission was tasked with investigating and addressing the root causes of the crisis in 
Liberia, including human rights violations (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2003).  
 
 
5.2.1 Background of the establishment 
 
Before the enactment of the TRC Act in Liberia, during May 2005, a process of national 
dialogue, consultation and consensus building took place. According to the Liberian TRC 
report (2009), on January 4, 2004, Chairman Bryant constituted a nine member TRC panel of 
commissioners. This panel failed to gain legitimacy in the country however. Thereafter, a 
conference was convened on April 29, 2004, and the Liberian TRC proposal document was 
circulated on August 13, 2004. The TRC Act was signed into law on June 10, 2005 and 
published into a Bill on June 22, 2005. The Liberian TRC was inaugurated on February 20, 
2006.  
 
Initially, the TRC was established with a working plan for October 2005 to September 2008. 
The Commission could not complete its task of finding the root causes and consequences of 
conflict to inform recommendations and procedures for reconciliation and reparation. Hence, 
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it was extended by 10 months, until June 30, 2009 to complete its task (Liberian TRC Report, 
2009). 
 
5.2.2 The objectives/ Role of TRC in Liberia 
The TRC was established by the government of Liberia, according to the Accra Peace 
agreement, to enquire into the human rights violations that occurred in Liberia from 1979 to 
2003 (Ojielo, 2010). Its overall objective was to promote national peace, security, unity and 
reconciliation (Article IV Section 4, TRC Act of Liberia 2005). It was mandated to identify 
the accountability of possible persons, authorities, institutions and organisations involved in 
the civil war (Liberian TRC Report, Vol. 1). It was also specifically established to provide a 
forum that will address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and 
perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences and reconciliation in order 
to create a clear picture of the past so as to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation (3, 
Article III, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 18 August 2003).  
 
The TRC in Liberia was empowered to investigate human rights violations and economic 
crimes under the TRC Act and to promote national healing and reconciliation (Long, 2008). 
The Commission was to investigate violations that occurred in between January 1979, the 
final year of the Americo-Liberian rule, and October 2003, the day of the inauguration of the 
National Transitional Government of Liberia (Lansana, 2015; Ycaza, 2013). It was also to 
investigate the root causes of the conflict and adopt mechanisms and procedures to address 
the experiences of vulnerable groups such as women and children through its 
recommendations and measures for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations, 
reconciliation, and reparation as part of healing (NTLA, 2005). The human rights abuses of 
massacres, sexual violations, murder, extra-judicial killings as well as the economic crimes 
like the exploitation of natural resources to perpetuate armed conflicts during 1979 to 2003 
were determining areas of the TRC in Liberia so that impacts on victims could be determined 
for reconciliation, rehabilitation and reparation (Liberian TRC Act, Section 4, 2003). 
 
The TRC was also responsible for gathering information from victims, perpetrators, 
witnesses and institutions through public and confidential hearings (Long, 2008). This task 
played a vital role in terms of providing opportunities for everyone to be heard and in in 
restoring the human dignity of victims. In special cases, the TRC had the mandate to 
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recommend amnesty under terms and conditions if international laws and standards had not 
been violated (Liberian TRC Act, 2003). 
 
Preparing and compiling a comprehensive report was another important task of the TRC in 
Liberia (Jaye, 2009). The report included findings and recommendations based on the 
information collected. The recommendations to the Head of State were on a range of issues 
including reparations, making findings and determinations on all matters brought before the 
Commission and adopting its own rules (Ojielo, 2010). The recommendations were in 
specific areas - legal institutional and other reforms, continuing investigations and inquiries, 
and prosecutions (Liberian TRC Act, Article VII, Sec, 26 (j), 2003).  
 
5.2.3 The Structure/ Composition of the TRC: 
Liberia had one TRC committee and one Advisory committee for the peace process. 
According to Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), Article XIII, the head of the National 
Transitional Government of Liberia, Charles Gyude Bryant nominated nine commissioners in 
October 2005 to form a Liberian TRC (ICTJ, 2010, p. 5). The team of commissioners was 
composed of four women and five men from Liberia. The Commissioners were inducted into 
office by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the President of Liberia, on 20 February 2006. The active 
phase of the TRC’s two-year mandate was launched at a public ceremony in Monrovia at the 
Centennial Memorial Pavilion (Steinberg, 2009; TRC, 2009). According to the Liberian TRC 
Act (2003), all TRC Commissioners had equal powers with the Chairperson exercising 
his/her powers as a “first among equals”. All members of the Commission could exercise 
oversight responsibilities for the functioning of the Commission to maintain a balanced and 
comprehensive perspective of TRC operations yet they were not involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the Commission. 
 
Article V Section 10 of the Liberian TRC Act provides the authority to form a three-member 
International Technical Advisory Committee (ITAC), as nominated by ECOWAS (two 
members) and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (one member). The three 
member advisory committee was formed in Liberia in 2006 then 2008. The ITAC advisors 
provided legal and policy oversight and advised the TRC Commissioners. They were 
accorded the same rights and privileges as Commissioners, except the right to vote (Liberian 
TRC, 2009, p. 36). However, none of the commissioners had any previous experience of 
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working with a truth commission or with transitional justice mechanisms (Gberie, 2008, p. 
457). 
 
Table 5.2: The Structure of Liberian TRC 
TRC Committee Advisory Committee 
Commissioners- 9 (Women-4 and Men-5 
From Liberia) 
Members- 3 
Source: Liberian TRC, 2009 
 
5.2.4 Findings and Recommendations of the Liberian TRC  
 
5.2.4.1 Findings 
The TRC of Liberia released the final report and summary in four volumes on 19 December 
2008 followed by the final and edited version of the report on 3 December 2009 (James-Allen 
et al, 2010). The findings can be divided into two sections, the causes of the 15 year long 
civil war and its consequences for Liberia. 
 
The major root causes of the conflict were attributed to poverty, greed, corruption, limited 
access to education, economic, social, civil and political inequalities; identity conflict; land 
tenure and distribution (Transparency International, 2006; The law offices of Dorsey and 
Whitney, 2007). Other contributors were the lack of reliable and appropriate mechanisms for 
the settlement of disputes and the duality of the Liberian political, social and legal systems 
which polarized and widened the disparities between settler Liberians and Indigenous 
Liberians (Consolidated Final Report, 2008, vol. 2, p. 16). The report identified one of the 
most disturbing and dangerous historical antecedents to the Liberian civil war was the 
politicization of the Liberian military (Liberian TRC, 2008, vol.1). It also found all the 
factions were responsible for abuses and that external state actors in Africa, North America, 
Europe and the USA participated, supported, aided, abetted, conspired and instigated 
violence, war and regime change for political, economic and foreign policy advantages and 
gains (Consolidated Final Report, vol. 2, p.18).  
 
5.2.4.2 Recommendations 
The Liberian TRC worked for three years and four months and made recommendations in 
different sectors. The major remedial activities recommended by the TRC focused on 
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specialized psychosocial and other rehabilitation services, legal, institutional and other 
reforms. The need for continuing investigations and inquiries into particular matters and the 
need to hold prosecutions in particular cases at the discretion of the TRC were other 
recommendations. The Commission’s recommendations focused on establishing 
accountability for human rights violations. To facilitate this, the National ‘Palava Hut’ was 
established as a mechanism to foster peace dialogues and rebuild broken relationships to 
promote national reconciliation.  This traditional justice and reconciliation processes enabled 
matters of concern to be resolved amongst or between individuals and/or communities. 
Palava Huts were especially common in rural communities around Liberia due to the lack or 
absence of courts, resources, lawyers, penal institutions and police officers (Liberian TRC 
Report, 2009). The TRC recommendation was to establish this system in all statutory districts 
for not less than three years but not more than five years. 
 
The TRC recommended the establishment of the “Extraordinary Criminal Court for Liberia” 
to prosecute 124 key individuals for gross human rights violations. These included violations 
of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, war crimes and economic 
crimes including, but not limited to, killing, gang rape, multiple rape, forced recruitment, 
sexual slavery, forced labour, exposure to deprivation, and abduction (Liberian TRC Report, 
2008, Vol. II). It recommended prosecuting eight leaders of warring factions and 116 
notorious persons, including Charles G. Taylor. The TRC also recommended these persons 
be barred from holding public office for 30 years as a form of sanction. Similarly, the TRC 
recommended 45 persons be prosecuted for economic crimes, barred from holding public 
office for 30 years and all the assets they had acquired unlawfully during the conflict were 
seized.  
 
The TRC further recommended 58 individuals who had committed egregious domestic 
crimes, but lesser than gross violations, be prosecuted under the jurisdiction of the domestic 
criminal courts (Liberian TRC Report, 2008, vol. 2). The TRC also recommended that 38 
individuals should be pardoned from prosecution for co-operating with the TRC, expressing 
their remorse, and confessing to crimes they had committed (Ycaza, 2013). The TRC found 
49 government officials, including President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, guilty of committing 
gross human rights violations, international humanitarian law violations, war crimes and 
egregious domestic law violations due to their roles during the civil war and instability in 
Liberia between 1979 and 2003. The TRC recommended these persons be subjected to public 
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sanctions to fulfil the purpose to promote integrity in public service and restore confidence 
(Article VII Section 26 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e), Liberian TRC Act, 2005). They should not be 
appointed in the government or legislative authority or have power to govern or make 
decisions on behalf of the Liberian people whom they victimized. For those holding elective 
public offices, the TRC allowed them to continue to the end of their tenure however they 
were banned from holding any public office in the future for a period of 30 years from 1 July  
2009. Those holding appointed offices had to resign immediately (Liberian TRC Report 
2008, vol. 2, p. 360). Unfortunately, this recommendation was criticized and ignited debate 
over peace versus justice because Sirleaf was a key actor in bringing peace to Liberia. 
However, the public sanctions were to provide a form of justice and demonstrate 
accountability, redress impunity, and promote integrity in public service (Liberian TRC 
Report, 2008, vol. 2, p. 360). 
 
Importantly, the TRC recommended some reparation procedures. These included the 
establishment of a Reparations Trust Fund of approximately US $ 500 million over 30 years. 
The fund would be utilized for compulsory free education from primary to secondary 
education and college level across subjects such as medicine, nursing, teacher training, 
agriculture, science and technology. The fund also provided help for mental and physical 
health such as psychological, physical, therapeutic and counselling treatments. Funds were 
also directed to economic programs like lending schemes and small business management to 
women through commercial banks; infrastructure and community development projects 
including the establishment and re-building of schools, health facilities, and roads. The TRC 
further recommended reparation procedures through the establishment of a national memorial 
and unification day to memorize the dead and respect the survivors; the promotion and 
protection of the rights of women and children; and issuing a public apology to the Liberian 
people for the devastating civil war and loss of human life and destruction of properties in 
Liberia (Liberian TRC, 2009). 
 
The TRC also made recommendations to the government of Liberia, the Liberian Diaspora 
and the international community. The recommendations to the government included 
confirming their responsibilities, duties and obligations relating to building a new Liberian 
political and civil culture. These included the administration of justice, the establishment and 
resourcing of the independent national human rights commission (INHRC), combating 
corruption, institutionalizing good governance and economic empowerment and poverty 
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reduction. The recommendation to the Liberian Diaspora was to contribute at least US $1.00 
per month to the Reparation Trust Fund to help the reparation process in their motherland 
(Liberian TRC, 2009, p. 396). Similarly, the TRC recommended international communities 
such as the UN Security Council, foreign states, international institutions, donors and NGO 
partners to continue their assistance to sustain the peace in Liberia. 
 
Lastly, the TRC recommended different sectors to come together as a national integration of 
Liberian society and to form a new model of social engineering (national visioning) that 
would inform the rebuilding of institutions and infrastructure, media and national Bar 
association, amnesty, use and management of land and other natural resources, distribution 
and reform of land, and a commission on Liberian history (Liberian TRC, 2009). 
 
5.3 The TRC: Strengths and Limitations 
The Liberian TRC achieved mixed results. It successfully met its mandate of investigating 
and determining the responsibility for gross human rights violations as well as examining the 
root causes of the violent civil war. It was successful in providing recommendations to the 
Liberian government for peace and justice. Unfortunately, it did not address all the causes 
and consequences for peace building because of the limited budget, personnel and time 
covering its hearings and the lack of suitable methods of implementing its recommendations. 
The Commission put forward reforms for legal and institutional laws and regulations. It was 
successful in recommending compulsory free education from primary level to secondary 
education as well as technical education such as nursing, teaching, and agriculture to help 
reduce the limited access to education and minimise poverty. It was also successful in 
decreasing the greed, corruption, civil and political inequities. The commission successfully 
addressed the economic causes of conflict as it recommended economic programs such as 
lending to small business for women and policy and program options to address these key 
conflict issues (Ycaza, 2013). 
The Commission recommended the establishment of the ‘National Palava Hut Forums’ as a 
means of promoting justice and reconciliation at the local level. The process was based on 
traditional dispute resolution mechanism and was popular with the people as local elders 
played a role in settling matters such as extramarital affairs, divorces, land disputes, debt, and 
occasionally theft and murder (Pajibo, 2008, pp. 16-18). Under the aegis of the Independent 
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Human Rights Commission, the Palava Huts provided a public venue for victims to confront 
perpetrators living in their communities and facilitate reconciliation between individuals, 
groups and communities. Traditionally, the process sought confession of the wrongful act, 
apology for the wrong committed, and forgiveness from the victim, followed by cleansing 
rituals and restitution (Pajibo, 2008, pp. 18–19).  This was a critical recommendation to foster 
reconciliation at the local level (Liberian TRC Report, 2008, vol.3, p.2). As reconciliation 
takes a long time and despite the end of the war, ethnic animosities and resentments were and 
are still strong in the country. The establishment of a Reparations Trust Fund was another 
success of the commission in Liberia. It recommended to providing approximately US $ 500 
million to the victims through this fund over 30 years as the reparation process. 
 
A success of the Commission was its proposal of a general amnesty for all child combatants. 
This respected international law and practice and included gross human rights violations, war 
crimes and economic crimes as well as killing, gang rape, multiple rape, force recruitment, 
sexual slavery, forced labour, exposure to deprivation, and declared missing (Liberian TRC, 
2009, vol 2, p. 349). 
  
The Commission found that all warring parties in the conflict, including the state security, 
were responsible for human rights violations and none of the parties took any measures to 
control the human rights violations. The civil war to liberate the people from tyrannical rule 
brought only more brutal violations and oppression.  The Commission recommended the 
establishment of a criminal court to determine the criminal responsibility of individuals and 
armed groups for the violations that occurred. This was to provide the justice for the victims 
who suffered from the criminal acts of the perpetrators. 
 
The Commission recommended that all individuals admitting their wrongs and speaking 
truthfully before it as an expression of remorse should not be prosecuted and be granted 
amnesty. This recommendation was in keeping with the Act establishing the Commission that 
amnesty could be offered to those who testified truthfully and expressed remorse. But the 
Commission was unsuccessful in determining and verifying the minimum condition of truth 
when judging statements made by alleged perpetrators which raised doubts about the level of 
truthfulness (Transitional Justice working Group, 2008); the lack of a measurement of 
remorse to decide whether it was genuine and the lack of knowledge of the role of the victim 
or of the victim’s family undermined the decision of whether to offer amnesty or not (Ojielo, 
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2010). In reality, a number of those recommended for amnesty were accused of gross human 
rights violations. The Commission did not offer any rationale or explanation for this decision 
of amnesty.  
The Liberian TRC recorded more violations than any other TRC. According to the TRC 
report (Liberian TRC Report 2008, vol.2, p.185) there were 86,647 victims and 163,615 
violations which were identified through the victims’ statements. As a result, it was crucial to 
the transitional justice process that these violations be addressed through specific 
recommendations. The commission was unsuccessful in achieving this (ICTJ, 2010, p. 15; 
Steinberg, 2009); many recommendations were quite vague and not directed towards specific 
actors (Section 18 and 22, Liberian TRC, 2008).The commission was also criticized for lack 
of a due process in formulating the recommendations (Weah, 2012). 
The commission failed to collect information on violations from all parts of the country 
(Ojielo, 2010), meaning large number of victims were excluded. The hearings were 
conducted in areas with available hotel accommodations for the commission members and 
staff and the presence of broadcast media. Hearings were thus limited to easy locations such 
as the administrative capital of the district or region. Therefore, although the commission 
recommended justice and reconciliation, a tenuous peace existed between victims and 
perpetrators.  
In general, due to the lack of policies on reparations and prosecutions, the work speed of the 
TRC in Liberia was very slow. The lack of a comprehensive program for psychological 
advice and support to victims and witnesses, lack of sufficient protection measures for 
victims and witnesses, and the lack of sufficient processes to protect the perpetrators 
exacerbated delays (Amnesty, 2008). These delays resulted in the TRC needing a nine month 
extension to conclude its work (James-Allen, Weah, & Goodfriend, 2010, p. 9). 
The non-binding effect of the TRC’s recommendations, because of the doctrine of separation 
of powers, was another weakness of the Liberian TRC (James et al, 2010, p. 10). Much of the 
evidence did not have supporting references which undermined the reliability of the facts the 
recommendations were based on. The lack of details made it more difficult to implement 
many recommendations. As Steinberg (2009) found, the recommendations on reparations 
failed to identify the preliminary beneficiaries and there was an absence of obvious criteria 
for determining who was accountable. Similarly, the TRC failed to capture the scenario of 
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sexual based violence against women and their experiences and failed to collect the 
information of female combatants with the majority of these experiences being unrecorded 
(Ojielo, 2010). The link between sexual violence and gender-based violations was also weak 
as the TRC focused on the abuses of women but not men and boys (ICTJ, 2010). 
Table 5.3: Strengths and Limitations of Liberian TRC 
Strengths 
Nos. Causes of war addressed Recommendations 
1 Greed and corruption Responsible to duties and obligations 
to building a new Liberian political 
and civil culture, institutionalizing 
good governance 
2 Education Free education 
3 Civil and political inequality Reform of laws and regulations 
4 Poverty Economic empowerment, 
institutionalizing good governance 
5 Economy Economic programs 
6 Reparation Reparations Trust Fund, Diaspora, 
national memorial and unification 
day, public apology by the 
government 
7 National integration Social engineering 
8 Human Rights violations National Palava Hut, Criminal Court, 
amnesty, public sanction 
Limitations/ weaknesses 
Nos. Weaknesses Reasons 
1 Unaddressed violations Lack of specific implementing agent, 
sufficient specificity, direction and 
guidance 
2 Failed to collect all information  Covering of easy locations only 
3 Slow functioning Lack of process and policies 
4 Binding effect of recommendations Doctrine of separation of powers 
5 Reliability of facts Lack of details and references 
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6 Incomplete link between sexual and 
gender based violations 
Failed to capture the scenario 
Source: Liberian TRC, 2008 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Liberian TRC was successful in finding the root causes of the civil war and 
in its measures to address them such as the reformation of legal and institutional laws and 
regulations, compulsory education, and economic programs. The utilization of local 
procedures in reconciliation such as Palava Hut Forums, the distribution of cash through the 
Reparations Trust Fund over 30 years to the victims, amnesty for all child combatants and the 
establishment of a criminal court were successes of the Liberian commission. However, it 
was unsuccessful in explaining its rationale for granting amnesty, in providing specific 
recommendations to a large number of victims, and unsuccessful in collecting information 
from all parts of the country and all victims. The lack of supporting references and criteria for 
accountability, the binding effect of recommendation and slow work speed were other 
weaknesses of the Liberian TRC that impeded its success. 
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CHAPTER-6:  Case study of the Sierra Leonean civil war and Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
 
6.1 Background of the conflict 
Sierra Leone is a country in West Africa. It covers 27,699 square miles and is bordered by 
Guinea in the north-east, Liberia in the south-east, and the Atlantic Ocean in the south-west. 
About 16 ethnic groups inhabit the 14 districts of Sierra Leone, each with its own language 
and customs. Sierra Leone is a predominantly Muslim country with a population of 6.6 
million (UNDP, 2016).  It relies on mining, especially diamonds, for its economic base and is 
among the largest producers worldwide of titanium, bauxite, gold, platinum, chrome, and iron 
and has one of the world's largest deposits of rutile. Despite this natural wealth, it is a poor 
country, ranking 179th in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) scale (HDR, 
2016). 
 
The political history of Sierra Leone goes back to 1787 when 331 freed slaves arrived there 
(Kaifala, 2017). In 1789, Freetown was built as the capital of the country. After abolishing 
the slave trade in 1807, the British took responsibility for Sierra Leone, especially the coastal 
areas; 50,000 more freed slaves arrived during the next half-century and the country became 
a British colony (HRW, 2014). In 1898, the British attempted to further expand their power 
and exert their rule over the sovereignty of indigenous chiefs. They established a new tax 
which resulted in the Hut Tax war (Arthur, 1974). This war ended in 1905 but resistance 
continued throughout the colonial period until the 1960s, most often in the forms of 
intermittent rioting and chaotic labour disturbances. For example, revolts against colonial rule 
took place around Kambia in 1931 but the British colonial forces put down the rebellion. The 
West African Youth League, a political party, again mobilized the workers against the 
colonial government in 1938 (Fyle, 2006) and riots in 1955 and 1956 involved tens of 
thousands of workers (Killson, 1966).  
In early 1951, educated leaders from different ethnic groups established the Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (SLPP) and negotiated with the British the transition to eventual national 
independence (World Bank, 2011). In November 1951, a new constitution was drafted with a 
framework for decolonisation (Taylor, 2011) and provisions for Sierra Leone to develop a 
parliamentary system with the Commonwealth of Nations (ibid). The first parliamentary 
election took place in May 1957 where SLPP won and Sir Milton Margai was elected as the 
Chief Minister (ibid).  
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On 27th April 1961, Sierra Leone celebrated independence from British colonial rule 
(Kamara, 2011; Momoh, 2011). Sir Albert Margai was appointed Prime Minister and enacted 
several laws against the opposition, the All People’s Congress (APC). When Sir Milton 
Margai died unexpectedly in 1964, as leader of the SLPP and the sitting Prime Minister, the 
country became unstable once again. The opposition party leader, Siaka Stevens, was elected 
as the Prime Minister and he established a one-party state. This resulted in riots in 1967 
(Pham, 2005). In this unstable situation, the military leader of the country, Brigadier Andrew, 
staged a coup and became the head of the state in the same year (Sierra Leonean TRC report, 
vol 3A, 2004). In 1968, Stevens resumed power as Prime Minister with the aid of Brigadier 
General Bangura, and declared a state of emergency (Gberie, 2005).  
 
In 1971, Sierra Leone was declared a republic and in 1978, the government, under Stevens, 
again became a one-party state under the aegis of the APC (Fowler, 2004).  In 1985 Stevens 
retired and nominated the head of the army, Joseph Momoh, as his successor. An 
unsuccessful attempt was made to overthrow Momoh in 1987 by the Vice President who was 
subsequently hanged and more than 60 senior governmental officers were arrested. 
Corruption, as well as economic decay continued, until rebel Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) soldiers overthrew Momoh in 1992, calling for a return to a multiparty system 
(Fowler, 2004). In 1993, the National People’s Revolutionary Council (NPRC) was formed 
by a group of disaffected army personnel. The opposing RUF and NPRC engaged in fierce 
battles for control of the country and in 1994, the NPRC staged a coup against the 
government and took control of the capital, including the diamond rich eastern province 
(Lahai & Lyons, 2015). 
 
Among the different rebel groups, the RUF targeted civilians, murdering, raping, and 
amputating hands, legs and arms and forcibly recruiting people. Children as young as eight 
years old were recruited as soldiers and girls were forced to be domestic servants or sex 
slaves (Human Rights Watch, 2000; Dougherty, 2004 cited in Kelsall, 2009). The RUF 
leaders lost their political motivation and instead fought for personal gain, robbing civilians 
and plundering the country’s diamond mines (Bones, 2001; Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004).  
 
In 1996, the NPRC government and the RUF signed a ceasefire and launched a Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program, especially for the rebels (HRW, 2000). At 
this time however, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) overthrew the government 
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through a military coup and the country was plunged into chaos again. That same year, a 
democratic presidential election took place for the first time in Sierra Leone and the People’s 
Party candidate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, won with 59.4per cent of the total votes (Larry, 
2002). Kabbah was ousted however by a violent military coup in May 1997 that was headed 
by the leader of the AFRC. After 10 months of exile, Kabbah resumed his rule but rebel 
forces continued their attacks in the country (Jackson & Albrecht, 2010). 
 
In 1998, the United Nations Security Council created the United Nations Observer Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNOMSL) to monitor the situation of human rights violations (UN, 1999). It 
was not strong enough to intervene however and in January 1999, the AFRC and RUF rebels 
seized Freetown and in a two week period murdered 6000 civilians and abducted 2000 
children (Bones, 2001). After several unsuccessful peace negotiations, in July 1999, the rebel 
groups and government signed the Lome Accord with a mandate to establish a TRC for 
Sierra Leone and provide a blanket amnesty upon the implementation of the DDR program 
(Mustafa & Bangura, 2010). The RUF disrupted the DDR process however, abducting about 
500 United Nations’ peacekeepers, and kidnapping and killing thousands of civilians, thus 
hostilities re-erupted in 2000. At that time however, after years of civil war, many rebels were 
tired of fighting and most decided to surrender their weapons. This led to peace finally and 
formally, being declared in January 2002 (Hayner, 2004). The war, which had lasted from 
March 1991 to January 2002 and resulted in 70,000 people being killed and 2.6 million 
people displaced, was officially over (Gberie, 2005; Kaldor & Vincent, 2006). 
 
In the aftermath of the civil war, a -TRC- and a UN sponsored war crimes tribunal (the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone) were established according to the provisions of the Lome 
Accord (Migyirka, 2008). The purpose of the TRC was to provide a forum for victims and 
aggressors during the conflict to tell their stories and help the healing process. The purpose of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone was to seek justice for people who had suffered during the 
civil war by putting on trial those responsible for the atrocities committed during the fighting 
(Perriello & Wierda, 2006).  
 
6.1.1 The warring parties 
Sierra Leone experienced civil war for 11 years. Some of the members of the rebellion were 
native Sierra Leones and others were not. The warring parties can be divided into internal 
actors and external actors (Ball, 1996; TRC, 2004), as indicated in the table below:  
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Table 6.1: Internal and External Actors of Sierra Leonean civil war 
S.N. Internal Actors 
1. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
2. Armed Forces Revolutionary Council including Westside Boys (AFRC) 
3. Sierra Leone Army (SLA) 
4. Civil Defence Force (CDF) 
5. Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group 
(ECOMOG) 
6. Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) 
7. United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) 
8. Police officers - including the special security divisions (SSD) 
9. Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Sierra Leone Army (AFRC/SLA) 
10. Minor perpetrator groups 
 External Actors 
1. Libya (as discussed in 6.2.4.1) 
2. Liberia (see 6.2.4.1) 
3. Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) (see 6.2.4.1) 
4. United Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) 
5. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
6. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group  (ECOMOG) 
Source: Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004 
 
6.1.2 Consequences of conflict 
The conflict resulted in the widespread destruction of infrastructure (homes, schools, and 
hospitals) and the internal displacement of almost a quarter of the population (Keen, 2005 
Richards, 1998). Almost two million people were displaced and became refugees; 400,000 
fled overseas and between 800,000 and 1.3 million were internally displaced (Amowitz et al., 
2002, p. 214). The civil war affected almost the entire population (Burman & McKay, 2007) 
and was characterized by extreme violations of human rights on all sides, including 
mutilation, murder, and destruction of property and looting (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004; 
Burman & McKay, 2007). It is estimated that 50,000 people were killed during the conflict 
(Bellows & Miguel, 2006, p. 394) with abductions and arbitrary detentions being other 
common violations during the conflict (see Table 2). 
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All armed groups involved in the civil war were responsible for plundering and looting in 
Sierra Leone. As the leaders of all the rebel groups were aware that whoever had control of 
the diamond mines controlled Sierra Leone (Hirsch, 2001), the civil war was concentrated 
mostly in and around the diamond districts (ibid). The Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) 
government also abused the death penalty to eliminate their political opponents (Sierra 
Leonean TRC Report, 2004, vol 2, pp. 27-29), misusing emergency powers to suppress 
political dissent. Many groups used child soldiers in the civil war, especially the RUF. It is 
estimated that between 10, 000 to 48, 000 children were forcibly recruited and forced to take 
drugs to reduce their inhibitions against committing violent acts (HRW, 2003; Dougherty, 
2004; Burman & McKay, 2007). These acts included “cutting off villagers’ hands and 
fingers” (Richards, 1996, p. 6), and during “drug-induced atrocities” the RUF was said to 
“mutilate and even sometimes to eat their victims” (Williams 2001, p. 15). After the war, and 
on returning to their home and community, ex-child soldiers were often excluded and 
remained socially isolated due to the extreme nature of their experiences (Betancourt et al., 
2010; Medeiros, 2007). 
 
In summary, 14 types of gross human rights violations were reported to the TRC as major 
consequences of the civil war in Sierra Leone. These violations are identified in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Violations reported the Sierra Leone TRC 
Types of violations Numbers 
Abduction 5,968 
Amputation 378 
Arbitrary detention 4,835 
Assault/ Beating 3,246 
Destruction of property 3,404 
Extortion 1,273 
Forced cannibalism 19 
Forced displacement 7,983 
Forced labour 1,834 
Forced recruitment 331 
Killing 4,514 
Looting 3,044 
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Physical torture 2,051 
Rape 626 
Sexual abuse 486 
Sexual slavery 191 
Source: Ball, 1996; Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004 
 
6.2 The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The civil war in Sierra Leone ended with the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement on 7 
July, 1999. Article XXVI of the peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone 
and the rebel RUF called for the establishment of a TRC within 90 days of signing of the 
agreement. However, the TRC was not enacted by the President and parliament of Sierra 
Leone until 2000 with the final report being issued in October 2004 (International Centre for 
Transitional Justice, 2010).  
 
6.2.1 Background of the establishment 
In June 1999, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights offered technical assistance to 
help establish the Sierra Leone TRC and the President accepted the offer (HRW, 2003). 
Between July and December 1999, the OHCHR- organised many consultations with civil 
groups, government representatives and the RUF. A working group under the National Forum 
for Human Rights was also established and the terms of reference for the TRC drafted. These 
included the recommendation that the TRC should consist of both national and international 
commissioners as the international commissioners would be free of parochial interests and 
bring fresh perspectives to the commission.  
 
The resumption of armed conflict in Sierra Leone in May 2000 disrupted the peace building 
process (Sola-Martin, 2009). A ceasefire was negotiated and the peace agreement was signed 
in Abuja, Nigeria in November 2000 with disarmament commencing in May 2001. The 
Security Council, the Secretary General of the UN and the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights again supported and encouraged the Government of Sierra Leone and an environment 
was created to establish the TRC among the warring parties in March 2001.  
The Sierra Leone government prepared a bill and on 22nd November 2000, the Parliament of 
Sierra Leone passed into law the TRC Act (TRC Act, 2000; James-Allen et al, 2003). To 
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support the adoption of the Bill, OHCHR representatives were in the country consulting 
different parties to prepare a detailed plan of activities (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). These 
included the selection process of commissioners, a strategic framework for a public 
awareness programme, research on traditional methods of conflict resolution and conflict 
management, and a project to first, identify violations and abuses committed during the 
conflict and ‘map’ the key incidents and second, to establish an interim secretariat for the 
commission. The commission consisted of three executive secretaries, 216 staff members, 21 
consultants, and 14 interns, as detailed in Table 3. 
 
6.2.2 The objectives/ role of TRC in Sierra Leone 
Similar to TRCs in different countries, the TRC in Sierra Leone was established to identify 
and address the human rights violations in the country during the civil war. As described in 
the Lome Peace Agreement, the TRC was to be a catharsis for constructive interchange 
between victims and perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses to help create and 
present a clear picture of the past (Section 1, Article XXVI). The principal objectives of the 
TRC in Sierra Leone can be discussed in three parts. 
  
First, the TRC was to investigate the causes, nature and extent of the human rights violations/ 
abuses as well as international humanitarian law abuses (Sierra Leonean TRC Act, Sec. 6). It 
would find out whether the violations were deliberately planned by a government, group or 
individual. Similarly, the role of internal, as well as external factors, would be investigated 
and reported in full (Sierra Leonean TRC Act, 2000, Sec. 6, Clause- a). 
 
Second, the TRC was to help restore the human rights and dignity of victims to promote 
reconciliation in the country. The TRC would provide a forum for both victims and 
perpetrators to tell their truths. Hence, the TRC would facilitate reconciliation, promote 
healing and work toward preventing future violations (Sierra Leonean TRC Act, 2000, Sec. 6, 
Clause-b). 
 
Third, the TRC would utilise all measures available to establish and maintain peace (Clause- 
c). For example, it could raise funds from both governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. However, it had to submit a financial report to the government on a quarterly 
basis (Section 1, Clause 12).  
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6.2.3 The Structure/ Composition of the TRC 
In May 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone proceeded with the establishment of the 
commission. Seven commissioners were named by President Kabbah and duly sworn into 
office in July 2002 (Sierra Leonean TRC Act, 2000, Article 3 (1)). Among the seven 
commissioners, four men and three women, four were Sierra Leoneans and three were 
internationals from Gambia, Canada and South Africa. The chairman was Sierra Leonean 
Bishop, Dr. Joseph Humper (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). The different backgrounds of the 
TRC commissioners allowed the commission to focus on different areas (Boraine and et al, 
1994). For example, the lawyers sought justice, human rights figures could seek the truth, and 
religious leaders could promote healing and forgiveness (Dumbuya, 2003).  
Table 6.3: Structure of the Sierra Leone TRC 
TRC Committee Nationalities 
Commissioners- 7  
(Women-3 and  
Men-4) 
Sierra Leone- 4 
Gambia-1  
Canada-1 
S. Africa-1 
Others  
Executive secretaries-3 
Staff members-216 
Consultants-21 
Interns-14 
Sierra Leone 
Source: Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004 
6.2.4 Findings and Recommendations of Sierra Leonean TRC 
The Sierra Leone TRC gathered information on the abuses committed during the civil war 
and made several major recommendations.  The findings and recommendations are discussed 
below. 
6.2.4.1 Findings 
The Sierra Leonean TRC presented the final report on 5 October, 2004. The report identified 
the major causes of the ongoing conflict and the consequences of the war between 1991 and 
2002. The Sierra Leonean TRC (2004) concluded different factors, both internal and external, 
made the conflict inevitable. These factors included years of bad governance, greed, endemic 
corruption, nepotism and the denial of basic human rights. In combination, these factors 
84 
 
created deplorable conditions and deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people 
to a state of poverty. The political elites plundered the nation’s assets and the government 
mismanaged the country’s natural resources, including its mineral riches (Sierra Leonean 
TRC, 2004, vol. 2, Arts. 13-17, p. 27); government accountability was non-existent at the 
expense of the national good.  
 
The TRC traced the different and diverse causes of the Sierra Leone conflict from historical 
antecedents in the colonial period to post-independence years, in particular, the years 
preceding the outbreak of violence in 1991. Prior to 1991, each regime implemented self-
serving mechanisms instead of positive and progressive policies in the country (Sierra 
Leonean TRC, 2004). This undermined democracy and killed the rule of law, creating the 
potential for violence to erupt. Bad governance and institutional collapse weakened the army, 
police, judiciary and civil service during the post independent period between 1961 and 1991 
(ibid). A culture of intolerance for the rights of others developed among the political elites 
who were in key decision making position (Keen, 2003; Abdullah, 1998). The government 
also favoured certain ethnic groups and appointed members of them in cabinet, civil service 
and the army. In time, this created divisions among ethnic groups and created fierce rivalries 
(Shearer 1997, p. 849; Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). Ultimately, this also fuelled the civil war 
in Sierra Leone, especially among the youth (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
 
The TRC also found that among the immediate antecedents to the armed conflict in Sierra 
Leone, major external causes were the outbreak of armed conflict in Liberia, as well as Libya, 
and the role played by Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL), who provided organisational oversight to the NPFL and RUF (Abdullah, 1998; 
Richard, 1996). A joint agenda to instigate a civil war in Sierra Leone was developed by 
Taylor and Foday, the leader of the RUF, in 1990 and 1991, and the insurgency was launched 
in Liberia in December 1989 (see Chapter 5). The Sierra Leone army failed to prevent attacks 
in the border area with Liberia and this also brought the civil war into Sierra Leone from 
Liberia via the joint plans and attacks by the NPFL and the RUF in 1991 (Sierra Leonean 
TRC, 2004, Vol 2). 
 
All these factors contributed to the collapse of an effective political system, particularly 
during the one party rule of the APC between 1969 and 1985.  The people lost all faith in the 
ruling class to act with integrity and to deliver basic services to the nation and population. 
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This, in turn, led them to believe a revolutionary movement could bring positive change to 
the country. Hence, the resulting civil war can be seen as the final convulsion of a failed 
system (Reno, 1995). 
 
6.2.4.2 Recommendations 
The TRC’s recommendations from two years of work focussed on building a new Sierra 
Leone based on the values of human dignity, tolerance and respect for the rights of all 
persons. Primarily, the recommendations intended to create an open and vibrant democracy in 
which all Sierra Leoneans were treated equally. The Sierra Leonean TRC Report (2004) 
further highlighted the need to confront the legacies of dehumanization, hatred and fear by 
promoting tolerance, not prejudice; a need for acknowledgment, not recrimination; a need for 
reparation, not retribution; a need for community, not victimization; a need for 
understanding, not suspicion; and a need for reconstruction, not greed. 
 
The TRC’s core recommendations related to the protection of human rights, the 
establishment of the rule of law, improved security services, promoting good governance, 
fighting corruption, and protecting the human rights of youth, woman and children. The 
recommendations also included the promotion of regional integration and unity by external 
actors, accountability for the proceeds from mineral resources, the building of the national 
justice system, reparations, and reconciliation - including guiding principles and 
reconciliation activities. Other areas of focus were a national vision of going forward, 
archiving of commission documentation, dissemination of the TRC Report and the 
establishment of a follow-up committee (Conflict Management and Development Associate 
et al., n.d., pp.123–125; Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
 
The establishment of a National Human Rights Commission was recommended strongly by 
the TRC. To foster the human rights, the commission focused on and recommended that 
preserving human dignity be a fundamental right in the constitution. The Commission also 
highlighted other measures to strengthen human rights such as abolishing the death penalty, 
ratifying international human rights treaties, and avoiding criminal sanctions. The TRC was 
particularly concerned to protect the human rights of youth, women and children, viewing 
this as a national emergency. The TRC further recommended discrimination against women 
be repealed by statutory and custody laws. To support this, they recommended political 
parties should ensure certain quotas were met, especially in public elections to represent the 
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government. Children would be protected through education, with failing to send a child to 
school until 18 years of age and trafficking, sexual exploitation and child labour being 
criminal acts (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
 
The TRC recommended the establishment of the rule of law, especially on judicial services, 
so that civilians could access proper justice in the country. Broadening the representation on 
the judicial services commission and increased representation of the Bar were key 
recommendations in this area. Along with this, the commission recommended creating an 
autonomous judiciary with budgetary independence, incorporating local courts into the 
judicial system and establishing a public defence system. Another recommendation of the 
TRC (2004) was that the security service in Sierra Leone be apolitical so that no political 
party or the leader could influence it.  
 
Importantly, the TRC recommended reparation procedures to promote permanent peace in the 
country. Activities such as apologies from all actors who were involved in the conflict and 
celebrating a national peace day as well as a national reconciliation day (18th of January every 
year) aimed to promote reconciliation. Further, the TRC recommended observing traditional 
and religious activities, and social and recreational activities, to play a vital role in 
reconciliation. The continuation of government support for trauma counselling and support 
for the activities of the District Reconciliation and Support Committees set up by the TRC 
and the Inter-Religious Council were other important recommendations of the commission 
(Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004, chapter 2, vol 3). The TRC also strongly recommended 
responding to victims’ specific needs in health, education, and economically through skill 
training and micro credit initiatives such as a monthly pension (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
 
Lastly, the TRC recommended the government archive all the documents for future reference 
and establish a follow up committee to monitor the activities of the government, according to 
the TRC Act and Lome Peace agreement 1999 (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). The follow up 
committee would have four representatives from civil society, including a woman and a 
youth, and would report quarterly and annually, for one year only (Sierra Leonean TRC, 
2004). 
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6.3 The TRC: Strengths and limitations  
The Sierra Leonean TRC successfully completed its mandate to determine gross human rights 
violations and the root causes of the 11 year civil war. Two of the most significant successes 
of the TRC in Sierra Leone were the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission 
and the public apology by President Ernest Bai Koroma in March 2010 to all women for the 
violations they suffered during the conflict (Dougherty, 2004b; Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
The TRC identified the suppression of political expression between 1969 and 1985 as a major 
contributor to the war and addressed this by strongly recommending freedom of expression, 
and in particular, equal political representation of youths and women without discrimination 
to help further promote a vibrant and healthy democracy (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004).  
The establishment of the Anti-corruption Commission (ACC) and broadening the campaign 
against corruption were other victories of the TRC that provided stronger procedures to fight 
against corruption (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). Importantly, the TRC recommended the new 
leaders commit themselves to the principles of leadership as committed leadership is vital for 
good governance and to control corruption. 
The TRC was successful in recommending the establishment of a Trust Fund as a reparation 
mechanism (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). The Fund was to be utilized to offer help such as 
health treatment, free education to all the children of victims, skill training for small business 
and micro-projects. It was also to focus on specific categories of people such as amputees, 
children, victims of sexual violence and certain groups of war wounded (Stovel, 2006). The 
TRC was also successful in recommending increasing solidarity among victims and 
perpetrators as symbolic reparation. The adoption of new principles in the constitution for 
national security to help protect the country from external influences in the future was 
another important success of the commission.  
The TRC largely failed however to communicate its purposes and procedures to the local 
communities (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004, p. 161; Sawyer et al., 2007; Miller, 2010). The 
delays in its establishment, the shortness of time and its limited budget of severely limited its 
success. It could spend only one week in each province for public hearings. Moreover, 
although many people wanted to testify, only a small number were chosen to and only a small 
amount of time was allocated to them (Dougherty, 2004b, pp. 43, 44). Similarly, 
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reconciliation efforts were largely left to the localities (ibid, p. 44). Hence, the TRC could not 
collect statements from many victims (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004, p. 169).  
Specifically, the TRC could not undertake comprehensive fact finding missions to establish 
accurate and fair accounts of history. The commission could not comprehensively outline the 
antecedents of the conflict or the role of major violators, as an example, the RUF bore the 
greatest responsibility for the war (60.5% of all violations) but the TRC was not able to take 
critical testimony from its members (Painter, 2009). It did acknowledge victimization 
officially and this began the important work of healing (Hayner, 1994, p. 607) and 
reconciliation to move the country beyond its tortured past (Gibson, 2006, p.410). However 
the TRC did not adequately focus on reconciliation due to its greater focus on the truth 
component (for example, investigation, details, facts, and so on) than on the reconciliation 
component (for example, healing, making amends, coming together, and so forth) (Park, 
2010). 
Lastly, the Commission failed to offer any specific and sufficient means for the funding of 
various schemes like health care (a complete physical and psycho-social support), education, 
skill training for people with disabilities, micro grants for small business, pensions, 
agricultural support for farming families and community and symbolic reparation. These 
areas of the TRC were unsuccessful.  
 
Table 6.4: Strengths and Limitations of Sierra Leonean TRC 
Strengths 
S.N. Causes of war which was addressed Recommendations 
1. Suppression of political expression Freedom of expression 
2. Exclusion of society-at-large by 
political elites 
Increase the level of representation 
especially of youths and women 
3. Resources exploitation Government accountability 
4. Corruption New Bill, a new culture of ethics and 
service and fight the scourge of 
corruption, establishment of Anti-
corruption Commission (ACC), 
commitment of leaders, anti-corruption 
campaign 
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5. Human Rights violations Establishment of National Human Rights 
Commission 
6. Reparation Trust Fund, helping in education, health, 
skill trainings, community reparation, 
symbolic reparation 
7. External political effects National security 
Limitations/ weaknesses 
S.N. Weaknesses Reasons 
1. Delayed functioning Rules and regulations, support from 
government and political parties 
2. Inadequate collection of statements all 
in all 
Short time 
3. Inadequate focus on reconciliation Greater focus on the truth component 
4. Inadequate fulfilment of various 
schemes 
Lack of funding 
Source: Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004 
 
6.4 Conclusion: 
In conclusion, the Sierra Leonean TRC was successful in finding the root causes of conflict. 
Additionally, it was successful in promoting accountability in government leaders towards 
the country and its people. The establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, 
Anti-corruption Commission as well as the Trust Fund were other strengths of the TRC in 
Sierra Leone. However, it was slow functioning and unsuccessful in collecting statements 
from all the victims and perpetrators. The lack of funds and short time contributed the TRC 
making inadequate recommendations to address key areas of need such as health care, 
education, agriculture, and pensions or to meaningfully promoting avenues of reconciliation.  
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CHAPTER 7:  Case study of the South African Civil War and Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
  
 
7.1 Background of the conflict 
South Africa is the southernmost country in Africa, covering 471, 359 square miles of land 
with close to 53 million people making up the population. It is bounded on the south by 2,798 
kilometers of coastline stretching along the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2015), on the north by the neighboring countries 
of Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe, on the east by Mozambique and Swaziland, and it 
surrounds the Kingdom of Lesotho. Its largest city is Johannesburg, the legislative capital is 
Cape Town, the administrative capital is Pretoria and the judicial capital is Bloemfontein. 
South Africa is a multiethnic society with a wide variety of cultures, languages, and religions. 
The population is approximately 80% black (African), 10per cent white (European) and 9per 
cent people of mixed white and black descent. The constitution recognizes 11 official 
languages, which is among the highest number of any country in the world. Nine of these 
languages are indigenous - Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Sotho, Swazi, Venda, Ndebele, Pedi and 
Tsonga - and the two are of European origin, being Afrikaans and English. About 80per cent 
of the population are Christian and a small number are Muslims, Hindu, Jews and followers 
of traditional African religions. The UNDP ranked South Africa at 119th position in its scale 
(HDR, 2016). 
 
The history of conflict in South Africa dates back to the 16th century with the arrival of the 
first European settlers of Dutch, German and French ancestry, known as Boers, the 
Afrikaans’ word for farmer. The gradual expansion of these new settlers, both in land and 
colonial powers over the next 150 years, changed into conflict, especially between the 
Xhosas, Zulus, and Afrikaners. In 1806, during the Napoleonic Wars, the British officially 
seized the Cape (where the Dutch East Indian Company first landed in 1652), to prevent 
further occupation by the French. Gradually, the British began to assert their rule, forcing the 
Boers to change their lifestyle and language, and abolishing slavery in 1834. British rule was 
formalized and the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 spurred competition 
among the British, Boers and native South Africans for wealth and immigration; it also 
intensified the subjugation of the native inhabitants. The Boers actively resisted British 
encroachments but were defeated in the Boer War that lasted from 1899 to1902. The result 
was a Union of South Africa that operated under a policy of apartheid i.e. the separate 
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development of the races - Boers and native, black South Africans. On 31 May 1910, the 
Union of South Africa became an independent state within the British Commonwealth and in 
1961 the country left the Commonwealth and became the Republic of South Africa 
(Saunders, 2002).  
 
While the policy of apartheid began after the Boer War between 1899 and 1902, and it was 
formally established when the National Party (NP) took power in 1948. In 1950, under 
apartheid, the population were classified by race under the Group Areas Act that segregated 
blacks and whites (Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999). In 1954, J. G. Strijdom drove apartheid 
legislation even further and in 1958, his successor, H. F. Verwoerd, refined and theoretically 
substantiated the apartheid ideology (Migykra, 2008). Until the first half of the 20th century, 
the conflicts or protests about apartheid were non-violent, however these changes resulted in 
mass protests against the government which signalled the beginning of civil war in South 
Africa (International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 2009).  
 
During this time, black resistance, under the leadership of the African National Congress 
(ANC), had consolidated (ARP, 1986). Mass protests against apartheid occurred and resulted 
in the government banning all opposition groups and organizations. This was ineffective as 
the resistance organizations became militant and went underground. In 1960, a demonstration 
took place at Sharpeville against the white government (Rees et al, 2002). The NP repressed 
it by killing 70 black demonstrators. In 1976, in the Soweto uprising, thousands of pupils 
who were demonstrating against Afrikaans being made a compulsory school subject were 
shot.  Unrest spread throughout the country and ANC backed guerrilla warfare on military 
personnel and government facilities escalated in South Africa, resulting in a full police state 
(Heston et al, 2002; ICTJ, 2009). This situation lasted until 1989 when the last President of 
the old South African government, F. W. de Klerk, openly admitted the failure of apartheid 
policies. This opened the door to multi-party negotiations, with the first general elections held 
in South Africa on 27 April 1994. This resulted in Nelson Mandela being inaugurated as the 
first democratically elected President of the Republic of South Africa (Tutu, 1998). 
 
7.1.1 The warring parties 
 
The warring parties in South Africa can be divided as non-government and government 
groups, as shown in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Lists of actors in the conflict in South Africa 
S.N. Non-Government groups: 
1 PAC- Pan Africanist Congress 
2 ANC- African National Congress 
3 UDF- United Democratic Front 
4 AZAPO- Azanian People’s Organisation 
5 APLA- Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
6 MK- Umkhonto we Sizwe 
7 IFA- Inkatha Freedom Party 
8 HCF- Homeland security forces 
9 ROG- Right-wing opposition groups 
10 Third Force 
11 Civil society- General people 
 
 Government groups: 
1 SAP- South African Police 
2 SADF- South African Defence Force 
Source: Davis, 1987; Thompson, 1995; South African TRC, 1998 
 
7.1.2 Consequences of conflict 
 
The impacts of the civil war on the people and country of South Africa were wide spread. 
One of the most important pillars for the development of a country, the economy, was 
destroyed. Gross human violations also took place during the 34 years of apartheid rule in 
South Africa.  In combination, these factors had an immense economic cost with 29per cent 
of survivors losing income as a direct result of violation (South African TRC, 1998, vol. 5, 
p.154).  These violations were perpetrated by all the warring parties and resulted in long-term 
psychological, physical, social and economical problems for the people and the country 
(South African TRC, 1998). Repression and exploitation severely affected the mental and 
physical wellbeing of the majority of people due to dire socio-economic deprivation, violent 
state repression and intra-community conflicts. Torture and other severe mistreatments (Table 
2) often caused depression, anxiety disorders and psychotic conditions (TRC, 1998, vol. 5, p. 
129), resulting in the loss of independence and dignity (National Institute of Mental Health, 
1998). Survivors of abuse also reported an increased risk of infectious diseases, malignancies, 
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and heart disease from torture or prolonged arbitrary detention (Basoglu et al, 1998; South 
African TRC, 1998, vol 5). These physical injuries had multiple effects on the individual and 
on the family and community. 
 
Table 7.2:  The major causes of psychological trauma 
Rape and punitive solitary confinement Sexual assault, abuse and harassment 
Physical beating, injuries Shot, injuries 
Burnings (by fire, petrol, chemicals) Injury by drugs, poison, other chemicals 
Mutilation (including amputation of body 
parts, breaking of bones, pulling out of 
nails, hair, or teeth or scalping) 
Detention without charge or trial 
Banning/ banishment Destruction of a person’s house 
Deliberate failure to provide medical 
attention in custody 
Deliberate withholding of food and water in 
custody 
Source: South African TRC, vol 1, 1998 
 
Physical injuries and disabilities were common during the conflict in South Africa with most 
caused by torture, shooting by the police into demonstrating or fleeing crowds, physical 
attacks and beatings and/or failed assassination attempts (South African TRC, 1998, vol.5, 
ch.4, p.140). South Africa also experienced unique types of killing such as burning and 
necklace killing (Ball, 1994).  The concept of necklacing originated from the Eastern Cape in 
early 1985 when angry residents put a rubber car tyre around the neck of a community 
councillor, who was accused of having links to a vigilante group, and set it on fire as revenge 
for 21 people being shot down by the police (South African TRC, 1998, vol 2, p. 388). 
Necklacing then spread to other areas of the country.  
 
Table 7.3: Data of Burning and Necklace killing in South Africa 
Year Total political violence deaths Necklace/ Burning 
1984 175 3/3 
1985 922 67/28 
1986 1352 306/84 
1987 706 19/35 
1988 1149 10/20 
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1989 1403 --/21 
Total 5707 700/ 191 
Source: South African TRC, 1998, vol. 2, p. 389 
 
The civil war also negatively impacted the family and social life as it contributed to family 
violence, disruptions of traditional and social cultures, invasion of homes, separation of 
family members and inter family conflicts in the community (South African TRC, 1998). 
Prolonged detentions also resulted in the breakdown of marital relationships due to their 
inability to function in expected family and social roles (Rupp & Sorel, 1998). This caused 
family disintegration, poverty and the degradation of living conditions (Engdahl & Fairbank, 
1998; HRC, 1990). An unmeasured cost included the value of time contributed by family 
members to caring for their sick family members as many had to leave their job or business 
which added further stress on the family (South African TRC, 1998,, vol. 5, ch.4, p. 154). 
Economic hardship disrupted 51% of people’s relationships due to the loss of income. 
Further, this cost was not confined to one generation as it hampered future generations 
through disrupted schooling and a lower ability to earn (South African TRC, 1998, vol. 2, 
ch.4, p. 154). 
 
7.2 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
The repression that underpinned life in South Africa during apartheid is well known, as is the 
resistance to it (Monama, 1996 cited in Stanley, E, 2011). From racial oppression, to torture, 
massacre and economic deprivation, the violence suffered by the masses was upheld on 
economic, political and judicial terms (Davis, 1991). The TRC, established under Nelson 
Mandela’s government on 19 July I995, heralded the most ambitious and organised attempt 
to deal with crimes of a past regime through a concept of truth (Amnesty, 1992; Wilson, 
1995). 
 
7.2.1 Background of the establishment   
 
After nearly 20 years of civil war, the political delegates met in Johannesburg under the 
auspices of convening a democratic South Africa (Thompson, 1995). Although this meeting 
failed, it led to a series of secret meetings that facilitated a return to the negotiating table 
(South African TRC, 1998). The participating parties agreed on an interim constitution in 
November 1993 with democratic elections to be held in April 1994. In recognition that 
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political change would not be enough to heal the damage caused by decades of political 
struggle (Interim constitution, Ch. 16, 1993), the South African TRC was established to seek 
truthfulness from all participants in the South African conflict and offer amnesty with respect 
to crimes that might have been committed (DeRouen & Heo, 2007).  
 
The National Unity and Reconciliation Act (the Act 1995) charged the TRC with i) 
investigating and documenting as complete a picture as possible of gross human rights 
violations committed within or outside South Africa in the period 1960 to 1994 and ii) to 
fairly and fully report the motives and perspectives of both the alleged perpetrators of gross 
human rights violations and of their victims. This was a difficult, challenging but necessary 
task to promote reconciliation and the reconstruction of a new democratic society that valued 
national unity and hoped to establish a more peaceful future (Stanley, 2001). 
 
7.2.2 The objectives/ Role of TRC in South Africa 
 
The South African TRC was conceived as part of the bridge-building process designed to 
help lead the nation away from a deeply divided past to a future founded on the recognition 
of human rights and democracy. In other words, the telling of the truth about past gross 
human rights violations, as viewed from different perspectives, sought to facilitate the 
process of understanding divided pasts, whilst publicly acknowledging previously “untold 
suffering and injustice” (South African TRC, 1998, vol. 1, ch. 4, p.48). It also sought to help 
restore the dignity of victims and afford perpetrators the opportunity to come to terms with 
their own past (South African TRC, 1998; Preucel & Mrozowski, 2010).  
 
The South African TRC had four major tasks to achieve to help promote national unity and 
reconciliation (South African TRC Act, 1995, Sec 14). The first task was to analyse and 
describe the causes, nature and extent of gross violations of human rights that occurred 
between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994, including the identification of the individuals and 
organisations responsible for such violations. Second, it was to make recommendations of 
reparation and rehabilitation to the President on measures to prevent future violations of 
human rights. Third, it was to help restore the human and civil dignity of victims of gross 
human rights violations through testimony and through the recommendations to the President 
for reparations to victims. Fourth, it was to grant amnesty to persons who made full 
disclosure of relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective.   
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7.2.3 The structure/ composition of the TRC 
 
South Africa was the first country to initiate sustained public involvement in the 
commissioner selection process (Graybill, 2002). Nominations were first solicited from civil 
society and nominees were interviewed by a selection panel which was itself multiracial and 
included representatives from major political parties, trade unions and civil society. After 
public interviews with almost 300 nominees, the selection panel created a shortlist of 
candidates. Of these, 25 names were presented to the President and cabinet. The President 
then requested that the public submit questions for the final interview, further increasing 
public participation and interest, before he selected the final 17 commissioners. The 
commissioners had various political backgrounds and included human rights activists, 
lawyers, theologians, historians, social workers and psychologists (Government Gazette No. 
16885, 1995). To assist the TRC in meeting its objectives, the TRC Act established three sub-
committees, the Committee on Human Rights Violations (HRV Committee), the Committee 
on Amnesty (Amnesty Committee) and the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation 
(R&R Committee). The TRC also had its own investigative unit and witness protection 
program (South African TRC, 1998). 
 
Table 7.4: Structure of the South African TRC 
Main Committee Different Committees Different Units 
TRC Committee 
-17 members 
1. Human Rights Violations 
Committee 
- 8 members 
1. Investigation Unit- support to 
Human Rights Violations and 
Amnesty Committees 
2. Amnesty Committee 
- 3 members 
2. Department of Justice- assists 
in establishing office and 
infrastructure of TRC 
3. Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Committee 
- 5 members 
 
Source: Migyirka, 2008; South African TRC, 1998 
 
7.2.4 Findings and recommendations of South African TRC 
 
The findings and recommendations of South African TRC are presented below. 
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7.2.4.1 Findings 
The TRC of South Africa presented its final report to the President on 29 October 1998 (South 
African TRC, 1998). It found the major causes of conflict in South Africa stemmed from the 
country’s long-term socio-political situation which the TRC described in four parts, the Cold 
War, the anti-colonial/ decolonization context, the apartheid context and the racism context. 
The international climate of Cold War was a foundational cause of the civil war in South 
Africa, contributing to the particularly virulent form of anti-Communism and anti-Marxism 
that took root in South Africa after the 1948 election victory of the NP. The anti-Communist 
zeal of the Cold War was an important factor in shaping the South African government’s 
actions in the 1960s. This was exacerbated by South Africa’s diplomatic alienation with 
Britain and the Commonwealth in the early 1960s as the notion of a common struggle against 
Communism and its forces was popular among key policymakers in the country. In this, the 
adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955, the relationship between the ANC and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) after 1960, and the ANC’s later links to China and then the 
Soviet bloc entrenched the ruling government’s perceptions of Communism and the struggle 
against white domination. The TRC found that South African society became largely divided 
into two opposing and rival groups, Communists and Marxists. As such, all opposing parties 
were labelled as Communist due to the global Cold War environment between 1960 and 
1994. Likewise, any black opposition was considered illegitimate, and those associated with 
such opposition were criminalised. This was another factor contributing to the start of the 
civil war in South Africa (South African TRC, 1998, vol. 2). 
 
The second wider context that contributed to the civil war was the anti-colonial resistance 
movement in Africa, particularly in the neighbouring territories of Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
Angola and Mozambique. This occurred over the same period and became deeply entangled 
with the South African struggle. Although the liberation movement was dominated by the 
non-racialism (maintain the vision of racial equality) of the ANC and anti-racism of other 
movements such as Black Consciousness, some organisations interpreted it as a struggle 
against whites. The tide of decolonisation that swept through Africa served only to reinforce 
the tendency of whites to regard blacks as the enemy (South African TRC, 1998).  
 
The third and most direct political context was the NP policy of apartheid, long rooted in 
colonialism and segregation that was increasingly prevalent from 1948, particularly after the 
banning of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the ANC in 1960. This caused direct 
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struggles between the oppressed and the oppressors that intensified into armed conflict over 
subsequent years. The apartheid system was maintained through repressive means, depriving 
the majority of South Africans of the most basic human rights, including civil, political, 
social and economic rights. Its legacy was a society in which vast numbers of people suffered 
from pervasive poverty and lack of opportunities and this drove the people to protest against 
the government (South African TRC, 1998). 
 
The fourth key reason for long-term conflict in South Africa was entrenched racism. As an 
ideology, racism was a means of domination and oppression, providing the central grounds 
for the systematic exclusion, segregation and denigration of the black majority. Due to 
racism, progress in South Africa was by ‘separate development’; any developments for 
blacks were slower as they were regarded as essentially different from the ‘white’ people. 
Politicians, leading academics, scientists, theologians and churches such as the Dutch 
Reformed Church (DRC) provided constant fuel to bolster such ideological positions. This 
served to distance and dehumanise the black population and opened the way for violence 
(South African TRC, 1998).  
 
The discrimination and differentiation of black to white people fuelled apartheid. For 
example, the policy of consistent racial separation introduced in 1910 curtailed the rights of 
the black majority (Kumarasamy, 2012).  The ‘Mines and Works Act’ of 1911 limited black 
workers exclusively to manual work with better positions going to white workers (Stewart, 
2012). The ‘Native Land Act’ of 1913 set aside 7.3% of South African territory as 
reservations for black people and barred them from buying land outside these areas (ibid). 
Marriage or any love relationship between members of different racial groups was forbidden, 
and in all public institutions and offices, in public transport and public toilets, racial 
segregation was enforced. More detrimental however was the apartheid education system. 
The so-called Bantu education did not encourage black children to learn formal subjects and 
instead included dish washing and weeding of flowerbeds. Deprived of the right to vote or to 
strike, the black population had no political influence. Hence, the African National Congress 
(ANC), and other resistance and liberation movements emerged (ibid). 
 
The TRC (1998) named the state and its security forces as the primary perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights in South Africa between 1960 and 1994. In these unlawful 
activities, the state acted with certain political groups such as the Inkatha Freedom Party 
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(IFP). The secondary largest perpetrators were allies of the state. For example, members of 
the State Security Council (SSC), including former President P. W. Botha, were responsible 
for unlawful activities such as killing political opponents and gross abuses of human rights. 
Their militant rhetoric created an acceptable climate where violations of human rights were 
possible. The TRC thus found them guilty of official tolerance of violations and accountable 
for such violations. 
 
The former government and its official bodies like the cabinet of the government, the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS), the security branch of the South African Police (SAP) 
and the SADF (South African Defence Force) perpetrated different human rights violations 
(South African TRC, 1998, p. 223). They also deliberately and systematically destroyed state 
and official documentation, in particular, valuable documentation of extra-parliamentary 
opposition to apartheid over a number of years. The mass destruction of records impacted on 
South Africa’s social memory and also severely hampered the work of the TRC to promote 
reconciliation and healing through a disclosure of the past (South African TRC, 1998, vol.5, 
ch.6, pg 226).  
 
Finally, the TRC found other elements in society acted as allies of the state in carrying out 
human rights abuses. These groups included Homeland Security Forces, Inkatha Freedom 
Party, Right-wing opposition groups, the Third Force, ANC, PAC, United democratic Front 
(UDF), and civil society (health sector, faith communities, business sector, media, and 
judiciary) (South African TRC, 1998). 
 
7.2.4.2 Recommendations 
The South African TRC worked for seven years to fulfil its objectives of finding the truth of 
gross human rights violations and recommending measures to establish peace. It made 
different recommendations for peace through reparation, rehabilitation, reconciliation, and 
changes in rules and regulations (South African TRC, 1998, vol. 5, ch.8). Primarily, it 
recommended an ongoing commitment to reconciliation and unity, healing, reparation and 
rehabilitation to help prevent gross human rights violations in the future and promote 
organizational management. 
 
The TRC requested the President to call a National Summit on Reconciliation as a part of its 
recommendations (South African TRC, 1998, vol. 5, p. 304). To prevent a repetition of the 
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past, the TRC recommended the government close the gap between the advantaged and 
disadvantaged in society, create job opportunities, prioritize economic justice against poverty 
and take all possible measures to overcome racism (South African TRC, 1998, vol. 5, ch. 8, 
p. 308). To complete the reconciliation and peace process, the TRC recommended that 
prosecution be considered for perpetrators where evidence existed and when amnesty was not 
sought or denied (South African TRC, 1998, vol 5, p. 309). 
  
To promote healing and rehabilitation, the TRC recommended the government fully utilize 
the services of non-government organizations (NGOs) to establish clinical and other 
appropriate services to facilitate the rehabilitation of perpetrators. Similarly, it recommended 
reparations of financial support of US$3,500 each year, for six years, to each victim or 
family. Further, the TRC recommended the government to address the rule of law, human 
rights practice, transparency, accountability and to root out corruption and other forms of 
criminality at all levels of society. To further advance this, the TRC recommended other 
sectors such as prisons educate prisoners and officers about human rights and for faith 
communities to promote reconciliation by developing appropriate theologies (South African 
TRC, 1998, vol.5, pp. 309, 313, 315, 316).  
 
The TRC recommended the establishment of a business reconciliation fund as well as the 
creation and reservation of jobs and skill training, especially for victims. Resource generating 
programs such as compensation with land, as well as providing banking services to the 
victims, aimed to promote economic development and reduce the gap between rich and poor. 
The Commission further recommended the government and business sectors to facilitate 
economic development, industrial growth and agricultural expansion (South African TRC, 
1998, vol. 5, pp. 319-321). 
 
The TRC emphasized the importance of the justice system in aiding the establishment of 
peace. Hence, it recommended access to justice for victims of crime by establishing a serious 
crimes compensation fund, as exists in countries like Australia, if feasible. They also 
recommended access to justice for accused persons, and training and education to administer 
justice, the protection of witnesses and complainants. The reformation of different aspects of 
society such as the security forces, armed forces and the health sector was also necessary to 
protect against gross human rights violations. The controls on the media were also reduced so 
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that it could play a role in uncovering and exposing evidence of gross violations of human 
rights (South African TRC, 1998, vol. 5, pp. 322-332, 334, 341). 
 
Lastly, the TRC recommended the government of South Africa ratify the international 
covenant on civil and political rights, archive the works of the TRC, and prevent records of 
the country being destroyed, however unpleasant.  The TRC recommended and urged that the 
President of the Republic of South Africa, as the Head of State, apologise to all victims on 
behalf of perpetrators from the security forces of the former state, and armed forces of the 
liberation movements, who committed gross violations of human rights (South African TRC, 
1998, vol.5, pp. 337, 343, 345, 348). 
 
7.3 The TRC: Strengths and limitations 
 
South Africa experienced 34 years of apartheid so the TRC had a broad area to cover to help 
establish peace in the country. Basically, the TRC was established to find the truth of gross 
violations of human rights, including the whereabouts of victims and identifying those 
responsible for human rights abuses, either directly or indirectly. Similarly, it was established 
to recommend steps to reform the institutions, provide reparation to the victims for the harm 
they had suffered and punish perpetrators. In these regards, the TRC of South Africa was 
successful. 
 
The South African TRC also succeeded in educating the South African population about its 
functions and procedures. The South African Broadcast Corporation aired special reports on 
the TRC every Sunday from April 1996 until March 1998, and the program often scored 
amongst the most popular on South African television (Gibson, 2006). Hence, the TRC was 
successful in getting the attention of the people, persuading them of its views of the struggle 
over apartheid and collecting the truth on the conflict. Due largely to this, the TRC process 
was persuasive and succeeded, in part due, to the nature of the truth it promulgated (Gibson, 
2006). Although there were limited available means, the TRC was also successful in 
uncovering past atrocities (Theissen, 1999) and establishing that gross human rights 
violations were committed (Dyzenhaus, 2000, p. 483). The TRC had a clear vision to address 
the economic causes of the civil war so another area of success was to provide the ways to 
reduce the economic differences between the poor and rich such as the creation of job 
opportunities, prioritization of economic justice against poverty, and taking all possible 
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measures to overcome racism through a business reconciliation fund (TRC, 1998, vol. 5, p. 
308).  
 
Further, the commission was successful in identifying historical causes that intensified the 
conflict in the country. As the commission acknowledged, the system of rule established 
during the apartheid era was one of the main causes of civil war in the country. For example, 
whites were granted access to the rule of law but black citizens were not; ‘Giving victims an 
opportunity to tell their stories is [also] a form of recognition that acknowledges the historical 
fact of their exclusion from legal recognition ... [and] is related to justice ... because it 
acknowledges the injustice of the exclusions that made [it possible for] abuses [to occur]’ 
(Dyzenhaus, 2000, p. 484). 
 
The most important success of the South African TRC was, as Beer and Fouche (2000) 
analyzed, publishing a report criticized by all sides of the political divide. Former President F 
W de Klerk managed to remove some of the most damaging findings about him. Similarly, 
the ANC tried to stop the release of the report because it was strongly criticized for human 
rights abuses and for violations committed by Winnie Mandela, the ANC women’s league 
leader, and her football club.  
 
However, there were some limitations in the functions of the TRC. These included 
insufficient time to collect the information through hearings and insufficient finances. The 
TRC therefore failed to deal with significant geopolitical areas, and the violations that 
occurred in those areas, in sufficient detail. For example, the violations primarily perpetrated 
by security force members in areas such as Venda, Lebowa were not reported in sufficient 
detail. Hence, thousands of victims could not share their experiences with the commission. 
As a result, the TRC did not record a full account of South African life under apartheid 
(Stanley, 2001).  
 
Further, despite offering amnesty in exchange for perpetrators' detailed stories and 
threatening prosecution for those who remained silent, the majority of perpetrators did not 
come forward (Stanley, 2001). Although the TRC promised reparation assistance, not many 
victims come forward to record their truth. Thus, the social and criminal justice that 
underpinned the TRC philosophy, such as prosecuting and punishing perpetrators, was not 
realised. For example, the perpetrators of violence, and beneficiaries of apartheid, have had 
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no obligation to make any substantive changes, and neither the TRC nor the government have 
sufficiently challenged the structural inequalities which contextualised apartheid policies 
(Zehr, 1997). 
 
The TRC also failed in its objective of balancing other problems such as crime, violence, and 
unresolved land issues. The reticence to settle reparations has led some to comment that the 
Commission was flawed in its focus, particularly as 'perpetrators' were granted immediate 
freedom with amnesty, while victims continued to wait to be financially acknowledged (Ash 
1997; Sooka, 2003). The commission did not make clear which victims deserved reparations 
and what they would consist of (Verdoolaege & Kerstens, 2004). As the TRC was not 
successful in all areas of its recommendations, many areas and 'communities' in South Africa 
remain dislocated and characterised by poverty, lack of good housing, poor education, limited 
health services and unemployment (Stanley, 2001). Whilst the Commission successfully 
provided a forum for diverse expression, acknowledging personal suffering and the 
promoting a more truthful future it has also left South Africa ultimately unsatisfied 
(Rosenburg, 1999, p. xi).  
 
Table 7.5: Strengths and Limitations of South African TRC 
Strengths 
S.N. Causes of war which was 
addressed 
Recommendations 
1 Gap between the advantaged and 
disadvantaged 
Rule of law, human rights practice 
2 Poverty Prioritize economic justice 
3 Racism Rule of law, human rights practice 
4 Corruption Rule of law, human rights practice, 
transparency, accountability 
5 Economy (gap between rich and 
poor) 
A business reconciliation fund, creation and 
reservation of jobs, skill trainings, resource 
generating program, industrial growth, 
agricultural expansion 
6 Human rights violations Rules and regulations, human rights 
practice, reformation of security forces, 
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armed forces and health sector, apology by 
President 
7 All the root causes Reconciliation, rehabilitation, reparation, a 
serious crimes compensation fund 
8 Rehabilitation and healing Full utilization of NGOs; clinic and 
appropriate services 
9 Reparation Financial support for six years 
Limitations/ weaknesses 
S.N. Weaknesses Reasons 
1 Lack of full truth Short of time and budget 
2 Less perpetrators came forward Threatening prosecution who remained 
silent 
3 Less victims came forward Lack of making to understand prosecuting 
and punishing the perpetrators 
3 Lack of coverage of all the areas Lack of focus on all areas 
4 Lengthy reparation to victims Immediate focus on perpetrators 
Source: South African TRC, 1998 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the TRC of South Africa was successful in covering most of the areas of the 
causes and consequences of the civil war (South African TRC, 1998, p. 306). These included 
the anti-colonial, apartheid and racism contexts as well as the wider Cold War atmosphere. 
Further, it was successful in promoting the peace process by recommending the government 
address poverty, racism, corruption, and the human rights violations through revised rules 
and regulations, and its good practices. However, the South African TRC was unsuccessful in 
finding the full truth as it could not cover all the areas of the country due to insufficient 
budget and time. Thus it made inadequate recommendations in all sectors and was ultimately 
unsuccessful in achieving its aims to promote social and criminal justice and reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER 8: Comparative analysis of the case studies: Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and South Africa TRCs 
 
The case studies of the TRCs in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa provide useful 
insights into the actions, recommendations, strengths and limitations of the functions of the 
commissions in those countries. This chapter compares the TRCs of these three countries 
with Nepal’s TRC. As discussed in Chapter 3 and 9, even though the TRC was established in 
Nepal in 2015, it has not been a smooth process due to different factors. Hence, this 
comparison of the functioning of other TRCs aims to identify factors and methods to help the 
Nepali TRC move forward and act to address, and reconcile, the causes of the country’s civil 
war and its consequences. 
 
8.1 Comparisons on TRC  
 
The countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Nepal each experienced civil war. 
The signing of a peace agreement in these countries opened the way to establish a TRC to 
promote peace and reconciliation. However, the background of the establishment of each 
TRC, their functions and recommendations were different in each case. 
 
In the case of Liberia, the CPA took place in August 2003 after 15 years of civil war. This 
cleared the way to establish a TRC. The Head of the National Transitional Government of 
Liberia, Charles Gyude Bryant, constituted a nine member TRC on 4 January 2004. 
Unfortunately, it failed to gain legitimacy; it then took another two years for the President of 
Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to officially establish Liberia’s TRC on 20 February 2006. It 
was launched with a two year mandate, up to September 2008, but was extended by 10 
months until 30 June 2009 (Liberian TRC, 2009). This commission also comprised nine 
Liberian commissioners. An International Technical Advisory Committee (ITAC) 
representing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was also 
established in 2006 by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(UNHCHR).  The ECOWAS representatives resigned within a short time so in September 
2008 the UNHCHR and ITAC nominated other members who were appointed by the 
President in July 2008 (Liberian TRC, 2009).   
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In Sierra Leone, the peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF- 
party was signed on 7 July 1999. Although this agreement mandated the establishment of a 
TRC within 90 days, it was not established until November 2002 and ran until October 2004 
(USIP, 2002). The commission consisted of seven commissioners, four Sierra Leoneans and 
three internationals from Gambia, Canada and South Africa respectively (four men and three 
women), three executive secretaries, 216 staff members, 21 consultants, and 14 interns. The 
members were nominated and appointed by President Kabbah (Liberian TRC, 2009). 
 
The South African TRC was established in 1995 after the abolition of apartheid in 1990. It 
was mandated to operate between 1995 and 1998 but was extended until 2002 thus it worked 
for seven years to help promote reconciliation and establish peace in South Africa. The 
commissioner selection process in South Africa was unique because nominees were first 
solicited from civil society. A selection panel that included representatives from all major 
political parties, trade unions and civil society interviewed the resulting 300 nominees to 
determine 25 potential commissioners. Thereafter, a final interview decided the 17 
commissioners who were appointed by the President (Graybill, 2002). The 17 commissioners 
(nine men and eight women) were from different backgrounds including politics, human 
rights, law, theology, history, social work and psychology. The commissioners were 
supported by nearly 300 staffs and three different committees - the Human Right Violations 
Committee, the Amnesty Committee and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee 
(Migyirka, 2008). 
 
Table 8.1: Comparisons of TRCs in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa 
Area Liberia Sierra Leone S. Africa 
Time taken to 
establish TRC 
after Peace 
agreement 
3 years 3 years 5 years 
Duration of 
TRC 
2 years but extended 
by 10 months 
2 years  3 years but extended 
in total to 7 years 
Number of 
Commissioners 
9commissioners 7commissioners, 3 
executive secretary, 
216 staff, 21 
17commissioners 
with 300 staff 
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consultants, 14 interns 
Nationality of 
Commissioners 
Liberian 4 Sierra Leonean,  
1 Gambian,  
1 Canadian,  
1 South African 
South African 
Number of 
committees 
Advisory committee of 
3 members 
None  3 committees 
Source: TRC, 1998, 2004, 2009 
 
8.2  Comparisons on TRC findings: 
8.2.1 Causes of war 
Each TRC collected information regarding the causes and effects of the civil war in the 
respective country, the number and types of gross human rights violations committed, and the 
situations of perpetrators, the victims and their families/relatives.  
 
The TRC in Liberia named corruption, poverty, limited access to education, and inequalities 
in economic, social, civil and political sectors in the country as the causes of the conflict. The 
greed of individuals exacerbated corruption in every sector in Liberia and the unequal 
distribution of land further contributed to the conflict between settler and indigenous 
Liberians. The social and legal systems played a vital role in polarizing these two groups of 
people and were ultimately further causes of the civil war. External factors, such as the role 
played by the USA, also contributed to the civil war in Liberia (Liberian TRC, 2009, Vol. II). 
 
The TRC of Sierra Leone found the major causes of the conflict included the failure of 
leaders to run the government, nepotism and greed, such as the plundering of gold and 
diamonds that promoted corruption and increased poverty in the country. The lack of positive 
and progressive policies, and policies that favoured particular ethnic groups and 
discriminated against others (Richards, 2003) were further causes of conflict in Sierra Leone, 
as was the loss of hope among the youth due to the non-accountability of the government and 
its bodies. The active role played by Charles Taylor was another major factor in starting, and 
extending, the civil war in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
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The South African TRC worked for a long time to examine and review events that occurred 
during the 34 years of apartheid. Apartheid policies in South Africa were a major cause of the 
long civil war. Racial separation was introduced to segregate blacks and whites in 1910, in 
1913 the Native Land Act barred blacks from buying land outside the South African territory 
(BBC, 2013), marriage between black and white was forbidden, racial segregation was 
enforced in all areas of life and the low standards of enforced education for blacks all 
contributed to the conflict in South Africa. The anti-colonial resistance movement in the 
neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola was another motivator among the 
South African people to fight against apartheid between 1960 and 1994 (South African TRC, 
1998).  
 
8.2.2 Consequences of war 
All the warring parties in each country were responsible for domestic and international war 
crimes and human rights violations. Killing, abduction, assault, and looting and enforced 
displacement were common consequences of the civil wars. 
 
Major consequence of the war in Liberia were the death of 250,000 people and displacement 
of 1.5 million people, the exploitation of forests and diamond mines and large scale damage 
to the physical structures of the country (Liberian TRC, 2009, vol. 2). 
 
In Sierra Leone, the human rights violations included mutilation, murder, child labour, sex 
labour, rape, abductions, arbitrary detentions, looting, torture and forced displacement. 
External actors, including Libya, Liberia, Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL), United Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), Economic Community of West 
Africans States (ECOWAS), and Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) were also responsible for the civil war and human rights violations in 
Sierra Leone (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
 
In South Africa, under apartheid, many people, predominantly black, suffered rape, sexual 
assault, beating, torture, abduction, shootings, burnings, poisoning, mutilation, destruction of  
houses, and separation from family members that often caused psychological effects,  loss of 
independence and dignity. South Africa, unlike other countries, experienced the killing of 
people by burning and neck lacing (see Chapter 7) (South African TRC, 1998). 
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Table 8.2: Comparisons on findings by TRC in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa 
Findings Liberia Sierra Leone S. Africa 
Causes  Poverty, limited 
access to education, 
inequalities in 
economic, social, 
civil and political 
sectors 
 Greed, corruption 
 Unequal land 
distribution 
 Social and legal 
system 
 Historical causes 
 Role of USA 
 Failure of 
leadership in the 
Government 
 Greed, 
corruption, 
nepotism 
 Unaccountable 
Government 
towards the 
public and civil 
society 
 Colonial 
strategies of 
divide and rule 
 Death penalty 
and misuse of 
emergency 
powers 
 The Cold War 
 Anti-colonialism 
and segregation 
 Racism 
 Former 
Government and 
President and some 
political 
parties/groups’ 
corruption 
Violations
/ Effects 
Human rights violations, 
gender based violations, 
250,000 were killed, 1.5 
million displaced, 
corruption, destruction of 
economic sectors such as 
forests and diamond 
mines, destruction of 
physical structures 
Human rights 
violations, 
displacement of 2 
million from birth 
place, abductions, 
amputation, arbitrary 
detentions, killing of 
50,000, forced 
recruitment and sex 
slavery of children 
Human rights violations 
abduction, severe ill 
treatment (sexual 
assault/abuse, rape or 
harassment, destruction 
of homes, mutilation of 
body parts, necklace 
murder) Internally 
displaced, and 
disappearance 
Warring 
parties 
 Violator groups – 10 
 Lesser violator 
groups – 11 
 Internal actors – 
10 
 External actors - 
 Different groups - 
8+ 
 Different 
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 Military institutions- 
2 
5 Government 
sectors- 2 
Source: TRC, 1998, 2004, 2009  
 
 
8.3  Comparisons on TRC recommendations 
 
8.3.1 General 
The TRCs of the three countries made recommendations to promote peace, reconciliation and 
reparation in different ways.  
 
The Liberian TRC made recommendations to the Head of State and to the Government. The 
recommendations focused on reparation, rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators, legal and 
institutional reforms, amnesty, and prosecution of offenders in a special court (Liberian TRC, 
2009).  
 
The major recommendations of the Sierra Leonean TRC focused on building a new and 
democratic Sierra Leone. In reconstructing the country, the recommendations prioritised 
health and education and emphasised the reparation process, equal opportunity, and 
abolishing discrimination against women by establishing the rule of laws, improving 
governance and prosecuting corruption to uphold human rights with equal respects to all 
(Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
 
In the case of South Africa, the TRC recommended the Government to address the causes of 
the conflict as well as focus on reconciliation and reparation procedures. The 
recommendations included making a national commitment to the promotion of reconciliation 
and unity, the prevention of gross human rights violations in the future, and processes for 
accountability, healing and rehabilitation, organization, administration and management. The 
archiving of the commission’s materials and public access, as well as preservation of 
documents, were other recommendations in the South African TRC’s final report (South 
African TRC, 1998).  
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Table 8.3: Comparisons on general recommendations by TRC in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and S. Africa 
Liberia Sierra Leone S. Africa 
Recommendations to the Head of 
State: 
Reparation and rehabilitation for 
both victims and perpetrators, legal 
reforms, continue investigation, 
prosecutions in particular cases 
Major Recommendation to the 
Government and all: 
Extraordinary criminal court, 
domestic criminal prosecutions, 
public sanctions, National ‘Palava 
Hut’ program, economic crime 
investigation, reparations, good 
governance, and others 
Human rights 
protection, 
establishment of rule of 
law, security services, 
good governance, focus 
on  youth, women and 
children, reconciliation, 
reparation, archiving 
TRC documents, follow 
up committee 
Human rights 
protection, 
reconciliation, 
prosecution, 
rehabilitation, 
reparation, good 
governance, different 
culture promoted in 
sectors like prison, faith 
communities, business, 
legal, security forces, 
health sector, media, 
archiving TRC 
documents 
Source: TRC, 1998, 2004, 2009  
 
8.3.2 Reconciliation 
Reconciliation is the process of coming to terms with past acts and enemies; this includes 
finding a way to live that permits a vision of the future and the rebuilding of relationships to 
promote a society-wide, long-term process of deep and broad change while acknowledging, 
remembering and learning from the past to enable a better future (Bloomfield et al, 2003). 
National reconciliation thus plays a vital role in establishing peace and promoting the long-
term process of healing. As Bloomfield et al (2003) describe, reconciliation can be achieved 
in a variety of ways such as forms of retributive or restorative justice, historical accounting of 
events via truth-telling, and reparation for the material and psychological damage inflicted on 
the victims. Restorative justice can thus help the processes of healing and rebuilding. In 
addition, telling the truth also facilitates reparation and reconciliation (Torpey, 2003; Walker, 
2010). 
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Reconciliation largely depends upon the commitment of the country’s Government, political 
parties, victims, perpetrators and population in general. The President, as the chief of the 
country, can actively encourage reconciliation by ensuring the broadest representation from 
all sectors of the country and ask for full participation in the reconciliation process. To further 
promote the success of reconciliation, a strong human rights culture should be maintained. 
Hence, decreasing the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged groups in the community 
is important and can be facilitated by providing job opportunities through economic 
development. 
 
To reconcile victims, as well as perpetrators within the same community, wounds inflicted as 
a result of the conflict should be healed. This can be promoted by encouraging all parties to 
tell the truth about human rights violations, with the Government then officially 
acknowledging the crimes and apologizing to the victims. Decriminalization, exoneration, 
exhumation and reburial are other avenues to promote reconciliation.  
 
In the case of Liberia, the TRC recommended a special ‘Palava Hut’ program be instituted to 
provide opportunities for people to tell the truth about their past experiences. The program 
aimed to allow rural communities to resolve conflict and begin the reconciliation process. 
The TRC also recommended 45 people be prosecuted for economic crimes and that all assets 
acquired unlawfully during the conflict be seized (Liberian TRC, 2009).  
 
The Sierra Leonean TRC focused on promoting reconciliation in several ways. These 
included having all the actors involved in the Civil War apologize and performing symbolic 
activities such as establishing monuments on mass graves and commemorating an annual 
National Day on 18th of January involving victims, ex-combatants and other members of 
communities in traditional, religious, social, recreational and sports activities to further 
promote the reconciliation process. To promote equal opportunity within society, the 
commission recommended the quota system in political parties. For example, 30 percent of 
seats would be preserved and separated for women and 10 percent for the youth, especially 
during the political elections (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
 
The South African TRC recommended restructuring some public sectors to help develop a 
culture of respect and promote reconciliation and peace. The TRC also recommended 
government agencies such as prison officers should be trained in human rights (South African 
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TRC, 1998, vol.5, p.316) and for faith communities to advocate a forgiveness theology to 
promote reconciliation (p.316). The South African TRC advised the President, as the head of 
the state, to apologize to all victims on behalf of those perpetrators from the members of 
security forces of the former state and those armed forces of the liberation movements who 
committed gross violations of human rights (pp.347, 348). 
Table 8.4: Comparisons on reconciliation process in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South 
Africa 
Liberia Sierra Leone South Africa 
Public apology by the 
Government 
Public apologies by all actors 
involved in the war 
Public apology and official 
acknowledgement by the 
President 
New political culture as 
anti-corruption, 
decentralization of power 
Government and civil society 
engage on political, moral 
and social issue dialogues of 
the past, present and future 
Decriminalization 
Resourcing civil society 
for national building 
Different activities between 
victims, ex-combatants and 
other community members 
such as traditional, religious, 
social, recreational and sports 
Exoneration 
Exhumation and reburial 
Forgiveness 
Equal economic, social 
and cultural rights to 
everyone 
Equal opportunity in politics 
through quota system 
Trainings to change 
attitudes in some 
governmental and non-
governmental organisations 
to develop the culture of 
respect 
Source: TRC, 1998, 2004, 2009 
 
8.3.3 Reparation 
Reparation plays a vital role in promoting the healing of war wounds. The TRCs in Liberia 
(2009), Sierra Leone (2004) and South Africa (1998) recommended different reparation 
processes. 
 
In Liberia, a reparation Trust Fund of US $500 million was recommended to compensate 
victims. Free education at primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education was another 
recommended avenue of reparation. The establishment of community development projects 
for schools, health facilities, and roads - especially in the most victimized communities, 
empowerment programs for women including education and micro economic programs, 
114 
 
psychosocial, physical, therapeutic, counselling, medical, mental health and other health 
related services were also part of the reparation processes. As an ongoing symbol of 
reparation, the Liberian TRC recommended memorial sites be built and a National 
Unification Day be recognised as a national holiday. Significantly, the Liberian Government 
issued a public apology which was an important aspect in promoting reparation in Liberia. 
The Liberian commission was the first commission that recommended the inclusion of the 
Diasporas to help in the reparation process by donating at least US$ 1.00 per month. The 
donation would go to the Reparation Trust which would be utilised in social engineering to 
rebuild public infrastructures. 
 
The Sierra Leonean TRC recommended the distribution of service packages and symbolic 
measures to help meet the needs of victims. Significantly, it did not recommend cash 
payments to victims as part of the reparation process. The services included health 
initiatives– particularly in medical and psychological care, pensions, education, skills training 
and micro credit paid for through the Special War Fund for victims (Article XXIX Peace 
Agreement; Section 7(6) TRC Act). The health care program included free medical treatment, 
free healthcare to amputees, and free mental healthcare treatment. The provision of free 
education until senior secondary level, and skill training programs for victims, were other 
important aspects of the reparation program to promote the rebuilding of the country. The 
community reparation was prescribed to rebuild the infrastructure and included the building 
of a national war memorial as a symbol of remembrance and reparation in Sierra Leone 
(TRC, 2004, p.196).  
 
In South Africa, the reparation program would help victims and the country move forward. 
The South African TRC proposed a US$3,500 payment each year for six years to victims 
and/or their family through the President’s fund as financial reparation. The money was a 
symbol of a commitment to reparation, as was the issuing of death certificates, the erection of 
monuments and memorials and proclaiming a National Day of Remembrance. Renaming 
streets and public facilities were further acts of symbolic reparation in South Africa. 
Importantly, the TRC of South Africa recommended the Government fully utilize the 
cooperation and capabilities of Non-Government organizations (NGOs) establishing clinics 
and providing the appropriate services to facilitate the rehabilitation of perpetrators (vol.5, p. 
309). In the sector of community reparations, the Government launched community based 
services and activities including a demilitarization program for youth, mental health services, 
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counselling, community colleges and youth centres, basic education and training for adults, 
skill based employment training for youth, housing projects, and laws to prevent human 
rights abuses in the future.  
 
Table 8.5: Comparisons on reparation process in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and S. Africa 
Reparation Liberia Sierra Leone S. Africa 
Financial US$500 million to 
victims over 30 
years through trust 
No financial help  US$ 3500 each year for 
six years to victims 
Symbolic A National Day A National war 
memorial 
A National Day  
 
 Building 
infrastructure in 
the most affected 
areas 
Erection of monuments 
and memorials 
  Renaming street and 
public facilities 
  Issuing death certificates 
Community Physical, 
psychological, 
therapeutic. 
Counselling, 
medical, mental 
and other health 
services 
Pension for adults 
as the amount 
determined by 
NACSA monthly 
Community based services 
such as demilitarization 
programs for youth 
Community 
development 
projects 
Free education 
and skill training 
to victims 
Free community colleges 
and youth centres  
Education and 
small business 
 Basic education and 
training for adults 
  Housing projects 
  Laws for human rights 
Diaspora and 
international 
community 
Donation of at 
least US$ 1.00 per 
month to 
reparation trust 
fund  
  
Help from UN, 
foreign states, 
INGOs, donors 
 NGOs for perpetrators 
Source: TRC, 1998 2004, 2009  
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8.3.4 Other areas 
Each TRC made recommendations on other areas to the country’s Government.  
 
The Liberian TRC covered different sectors widely in its recommendations. It recommended 
the extraordinary criminal court address the gross human rights violations such as the 
international humanitarian law and human rights law, war crimes, economic crimes, killing, 
gang rape, multiple rape, forced recruitment, sexual slavery, forced labour, exposure to 
deprivation, and missing persons (Liberian TRC, 2009). It strongly recommended people who 
committed violations during the period of 1979-2003 not to be able to hold any appointment 
for 30 years from 1st of July 2009 and the prosecution of 116 persons, including Charles 
Taylor. The Liberian TRC also recommended building a new political culture, resourcing 
civil society for nation building, providing equal economic, social and cultural rights to 
everyone, protecting children, resourcing an independent human rights commission, the 
decentralization of political and economical power, and poverty reduction. 
 
The Sierra Leonean TRC recognised that without the presence of good governance, the 
country could not achieve any of its goals. Hence, the Sierra Leonean commission 
recommended the Anti-corruption Commission to promote and equip public servants to 
follow and uphold the Code of Ethics in their service to the Nation. The Commission 
recommended establishing a human rights commission to protect and uphold human rights in 
the country. It recommended covering these fundamental rights in the constitution as well as 
abolishing the death penalty and gender-based discrimination. Importantly, the TRC 
recommended the local courts and public defence systems protect human rights (Sierra 
Leonean TRC, 2004). Other recommendations to address the human rights protection were 
the establishment of a compensation fund, reformation of the security forces and health 
sectors and more press freedom to report incidents (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004, vol.5, pp. 
322-341). 
 
Similarly, the South African TRC recommended the rule of law, transparency and 
accountability be strengthened to uproot corruption and better protect human rights (South 
African TRC, 1998, vol.5, p. 313), including access to justice for crime victims, protection of 
witnesses and complainants (pp. 322-328). Reformation in education, as well as training 
army, security force and police officers to protect human rights were further 
recommendations (pp. 328-332). The provision of health facilities to all war victims, and 
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greater freedom to the media to report the war and its impacts, including the human rights 
abuses so everyone could understand the causes, impacts and ratifying procedures to balance 
the human rights were further recommendations of the TRC (pp. 334-341). The TRC of 
South Africa also recommended providing banking services to generate resources as well as 
develop an environment for economic development so that the gap between poor and rich 
would be reduced (pp. 319-321). 
 
All the TRCs recognised the need to guard against a repetition of the human rights abuses and 
conflicts they had experienced. The Liberian TRC recommended an encyclopaedia of 
Liberian culture and history be prepared to help educate future generations. Both the Sierra 
Leonean and South African TRCs recommended preservation of all the documents, videos 
and audio tapes, pictures, photographs, and database information from the TRC so people 
could see and better understand the effects of civil war and human rights violations on a 
country (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004, pp. 313, 343, 345). Similarly, as a post peace process, 
the Sierra Leonean TRC suggested the establishment of follow-up committee to monitor the 
activities towards the peace process (Recommendation tables; vol 2, pp. 206-225).  
 
Table 8.6: Comparisons on other processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and S. Africa 
Others Liberia Sierra Leone South Africa 
Human 
rights 
preservation 
Extraordinary criminal court, 
restriction to appoint violators 
for 30 years, prosecution 
Human rights 
commission, 
fundamental rights 
in constitution, 
compensation fund, 
reformation in 
security forces and 
health sectors, 
freedom to media 
Rule of law, 
transparency, 
accountability, 
access to justice, 
reformation in 
education as well 
as training of 
Code of Ethics, 
role of media 
Further 
development 
of peace 
New political culture, 
resourcing civil society, equal 
rights of economic, social and 
cultural, protection of  
children,  
Good governance, 
anti-corruption 
commission, 
new principles of 
national security 
Banking services, 
economic 
developments 
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Resourcing independent 
human rights commission and 
anti-corruption commission, 
decentralization of political 
and economic power, poverty 
reduction. 
 
Protection 
from 
repetition of 
conflict 
Encyclopaedia of Liberian 
culture and history 
Preservation of TRC 
records such as 
documents, videos 
and audio tapes, 
pictures and 
photographs, 
database,  
follow-up committee 
Preservation of 
TRC records such 
as documents, 
videos and audio 
tapes, pictures 
and photographs, 
database 
Source: TRC, 1998, 2004, 2009 
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CHAPTER 9: THE TRC OF NEPAL AND ITS FUNCTIONS 
 
9.1 The Nepali Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) mandated the Government of Nepal establish a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 2006. The TRC in Nepal was to be 
established to promote the processes of peace and reconciliation between the warring parties 
(CPA, 2006). However, it has taken nine years to establish the TRC in Nepal. In this time, 
multiple factors have delayed its establishment, as observed by the Government and 
concerned political actors (The Kathmandu Post, 2015). These factors include the instability 
of the Government, a lack of will from major political parties to establish the commission and 
international politics are and examined in this chapter. The Nepali TRC was finally 
established in February 2015 (Kantipur, 2015) however little progress has been achieved to 
date (TRC Interim Report, 2016). This chapter builds on Chapter 3; while it provided the 
background for establishing a TRC in Nepal, this chapter explores the implementation and 
progress of the Nepali TRC. 
 
9.2 The objectives/mandates of the TRC in Nepal 
The Nepali TRC’s mandate by the National Assembly is defined in the Investigation on 
Enforced Disappeared Persons (IEDP) and TRC Act 2014. In brief, the TRC in Nepal has six 
major tasks to achieve (TRC, 2015); it is to investigate and publish incidents of gross human 
rights violations committed between 13 February 1996 and 21 November 2006. It is to 
identify the victims and perpetrators of civil war in Nepal and promote reconciliation 
between them. It is to recommend compensation for the victims and their families as part of 
the reparation process to help compensate, in part, for the violations endured during the civil 
war. It is to identity victims to officially record the events and inform the reparation process. 
And it is to make recommendations to the Government for legal action against the 
perpetrators if amnesty will not be granted, and in the cases where reconciliation cannot be 
reached. The TRC recognised that implementing these objectives will be difficult and divides 
the mandate into three different sections; a mandate of functions, duties and powers of the 
commission, a mandate on investigations, and a mandate on recommendations. 
The mandate for the functions, duties and powers of the TRC has the power to investigate 
incidents of gross violations of human rights and consult and investigate incidents with the 
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concerned court and authority. The TRC can determine if cases took place during the conflict 
or not. To ensure the TRC can complete its procedures, especially the collection of 
information, the TRC can make separate arrangements for victims filing a complaint to be 
heard by the Commission (TRC Act, 2014). The TRC mandate on investigations has a wide 
range of powers including ensuring informants’ and victims’ security, searching a person’s 
place and belongings without notification if the commission thinks it necessary and 
suspending a person from their workplace if there is a risk he/she will destroy evidence from 
his/her office. The TRC mandate on recommendations details the steps toward promoting 
reconciliation, reparation, rehabilitation and returning property to the victims and 
recommends actions to provide justice for victims and perpetrators. 
The Reconciliation Commission has the mandate to promote mutual reconciliation when/if 
perpetrator/s and victim/s makes an application to do so. During the mutual reconciliation, 
the commission may cause the perpetrator to apologize and offer reasonable compensation to 
the victim. It can further promote reconciliation by organizing reconciliation functions at the 
sites of conflict; constructing statues and monuments in public places; publishing articles and 
literary works concerning reconciliation; and by enhancing social and communal good faith 
by carrying out other appropriate acts. In instances where a victim was a minor or has died, 
the commission has the mandate to bring about reconciliation between the perpetrator and the 
family of the victim.  
In the case of reparation, the commission will make recommendations to the Nepali 
Government to compensate the victim/s via restitution, rehabilitation or other appropriate 
arrangements. It can recommend the Government provide facilities to the victim or any 
member of his/her family including free education and medical treatment, skill oriented 
training, loan facilities without interest, arrangements for settlement, employment and other 
facilities or concessions as the commission deems appropriate. In the case of returning 
property, the commission can recommend property be returned if it was captured or seized. 
The commission can also recommend reasonable compensation to the victim for his/her 
actual loss of the captured/seized property.  
In the case of recommended actions, the commission can recommend the Government take 
proper action against any person who was involved in the offence of gross violations of 
human rights during the civil war. In the case of amnesty, the commission can recommend 
the Government grant amnesty to any perpetrator on the basis of conditions and criteria, as 
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referred to in IEDP and TRC Act 2014 (Section 25, Sub-section 4, 5 and 6). However, the 
Act (Article 2J) does not grant blanket amnesty in the cases of punitive human rights 
violations or abuses in extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and rape cases (IEDP 
& TRC Act, 2014; Pathak, 2015). The commission may recommend amnesty to those 
perpetrators who submit an application within the time frame specified by the commission, 
mentioning the truth and facts on the activities carried out in the armed conflict and 
expressing regret for their acts during the civil war while promising not to repeat any such act 
in the future. However, if the commission makes a recommendation for amnesty the 
perpetrator may need to provide reasonable compensation to the victim for the loss he/she 
suffered.  
Table 9.1: Objectives/mandates of the TRC in Nepal 
Investigate and publish the 
incidents/realities of gross violations of 
human rights violations 
Investigate the realities of gross violations 
of human rights 
Recommend processes to promote 
reconciliation 
Recommend processes to promote the 
reparation processes 
Recommend the rehabilitation and return of 
property to  victims 
Amnesty (rare) to the perpetrators with 
conditions 
Source: Nepali TRC, 2015 
 
9.3 The structure/composition of the Nepali TRC 
A TRC was constituted by the Government of Nepal, Council of Ministers on 10 February, 
2015 in accordance with the IEDP and TRC Act, 2014. A five-member committee, headed by 
former Supreme Court Chief Justice Om Bhakta Shrestha was established on 16 June 2014. It 
worked for eight months to finalize a list of officials and presented their recommendations to 
the Prime Minister, Sushil Koirala and the Government of Nepal established the TRC on 10 
February, 2015 (The Rising Nepal, 2015). 
 
Eight sub committees were established to be responsible for different tasks.  
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Table 9.2: Structure of the TRC in Nepal 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Nepal (with its sub-committees) 
1.Procedures relating to conduct of business 
of meeting draft sub-committee 
2.Code of conduct drafting sub-committee 
3.Format development sub-committee 4.Rules drafting sub-committee 
5.Dialogue, consultation and communication 
sub-committee 
6.Structure of commission development team 
7.Victim, children, senior citizens, persons 
with disability and women friendly structure 
sub-committee 
8.Financial rules sub-committee 
Source: Nepali TRC, 2015 
9.4 Delayed establishment 
A number of political factors that threatened law and order also paralyzed the establishment 
of the TRC in Nepal. While all political parties understood the peace process as a power-
sharing agreement between them, the major elements of the peace process were reduced to 
bargaining chips in the struggle for immediate benefits of power-sharing and longer-term re-
alignments between, and within, the different parties (International Crisis Group (ICG), 
2011). Hence, each party was more interested in establishing a monopoly of power sharing 
than establishing the TRC. As a result, both democracy and promoting the peace process 
through the TRC become casualties of shifting political powers (Bhatta, 2012). 
 
The lack of political understanding and consensus among the political parties, on the 
fundamental processes that govern how a TRC stands and works, further delayed its 
establishment (Tamang, 2012). From 2011 to 2013, Nepal suffered political deadlocks 
because the political parties could not reach an agreement to appoint an interim election 
council (IEC) headed by a non political Prime Minister. This was largely because the 
different parties could not agree among themselves on a political coalition to govern and were 
more concerned with their own interests and benefits (Asian Network for Free Election 
(ANFREL), 2013). This prolonged political wrangling contributed to unstable conditions for 
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Government, as evidenced by the appointment of eight Prime Ministers within 10 years from 
2006, and further delayed the formation of the TRC as it was supposed to be established 
under broad political understandings and based on consensus among the political parties 
(Tamang, 2013). Hence, the establishment of the TRC was permanently overshadowed by 
these political actions, as detailed below. 
 
The factions of political parties in Nepal have also delayed the formation TRC as the political 
parties are engaged in the formation of new parties. Overall, the major parties such as the 
Nepali Congress fractioned into Nepali Congress, Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), 
Madheshi Janadhikar Forum Madhesh (MJFM) and Tarai-Madhesh Loktantric Party 
(TMLP). Factions in the Maoist Party resulted of five different parties such as Communist 
Party of Nepal-Maoist or CPN (M), Janatantric Mukti Morcha (JTMM), Communist Party of 
Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CONM) and New Force Party 
(NFP). 
 
During the CA election in 2008, under the proportional representation system, each party had 
to present their own closed lists of candidates which left the room to favour the nomination 
own relatives in CA i.e.; the parties had promoted family friendly politics. As a result, the 28 
families, made up of husband and wife teams, represented in the Constitution Assembly 
(CA). Their political power and involvement in corrupt practices delayed the establishment of 
the TRC in Nepal. Combined with the rise of armed non-state actors in the southern flatlands 
of Nepal bordering India and the eastern hills from groups including the Madhesi Mukti 
Tigers, United Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha, Terai Cobra, and Janatantrik Terai Mukti 
Morcha-Rajan, the political dynamics in Nepal further hampered the establishment of the 
TRC (Bhatta, 2012). 
  
The involvement of international forces in Nepal’s peace and constitution building process 
was another critical factor in delaying the establishment of the Nepali TRC. India’s 
involvement in encouraging the Madhesi political parties from the Southern Terai plain of 
Nepal, for example the protest against the demand called for the ‘liberation’ of the entire 
Terai by redrawing the region into a single autonomous unit called Madhes, unsettled the 
then Maoist Government (Miklian, 2008). This was because the then Nepali Prime Minister 
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visited China in 2008 (BBC, 2008) instead of India. This China visit contributed to deepening 
tensions between India and the UCPN (Maoist Party). This resulted in the dissolution of the 
Constitutional Assembly (CA) from 2006 to 2014 (Tamang, 2011).  
 
The Nepali TRC was finally established on 10 February 2015 to examine human rights 
violations during the conflict and create a forum for social reconciliation (Kantipur, 2015). 
 
Table 9.3: Delayed establishment of the TRC in Nepal 
Interim constitution Could not work out as it was interim 
TRC Bill Inadequate consultation with civil society,  
insufficient guarantees of independence 
from the government and political parties,  
limited mandate, absence of recognition for 
the rights of victims and witnesses 
Politics Unstable Government due to political 
shifts, absence of seriousness,  
power plays and power sharing, 
International interventions (India) 
Source: Bhatta, 2012; Gonzalez, 2012; ICG, 2011; ICTJ, 2011; TRC, 2016;   
 
9.5 Factors impacting the slow functioning of the Nepali TRC 
Just as the Nepali TRC was slow in being established, its functioning is equally slow moving. 
Different factors are responsible for this sluggishness, including the political situation in 
Nepal, the lack of established acts, rules and regulations, the Maoist party, insufficient 
manpower and budgets, a devastating earthquake, and the influence and interests of 
international stakeholders. Among these factors, the political scenario has been one of the 
most challenging. Instead of focusing on restoring peace, the political parties have focused on 
strengthening their positions to form their own majority Government. This has delayed and 
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slowed the TRC’s functioning. The Nepali TRC and the Commission of Investigation on 
Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), for example, recommended the Government bring 
in a law to criminalise torture. These bodies also sought amendments in the TRC Act to 
define some crimes, and to over-rule the statute on the limitation for rape, especially for the 
incidents of rape that were committed during the decade-long People’s War (Maoist 
insurgency). However, to date, the Government has not acted on either (ICTJ, 2016). The 
TRC did not have working regulations until 14 months after its establishment, nor did it have 
a budget. Six months after its formation in mid 2015, the commission forwarded draft 
regulations to the Government of Nepal, but the Government did not endorse them until 19 
March 2016 (Rai, 2016).  
The main party in the civil war, the Maoist party, voiced concerns over provisions in the draft 
regulations, saying it was a political war and any incidents could not be judged by a civil 
court but through a political consensus; problematically, this process does not consider the 
victim (Bastola, 2012). Similarly, the Maoist party delayed the progress of the TRC by 
strongly condemning the provisions relating to i) issuing arrest warrants against perpetrators, 
ii) invalidating their passports and iii) the courts handing down verdicts in conflict-era cases. 
The provisions in the draft that made it mandatory to seek the victims' consent for pardons, 
even after the courts ordered a pardon for the perpetrators, was also objected to by the Maoist 
party (MyRepublica, 2016). These delays have also made it more difficult to find evidence of 
crimes, thus complicating the steps of uncovering the truth on human rights violations (Jha, 
2015). 
Even though the TRC had been formed, 14 months have passed without any significant 
progress in its functions due to a lack of TRC regulations. To implement and uphold justice 
for Nepali victims, different laws should be in place, for example, a Witness Protection Act, 
Transitional Punishment Act, Crime Humanitarian Law, and a Retroactive Law. However, all 
of these laws are so far, absent in Nepal. The vagueness of the power relationships between 
the court and the TRC is also delaying the functioning of the TRC. For instance, the TRC has 
been provided with powers by the TRC Act 2014 to demand papers from the court with 
regard to cases that have been filed and investigated. It is not clear however if the court’s 
investigation will be stopped once the TRC begins its examinations. This has led to a kind of 
parallel jurisdiction, which potentially creates problems and has a direct impact the 
functioning of the TRC (The Kathmandu Post, 2015). 
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The universal jurisdiction in criminal law for cases of human rights abuses requires the 
Government of Nepal to provide working regulations for the smooth functioning of the TRC. 
This law enables human rights abusers from any country to be arrested in any other country.  
Colonel Kumar Lama of the Nepal Army was arrested in Britain in January 2013. His charges 
were based on allegations that in 2005, during Nepal’s decade-long internal armed conflict 
(People’s War) between the Government and Maoist forces, Colonel Lama participated in the 
torture of two detainees at an army barracks under his command (BBC, 2013). Despite these 
allegations, the coalition Government failed to provide the necessary regulations to the TRC 
until 14 months after its establishment, thus immunizing themselves from this international 
law. Similarly, the Government has not amended the laws for amnesty to serious crimes such 
as torture and the act of disappearance even after 23 months of the Supreme Court order to do 
so (Kantipur, 2016).  
 
Other factors have further slowed the progress of the Nepali TRC. Within 14 months of its 
formation, the TRC was reeling under budget constraints as less than half the amount of the 
required funds had been released. While the TRC requested NRs 140 million, the 
Government had released NRs 90 million only. The shortfall in the budget directly affected 
the functions of the TRC. With not enough funds and a lack of regulations, the commission 
has not been able to work smoothly or progress its work (Kathmandu Post, 2016). 
Unfulfilled promises from the top leaders are also the cause of slow functioning of the TRC. 
For example; according to NHRC; Pushpa Kamal Dahal (The Moist Supreme Commander) 
promised to help the TRC when he was the Prime Minister of Nepal between 18 Aug 2008 
and 25 May 2009, and between 4 Aug 2016 and 31 May 2017. He promised to resolve all 
outstanding issues of the peace process, but he neither amended the TRC Act nor released 
budget for TRC to appoint adequate staff (The Himalaya Times, 2016).There is inadequate 
resources of human, financial and technical which are major obstacles of the TRC for its 
smooth performance effectively and efficiently (ICJ, 2017). 
There has also been a significant increase in the influence of other countries on Nepali 
politics since the insurgency and the palace coup in 2005 (Bhatta, 2013), especially from 
India (Muni, 2012). The Indian Government now provides scholarships to the children of 
political leaders, including the Maoists, as well as children of high profile bureaucrats and 
civil society elites, irrespective of their competency; this is concerning as these individuals 
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may then act to support India’s interests in Nepal rather than representing the Nepali people. 
Seemingly, the peace process in Nepal is of little interest to the major political parties and 
leaders unless it is beneficial to India. Arguably, given the Comprehensive Peace Accord 
2006 (CPA) was completed in Delhi, India, this is not surprising (Bhatta, 2013). The lack of 
cooperation from political parties and their leaders in Nepal is one of the major issues 
hindering the work and progress of the Nepali TRC. 
Similarly, until and after the promulgation of a new constitution for Nepal, the Government 
has been delaying solving the issue of state restructuring, as raised by the Madhesi political 
forces. This question became problematic when India supported protesters and imposed an 
unofficial blockade on Nepal that has been in place since September 2015 (BBC, 2015). 
Because of this, the Nepali Government has had to divert its attention and resources to 
resolving this problem, further hampering the functioning of the TRC. 
At present, the parties involved in the peace process are unwilling to negotiate. The parties 
can be divided into two groups: those who support the Government and those who oppose it. 
The opposing side includes the Madhesi political parties, Tharus (Kantipur, 2016) and 
although a comprehensive outline to guide and enact the peace-making processes is required, 
these factors are impeding the functions of the TRC. 
 
In April 2015, Nepal experienced a major earthquake that extensively damaged the 
countryside and infrastructure of the country. The earthquake again diverted the interest of 
the political parties away from the peace making process. Moreover, the centralized 
management of relief materials enabled a systemic practice of corruption to develop. Security 
forces, members of the bureaucracy and members of political parties were found to be openly 
involved in this corruption yet the Government failed to take any action (Elliot, 2015).  
 
Table 9.4: Factors contributing to the slow functioning of the Nepali TRC 
Factors Situation 
Political situation of the 
country  
Parties focused on making Government and not on 
promoting the peace and reconciliation process 
Lack of working acts, rules Absence of Witness Protection Act, Transitional 
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and regulations Punishment Act, Crime Humanitarian Law, Retroactive 
Law, no working regulations until 14 months after its 
establishment 
Concerns of the Maoist 
party 
Concerns on judgement by the court, arrest warrants 
against the perpetrators, invalidation of their passports, 
victims' consent for pardons,  
Insufficient manpower and 
budget 
TRC requested NRs 140 million but the Government 
released NRs 90 million only 
Devastating earthquake Earthquake diverted the interest of political parties, 
socio-economic turmoil since 25 April 2015 
International interest India 
  Source: BBC, 2015; Bhatta, 2013; Elliot, 2015; Himalayan Times, 2016; ICTJ, 2016; Jha, 
2015; Kantipur, 2016; Kathmandu Post, 2015; MyRepublica, 2016 
9.6 Progress to date 
The Nepali TRC and CIEDP have warned the Government many times of the dangers of 
delay in addressing the serious crimes and human rights violations that occurred during the 
decade-long People’s War (Kantipur, 2015). Despite the extensive delays it has experienced, 
the Nepali TRC prepared and submitted interim reports to the President of Nepal on 7 Feb 
2016, one year after the formation of the commissions (The Himalayan Times, 2016). The 
report was detailed; it comprehensively identified the work, challenges and future plans of the 
TRC and offers the conclusions drawn from the commissioners’ interactions with conflict 
victims, civil society and journalists from 52 districts across the country (TRC-Nepal, 2016). 
The report contains different sections, including the duties and responsibilities of the TRC, 
the functions it has accomplished from 10 Feb 2015 to 6 Feb 2016, suggestions regarding the 
functions of the TRC from stakeholders, challenges experienced and facing the TRC, future 
plans and recommendations to support the TRC in its functioning. While it is expected the 
commission will deliver victim-centric justice, such outcomes remain undecided because of 
the absence of regulations, the lack of support from the Government and the stalemate in 
negotiations between the different political parties (Kantipur, 2015). 
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One year after the establishment of the TRC, the interaction programs on the activities of the 
Nepali TRC, with representatives from Government, civil society and journalists, and conflict 
victims have been established in 20 out of 75 districts in Nepal, and separately conducted by 
office bearers of the Commission. From these interaction programs, the TRC collected 
suggestions from the victims and their family members, civil society, journalists and others 
(Interim reports, TRC, 2016). 
 
The suggestions mainly focused on providing temporary relief measures such as medicine for 
the victims and their families. Other suggestions focused on the criteria to categorize the 
victims because of the rise in claims by ‘fake victims’ through different political parties. 
Further suggestions to the TRC from the victims and their families included scholarships to 
the children of victims, ongoing health treatment for victims as they still face health issues, 
life skills training, employment opportunities, help to orphans and cash help for the victims to 
the value of NRs. 100,000 per person. 
 
To help meet these suggestions, the TRC requested the Government provide a sufficient 
budget, manpower and facilities and implement related regulations; skill based training and 
effective help to support its functioning. It demanded the complete amendment of TRC Act 
2014 and lawful criteria to categorize real victims so false victims would be punished. 
Further, it suggested increasing the budget by NRs. 1.5 million for health treatment to the 
victims, as well as providing a cash amount of NRs. 100,000 to every victim as temporary 
support. Psychological treatment, scholarships to the children of victims, protection of 
orphans, protection of property of victims, and a one door system to provide help for 
unlawfully detained victims as soon as possible were some of the other recommendations 
included in the interim report of the Nepali TRC. 
 
After submitting the interim report, the TRC still awaited the decision of cabinet for its 
regulations so that it could effectively function. Due to the lengthy delay in reaching a 
decision, the chairman of the Nepali TRC warned the Government that the United Nations 
(UN) was already skeptical of Nepal’s ability to effectively manage a transitional justice 
system. He added that it would be unfortunate for Nepal and Nepalis, as well as Nepal’s 
independence, if Nepal’s judicial system failed to deliver and it would be taken as an 
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invitation for foreign intervention, including from the UN (The Himalayan Times, 7 Feb 
2016).  
International practice is that if a Government cannot support the TRC to resolve human rights 
violations that occurred during an insurgency, the international community, such as the UN, 
would establish a tribunal and prosecute those involved in serious crimes (Pandey, 2017). 
Furthermore, if the TRC failed to work, as per international standards in the absence of 
suitable regulations for it, the international community would not accept Nepal’s decisions 
and could demand mechanisms of international justice, akin to events in Sri Lanka where the 
Government of Sri Lanka was totally disregarded. This was because they were unable to 
establish and apply the rule of law and international standards so an international mechanism 
to prosecute those responsible for mass human rights violations was demanded and created 
(Khatiwoda, 2016, Kantipur, 2016, MyRepublica, 2016, Amnesty International, 2012; 
Human Rights Watch, 2013; Clarke, 2011).  
 
Considering the potential for such an event to occur in Nepal, on 18 March 2016, the 
Government of Nepal endorsed the regulations of the Nepali TRC (The Kathmandu Post, 
2016). The Nepali TRC received its regulations just 10 months before its allocated time 
duration to complete the task. However, the TRC Act 2014 allows the commission to expand 
its functions for one further year. The TRC published its schedule, including the expanded 
one year time duration to complete its tasks and achieve its objectives (TRC, 2015). 
 
In real time, the Nepali TRC has spent one year trying to make progress; it has not begun to 
address the need to develop a legal framework, or the real task of documenting and 
investigating cases of human rights abuses (Kantipur, 16 Feb 2015). The TRC is yet to recruit 
and train employees for its purposes (Kathmandupost, 2016). The TRC also now doubts the 
neutrality of the existing peace committees, which are basically all-party mechanisms; it 
therefore plans to set up a separate mechanism in all districts to collect complaints from 
conflict victims. This is because many fake victims received relief as the district based Peace 
Committees failed to work properly (Nepalekhabar, 2016). As it is not possible to collect the 
complaints by immediately establishing local offices, the TRC has decided to collect 
complaints through the existing local Peace Committees as the best option in a short time, 
and given the lack of budget and manpower (Kantipur, 16 Feb 2015). Hence, the TRC gave 
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public notice on 17 April 2016 those complaints of human rights violations that took place 
during the People’s War in Nepal were to be lodged within two months (TRC, 2016). It 
provided options for the complainants’ to submit claims either to the head office of the TRC 
in Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal, or with one of the 75 local Peace Committees (TRC, 
2016).  The TRC will accept complaints about human rights abuse cases such as 
killing/murdering, abduction or taking hostage, mutilation or disability, physical or mental 
torture, rape or sexual abuse, looting or the destroying of properties, and any acts against the 
international human rights and laws. Up to the last of December 2016, the Nepali TRC had 
received 58,052 applications (TRC, 2016). Given the response, on the 20th of July 2016, the 
Government of Nepal decided to increase the time duration of existing local Peace 
Committees by one year to better support the work of the TRC (The Kathmandu Post, 2016). 
Similarly, the TRC extended the date for victims to lodge complaints until 10 August, 2016.  
The two-year term of the TRC of Nepal expired without it completing its tasks on 8 February 
2017.The Government of Nepal extended its tenure by one year on 9 February 2017 as per 
Clause 38 (2) of the TRC Act 2014 which allows the Government to do this if necessary 
(Republica, 2017). 
 
Table 9.5: Progress of the TRC in Nepal to date 
Interim reports on 7 Feb 2016 to the 
Government of Nepal 
Interaction programs on the activities of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission with 
the representatives of Government officials 
and offices, civil society and journalists, and 
conflict victims 
Recommendation for the TRC regulations 
and endorsed on 18 March 2016 
Published work plan 
Public notice 17 April 2016 to apply for 
complaints of human rights violations 
Acceptance of complaints until 18 July 2016 
extended until 10 August 2016 
Source: Kantipur, 2015; Nepalekhabar, 2016; The Kathmandu Post, 2016; The Himalayan 
Times, 2016; TRC, 2016 
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9.7 Criticisms to Nepali TRC 
A TRC is established to find out the truth and provide justice to the victims as well as 
perpetrators so that they can live together in the same community with dignity. If the 
Commission works independently and without prejudice, it will be possible to make 
perpetrators accountable and provide redress to victims. However, more than two years after 
the commission was established, these functions have largely remained unfulfilled (ICJ, 
2017) because its functioning has been stalled due to different reasons. This has provoked 
individuals, institutions, civil society organizations and victims to criticize it. The absence of 
political will is a major factor impeding the commission’s function. For example, even 
though the Supreme Court declared in February 2015 that amnesty cannot be granted for 
serious crimes like rape, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killing and torture (Global press 
journal, 15 Aug 2016), the two major political parties ─ the Communist Party of Nepal-
Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Maoist (now is Maoist Center) signed a nine-
point agreement on 5 May 2016 which contains provisions for general amnesty to 
perpetrators. As the Attorney General Raman Kumar Shrestha opposed the recommendation 
that no general or blanket amnesty (Kathmandu Post, 2016), the commission’s 
recommendation and the Supreme Court’s ruling was ignored.  
The absence of political will within Nepal’s ruling Government to bring perpetrators to 
justice is the major obstacle to addressing violations and abuses committed during the 
People’s War. This lack of will has impeded the pace and the dynamic of the transitional 
justice process in Nepal (ICJ, 2017). The Human Rights Activist, Mandira Sharma, has 
criticized the Government’s failure to address the ongoing issues from the People’s War and 
the surviving families and their associations feel the transition to peace is guided by political, 
rather than humanitarian or moral concerns (Bhandari, 2015). Due to the delay, serious 
discussion has occurred about the best ways to address the past atrocities. Similar to the 
ruling Government, the security apparatus has not wanted the Nepali TRC to succeed (BBC, 
2016).  
Different organizations have also criticized the lack of action of the Nepali TRC. However, 
due to the lack of international obligations in the TRC Act, the UN is unabile to support the 
TRC in the prevailing circumstances (Accord, 2017). Thus, the TRC is essentially toothless 
because it lacks any enforcement mechanisms (Open society Foundation, 2016). As a result, 
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the international donors and human rights organisations have kept their distance from the 
work of the TRC and CIDP (Mandira Sharma, Accord, March 2017, London). 
Like the UN, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has raised concerns about the 
lack of the TRC to achieve its basic duty to resolve human rights abuses during the People’s 
War. The Chairman, Anup Raj Sharma, is particularly concerned about the TRC’s approach 
of not consulting conflict-victims to investigate complaints and criticized the growing 
hostility among TRC members (Himalaya Times, 2016).  
The coordination and victim-friendly mechanisms between the TRC and other organisations 
is also ineffective. Due to this, the documenting of a large number of human rights violations 
and abuses during the People’s War has not been shared with human rights organizations 
leaving the TRC’s records incomplete. The lack of confidentiality in the resolution of human 
rights abuses process is a further criticism and raises concerns about security threats to those 
who engaged with the TRC and registered complaints (ICJ, 2017). 
The entire reconciliation effort has been plagued with problems. For example, the selection of 
members was political and lacked transparency. The selection was carried out without any 
consultation with victims and human rights groups (ICJ, 2017). The appointment of five-
member commissioners was manipulated by major party leaders with the intention to 
influence the investigation of the cases in their favour (Global Press, 2016). Although the 
commissioners belong to advocates, civil servants and academics from different backgrounds, 
there is an absence of civil society representatives despite this representation being 
imperative for the TRC to implement one of its key recommendations (Himalaya Times, 
2017). The functioning of the TRC has been further stalled by internal feuding between the 
members as well as alleged partisan interests from different political parties (Republica, 
2016). The rifts between the commissioners who represent contrasting political ideologies are 
thus leading the TRC nowhere (Kantipur, 2017). 
Mistrust in the intent of the Nepali TRC is rising. The failure of the Supreme Court of Nepal 
to establish international standards on transitional justice or jurisprudence means the TRC is 
unable to adopt a victim-friendly approach to its mandate (ICJ, 2017). As a result, there is no 
role for victims in the truth and reconciliation process. Unless a deeper victim-centred justice 
process is articulated, the TRC process will not be able to address the core needs of victims 
(Bhandari, 2015). 
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A culture of impunity has a priority in Nepal and within Nepali politics. For instance, victims 
or rape and torture have a 35-day statute of limitations to register cases. Despite immense 
pressure from civil society, the Government and TRC have not yet developed and enforced 
the required laws and policies to address this problem (Open Society Foundation, 2016).  
The prolonged delay in the delivery of truth and justice is angering the victims. In November 
2016, a group of former Maoist combatants picked and padlocked the Maoists’ office with a 
demand for compensation for the exploitation as child soldiers. In February 2017, hundreds 
of victims’ families protested in front of the Parliament Secretariat in Singha Durbar, 
Kathmandu demanding justice. And more recently, on 28 August 2017, the families of police 
and army personnel who fought against the Maoists during the People’s War also protested in 
front of the TRC office, Kathmandu. The delay in the Nepali TRC delivering justice is now 
sowing the seeds for future conflict instead of promoting reconciliation and recovery (The 
Himalayan Times, 2017).  
The slow and frustrating progress of the Nepali TRC makes victims doubt they will receive 
justice. This is because of the actors of People’s War i.e.; the Maoists and other political 
parties are running the Government in syndicate way (power sharing mechanism) so there is a 
possibility to sideline the truth and justice by them (Kantipur, 4 April 2017).  
Table 9.6: Criticisms to Nepali TRC 
Lingering on amnesty matter. Lack of will among major political parties. 
Lack of enforcement mechanisms. Lack of consultation with victims. 
Presence of de jure and de facto impunity, 
weak centralized institutions and weak rule 
of law. 
Lack of confidentiality and security for the 
victims who engaged with the TRC. 
Lack of transparency during the selection 
of the TRC members which was a political 
motivation. 
Lack of international standards. 
Presence of a culture of impunity. Presence of doubt as the powerful actors of 
People’s War holds the key power of the 
Government. 
(Source: Bhandari, 2015; Himalayan Times, 2017; ICJ, 2017; Kantipur, 2017) 
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CHAPTER-10: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 Summary 
This thesis has focused on the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 
Nepal’s peace process. It has reviewed the background causes of the conflict in Nepal, from 
1995 to 2005, and the consequences of this conflict that need to be addressed in the peace 
process. The TRC, as an institution, has a vital role in establishing, facilitating and managing 
the peace process by addressing and recommending to the Government how to reconcile the 
country considering the causes and consequences of the war and progress into the future. In 
this regard, the thesis examined, analysed and compared the case studies on the role and 
successes of previous TRCs in South Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone to help inform and 
promote progress in finalizing Nepal’s peace process. 
10.2 Key Findings 
This thesis was concerned to examine two research questions. First: the background of the 
conflict in Nepal and the key impacts of the conflict. Second: the role of the TRC in 
facilitating and establishing peace in Nepal. The findings on these two questions are 
summarised below. 
What were the causes of conflict in Nepal? 
Nepal has experienced an interwoven and complex web of socioeconomic, legal and politico-
ideological problems for many years. Thus, in Nepal, socio-cultural, political and individual 
factors were the major causes of the war. They included the inequitable socioeconomic 
situations of the majority of the population, the entrenched discrimination against the poorest 
Nepalis (Karki & Bhattarai, 2003; Hachchethu, 2005, Venhaus, 2010), the feudal social 
structure, the indifference to oppressed ethnic groups (Katsiaficas, 2013), the structural 
poverty (Hutt, 2004; Joshi & mason, 2007; Lawoti & Pahari, 2009), the caste system (Mahat, 
2005), discrimination against women (GoN, 2011), and the Hinduist suppression of peoples’ 
culture and religion (Shakya, 2006). 
Nepal is a multi-dimensional country in terms of culture, ethnicity, religions and language. It 
has 125 dialects and 61 ethnic groups, with Hinduism and the Nepali language dominating 
since the unification of the Nepalese kingdom 235 years ago (Gurung et al, 2000). This has 
resulted in Hinduism and Hindus being considered as the upper class in Nepal and this 
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divided Nepali society into two parts i.e. upper class and lower class including the so-called 
untouchables, the Dalits. The long-term oppression, neglect, and refusal to address social and 
economic inequalities, as well as failing structural factors, energised the oppressed ethnic and 
lower class groups to take part in the insurgency. All these issues frustrated many people, 
predominantly those from the rural areas of Nepal. The Maoists, identifying these problems, 
put forward new ideas of social justice. These new ideas played on individuals’ 
consciousness to support the insurgency that began in 1995. 
The ongoing corruption, lack of stability and bad governance made the people seek radical 
options. The Government excluded many minorities, indigenous, ethnics and marginalized 
populations from the parliamentary representation so they were not represented in the policy 
and decision-making processes in Government. As the people did not feel part of the 
democratic process they were ready to participate in the civil war (People’s War) to help 
deliver institutionalized bureaucracy, more balanced representation, and stable Government. 
Lack of personal fulfilment due to poverty, mistreatment and discrimination such as torture 
by the authorities and the desire to feel safe prompted many people to join the insurgency, 
thinking they would receive all the basic needs after winning the war.  
What were the major societal impacts of the conflict in Nepal?   
Thousands of people were killed, disabled, and displaced during the insurgency, resulting in 
many people being orphaned, widowed and disappeared. Incidents of human rights were rive, 
and included torture and disappearances, as discussed in Chapter Two. Over the 10 years of 
turmoil, every sector of Nepali society suffered from the Maoist insurgency (People’s War). 
Physical infrastructures such as the drinking water and electricity systems, 
telecommunication system, suspension bridges, historical monuments, public buildings and 
institutions and personal property were severely damaged or lost.  The economy generating 
sectors of Nepal such as agriculture, industry, employment, tourism, and foreign aid were 
acutely disrupted for an extended period because of the insurgency. As a result, Nepal’s 
economic activities declined and this has contributed to the younger generations migrating 
overseas for employment opportunities.  
How can the TRC play a role in Nepal’s peace process?  
A TRC is an institution that is instigated for peace management and to facilitate a larger 
program of justice, especially in a transitional or post-conflict situation. Hence, it is an 
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important avenue to help deliver justice to both the victims and perpetrators of the human 
rights violations. In the case of Nepal, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) 2006 
mandated the establishment of the Nepali TRC however due to different political 
circumstances the TRC was not established until 2015. 
The TRC investigates the past and looks forward as it attempts to facilitate social 
transformation and develop a peaceful society for the future. It focuses on establishing 
democracy and establishing the rule of law by investigating, establishing and reporting the 
truth. The TRC achieves this by organizing hearings for victims and perpetrators to present 
their experiences, collecting evidence from various sources such as documents, newspapers 
and perhaps the strongest means - interviews. The final report the TRC prepares includes 
recommendations for rebuilding the divided society, mainly through the creation of an 
environment for sustainable peace and reconciliation, providing reparations to the victims and 
avenues of rehabilitation, as well as recommending any legal actions against persons who 
were involved in serious offenses against humanity. Most importantly, it recommends 
measures to prevent future human rights violations. The TRC is thus in a position of authority 
to facilitate the establishment of a social peace in Nepal. 
How can case studies from other countries inform the role of the TRC in progressing 
and completing the peace process in Nepal?  
As the TRC has practical truth-seeking functions to reconcile societies divided due to 
conflict, it can help reconcile a society’s troubled past and address human rights violations 
for perpetrators and victims. Primarily, the TRC advocates justice to repair the past damage 
and heal the past human rights violations through different means such as financial help, 
different income generating training, health and education facilities, official apologies, 
commemorations, and the creation of a society where all people can live and work together. 
In general, these three TRCs in Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa investigated the 
causes of the conflicts, the subsequent atrocities and consequences and then made 
recommendations to address these problems. Importantly, they focused on reconciliation, 
reparation, and rehabilitation to establish the peace and join the divided communities in their 
respective countries. Inherent in these processes was the ability of the TRC to address 
corruption, gender-based discrimination, health, education, press, security forces, prison, 
human rights abuses and rule of law. The studies of these different TRCs illustrate various 
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pathways the TRC in Nepal may consider in progressing the peace processes as well as what 
to recommend to effectively address the problems brought by the war. 
10.3 Recommendations 
This thesis is concerned with progressing the peace process in Nepal. The most important 
measure for peace building is to redress the root causes of conflict. This is essential, as 
recognized by the President of the United Nations’ Security Council (2001) in a Presidential 
Statement on peace building on 5 February 2001:  
The Security Council recognizes that peace building is aimed at preventing the 
outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore 
encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human 
rights programs and mechanism. This requires short- and long-term actions tailored 
to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. 
These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of 
poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of 
democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a 
culture of peace and nonviolence (pp. 1-2). 
For the establishment of permanent peace, the negative, as well as positive peace should be 
established (Galtung, 1964, 1996). The negative peace is the absence of direct violence 
between individuals and groups through suitable mechanisms to avoid, reduce and manage 
conflict. On the other side, the positive peace is the integration of human society through 
social justice, equal opportunity, and rights under the laws of the country. Nepal has both 
negative and positive factors that need to be reconciled for the peace process. This thesis thus 
makes the following recommendations to facilitate the TRC establishing both negative and 
positive peace in Nepal. 
The success of peace building is assessed by reviewing the likelihood of the recurrence of 
war and the quality of post-war governance (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). The 
recommendations to the TRC of Nepal focus on; first; the structure of the commission itself 
with its subcommittees and commissioners; second, implementing the recommendations to 
address the causes and consequences of the war to provide justice and facilitate the 
establishment of peace in the country through reconciliation, reparation, and rehabilitation 
procedures. The experiences of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa clearly illustrate how 
the workings of a TRC can address the causes and effects of the wars in their countries and 
promote peace.  
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10.3.1 Recommendations on Structure of the TRC 
The signing of a peace agreement opened the way to establish a TRC in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and South Africa, however, each country nominated its commissioners differently. 
Sierra Leone and South Africa appointed several international commissioners who were 
human rights activists, lawyers, theologians, historians, social workers and psychologists (S. 
Africa Gazette No. 16885, 1995). The inclusion of international committee members could 
reduce bias and promote open-mindedness as opposed to local commissioners who may be 
influenced by political parties, local influences, and private concerns. 
i. The commission should include national as well as international persons from 
different sectors such as human rights activists, lawyers, theologists, historians, social 
workers, psychologists and United Nations’ representatives. 
 
10.3.2 Recommendations on the causes and consequences of civil war 
Unless the causes of civil war in Nepal addressed, the peace process and the establishment of 
peace will not be completed. As the major causes of war were socio-cultural, political and 
individual, the TRC should recommend the Government, as well as related organizations, 
political parties and individuals (within the country and Diasporas), address these causes to 
help expedite the peace process.  
Until the signs of the consequences brought by the Maoist war are erased, the people will not 
move past the war and its pain. Hence, the consequences are to be addressed to help the 
people reconcile themselves and feel peace in their community. 
 
10.3.2.1 Recommendations on the socio-cultural causes of civil war 
Multiple, long-term socio-cultural inequities in Nepali society contributed to the war.  
i. Nepal needs to maintain and protect human rights as well as social rights and uphold 
equal opportunity for everyone without any discrimination on caste, gender and 
ethnicity (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004; South African TRC, 1998).  
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ii. Discrimination against women should be addressed by implementing quotas for 
women strictly, which is present in the New Constitution of Nepal, in the political 
parties in public elections so they can represent themselves.  
iii. Resourcing civil society as well as providing the social and cultural rights to 
everyone, as in Liberia (TRC, 2009), to address the presence of discrimination 
between upper and lower class/caste as well as the oppression and suppression in 
Nepali society.  
iv. Human Rights should be protected strongly through the Human Rights Commission 
of Nepal and should be included in the constitution of Nepal. Furthermore, social 
engineering is a major task for the Nepali Government to establish peace and equity in 
society. 
 
10.3.2.2 Recommendations on political causes of civil war 
Nepal’s future development depends on upon how effective its Government is. In Nepal, the 
governing political parties and their leaders prioritized their interests before the country and 
people.  Political struggle was the major factor driving the People’s War.  Political strategies 
need to be adopted to end Government corruption, nepotism and cronyism to achieve political 
stability (Hachchethu, 2005), ensure the inclusion of minorities in political representation 
(Gersony, 2003; Gurung, 2005; Hutt, 2004; Leve, 2007; Parvati, 2003; Thapa, 2004), and end 
elite domination of the states (Deraniyagala, 2005).  
i. A primary recommendation is the reconstruction of a new political order, as 
undertaken in Liberia (Liberian TRC, 2009).  
ii. The political class should implement plans to build a new Nepal. Their 
responsibilities/ duties and obligations should include the administration of justice, 
combating corruption, institutionalizing good governance and reducing poverty.  
iii. Establish an Anti-Corruption Commission in Nepal to end endemic corruption as in 
Sierra Leone. Furthermore, political leaders and parties publicly commit themselves 
to the principles and practice of good governance (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
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iv. Promote freedom of political expression to all (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004), including 
the equality of political representation, without discrimination to promote a vibrant 
and healthy democracy and to end political oppression and suppression. 
v. The Nepali Government uphold the rule of the rule which is transparent and 
accountable at all levels of the Government, politics and society as occurred in South 
Africa (TRC, 1998). 
10.3.2.3 Recommendations on individual causes of civil war 
The People’s War in Nepal impacted on the lives of most Nepalis. Many of the poorest 
Nepalis participated in the People’s War believing it was the only way to change their 
circumstances.  
i. The Government is to address the poverty, especially among the ethnic groups, so-
called low caste people to provide full and equal recognition of their economic rights 
along with social and cultural identities to ensure these minorities have access to 
economic opportunities for personal and group benefits.  
ii. The creation of job opportunities, decentralization of economic power to support the 
economy through loans and grants, as occurred in Liberia and South Africa (Liberian 
TRC, 2009; South African TRC, 1998).  
iii. Provide financial and banking services to help support economic development and 
reduce the gap between poor and rich (South African TRC, 1998). 
iv. Establish an anti-corruption commission, as occurred in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(TRC, 2009, 2004) and strong accountability measures be put in place as they were in 
South Africa (South African TRC, 1998).  
v. Create job opportunities to help overcome the gap between rich and poor and to assist 
victims of the civil war in establishing a business reconciliation fund, as in South 
Africa (South African TRC, 1998). 
vi. Reforming the Land Act 2012 (B.S.) for balanced distribution of land to every Nepali 
(Department of Land Reform and Management, Nepal; 2016). 
vii. The Dalits, are the most disadvantaged in the Nepali caste system. They have high 
illiteracy levels and are landless (Mahat, 2005). Hence, use and management of land, 
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as well as other natural resources to assist the Dalits, should be reviewed as in Liberia 
(Liberian TRC, 2009).  
viii. The Nepali Government to apply strongly the new constitution of Nepal 2015 on all 
forms of discrimination and oppression relating to class, ethnicity, religion. Language 
and gender including all forms of racial untouchability should be made punishable 
(Constitution of Nepal, 2015).  
ix. The introduction of Human Rights in the curriculum in high school level formal 
education to address the issues of racism, gender discrimination, conflict resolution 
and the rights of children, as in South Africa (South African TRC, 1995). 
x. Investigate police violence, repression, and abuse. Establish an Extraordinary 
Criminal Court, as in Liberia, to prosecute key police and army officers for gross 
human rights violations (Liberian TRC Report, 2009). 
10.3.2.4 Recommendations on socio-cultural consiquences 
Acknowledging crimes committed during the insurgency and apologizing to the victims is 
essential in the reconciliation process. This occurred in both Sierra Leone and South Africa 
(Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004; South African TRC, 1998). In Liberia, the President issued a 
public apology (Liberian TRC, 2009). Different reconciliation methods must be 
recommended by the TRC of Nepal to the Government of Nepal to address the socio-cultural 
consequences. Healing of war wounds can be made through the reparation programs in 
Nepal, as recommended below. 
i. Establish monuments for symbolic reconciliation, the celebration of a reconciliation 
day as a national day in which different Nepali traditional, religious, social, and 
recreational and sports activities would occur, similar to the measures undertaken in 
Sierra Leone (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004).  
ii. The restructuring of Government institutions by promoting a culture of respect to 
assist the reconciliation and peace process. Nepal can follow as in South Africa, the 
prison guards, the police, and army officers were trained to protect human rights 
(South African TRC, 1998) to secure the trust of the people.   
iii. Establish a Reparation Trust Fund. The Trust could be funded by all Nepalis and the 
Nepalis Diaspora. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and International Non-
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Government Organizations (INGOs) continue their work in reparation programs to 
sustain the peace, following the South African model (South African TRC, 1998) in 
Nepal.  
iv. The Reparation Trust fund compensation for war victims; free education to their 
children; community development projects such as free health facilities and services 
(medical and psychological care); empowerment programs like micro-economic 
programs including skill trainings, agricultural trainings especially to the women, as 
in Liberia, and the construction of roads which can bring development in rural areas 
(Liberian TRC, 2009).  
v. Symbolic reparation is recommended in the renaming of streets, public facilities, as in 
South Africa. Reconstruction of destroyed physical structures (South African TRC, 
1998) such as police posts, schools, Government offices and the houses of the victims 
to provide infrastructure for internally and externally displaced people. 
vi. Laws to prevent the repetition of human rights abuses.  
vii. Education and training and employment for the People’s War victimized youths and 
adults (South African TRC, 1998). 
viii. Establish an Extraordinary Criminal Court to prosecute individuals for gross human 
rights violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, war crimes, 
and economic crimes. Building a new political culture, resourcing civil and political 
society for nation building to address the present political culture such as power game, 
strikes (Liberian TRC, 2009).  
ix. Establish  and resource a  National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to 
proactively  combat corruption, institutionalizing good governance, promoting 
economic empowerment and facilitating poverty reduction. 
10.3.2.5 Recommendations on physical consiquences 
Different infrastructures of Nepal were destroyed during the 10 year People’s War. All 
infrastructures should be re-structured within a certain time frame but this may be possible 
only through a special program, such as implemented in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
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Although Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa had the problem of landmines and 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) the TRCs in these countries made no recommendations 
to address the issue.  This research recommends the following steps to address the issue in 
Nepal. 
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations (UN) have supported 
the Mine Action Work Plan since 2007 in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
and Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) Nepal. Different actions have raised 
awareness of the impact of landmines and the need to stop using them including the 
importance of fencing minefields, using warning signs and starting to clear landmines (Nepal 
National Mine Action Strategy, 2011).  At the end of 2014, the Mine Action Program ended 
despite landmines and IEDs still being an issue in Nepal.  
i. Establish a Reparation Trust Fund (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004; Liberian TRC, 2009). 
The fund could be directed for re-building of bridges, schools, health facilities, roads 
and public office buildings. 
ii. Establish a National Landmine Action Authority (NMAA) which runs a special 
search program to locate the landmines and IEDs and clear out or dispose of them to 
protect Nepalis (GICHD, 2015). 
10.3.2.6 Recommendations on political-economy consiquences 
The main economic sources of Nepal are agriculture and tourism. These areas support various 
industries and create job opportunities and employment. But the insurgency ruined these 
sectors in Nepal. The TRC should recommend the recommendations to the Government of 
Nepal, the Nepalis Diasporas and the international community/donors as in Liberia (Liberian 
TRC, 2009).  
i. The Government, Nepali Diaspora and international community/donors relating to 
constructing a new Nepal through economic development by economic empowerment 
and poverty reduction.  
ii. Establishment of new programs in the agriculture and tourism sectors.  
iii. Establish a business reconciliation fund as well as the creation and reservation of jobs 
and skill training, especially for victims. 
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iv. Resource generating programs such as compensation with land, as well as providing 
banking services to the victims to promote economic development and help reduce the 
gap between rich and poor.  
v. Government and business sectors facilitate economic development, industrial growth 
and agricultural expansion (S. African TRC, 1995). 
vi. The Nepali Diaspora should contribute at least US $30.00 per month to the Reparation 
Trust Fund which to help different reparation processes. 
vii. Promote individual economic empowerment through skill training as well as micro-
credit schemes, as in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004).  
viii. Training and schemes target the women such as women ex-combatants, internally 
displaced women, war widows and all the war victims should also be included in 
these training and schemes. Training in basic business management courses so that 
trained people can establish their own small businesses (Sierra Leonean TRC, 2004). 
10.4 The ‘6R’ Recommendations 
In summary, the recommendations of this thesis fit under the 6Rs, as detailed below. 
 
Figure 2: 6’R’ Recommendations for Nepali TRC 
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Rests 
 
‘6R’ 
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1.    Reparation-  
Trust fund, skill based training, health, pensions, education and skills training, micro-credit 
initiatives, community and symbolic reparations, public apology, victim or family to receive 
a $15,000.00 once off payment.  
2.    Reconciliation-  
Social and cultural system, prevention of gross human rights, new social engineering 
(national vision), violations in future (protection of human rights), national reconciliation 
day, distribution and reform of land,  economic, social and cultural rights, women’s right, 
child rights.  
3.    Rehabilitation-  
Victims’ family- Unlawful detention victims have to be provided help, life skills training, job 
opportunities, education, health. 
Children- Offering the Scholarship (free education up to university).  
Widow- Providing allowance, job opportunity, life skills training. 
Orphan- Managing the education, health and protection. 
Internally displaced people (IDPs) / externally displaced people (EDPs)- The real victims 
whose property was seized, destroyed so that they were displaced should be provided help. 
Others- Health related services, community development projects and programs e.g. school, 
health facilities, roads, women’s education on small business management for sustainability, 
micro-economic programs and government guaranteed lending schemes to women.   
4.    Reforms in rules and regulations-  
For organization, administration, and management of the country legal and judicial systems, 
establishment of rule of law, good governance. 
5.  Reinforcement of recommendations/ Running the recommendations strongly- 
Implement the recommendations strongly and efficiently. 
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6.    Rests-  
i)    Political parties and politicians-  
New political culture, civil and political rights, decentralization of political powers 
ii)    Private organizations-  
Business, media and bar association, faith communities should develop programs to help 
victims. 
iii)    Individuals- 
Every individual should develop a sense of responsibility towards the nation. 
iv)    Diasporas-  
Ask for cash support of at least $ 30.00 every month from each Diaspora. 
v)    Related matters of TRC-  
Archiving commission material and public access; follow-up committee for one year, 
protection for TRC commissioners, and strong punishment for breach of confidentiality in 
TRC matters. 
 
AT LAST, 
Basically, this research study intensively explored the causes and consequences of the 
People’s War (Maoist insurgency) in Nepal as well as the procedures to provide justice to the 
victims and the perpetrators so that they can live together peacefully in same society. Hence, 
Nepali TRC could learn the lessons and follow the procedures from the strength and 
weaknesses of the TRCs from the case studies to complete its tasks. 
However, the TRC of Nepal is in the preliminary stage of its function i.e.; it has just 
completed the collection of complaints from the victims and perpetrators although its two-
year tenure was completed without any real progress so was extended one more year in 
February 2017 (MyRepublica, 2017). The mandates of the TRC were to find the truth of 
human rights violations, recommendation for the punishment of guilty, recommendation for 
reparation, reconciliation and rehabilitation as well as the recommendations for the 
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reformation of the legal and institutional laws, rules and regulations of the country to avoid 
the repetition of the human rights violations.  
For these different major tasks, the Nepali TRC should follow the other TRCs functions and 
recommendations which would help significantly to progress the TRC and establish the peace 
in Nepal. As such, after the collection of the complaints from the victims and perpetrators, the 
hearing process should be conducted in major parts of the country but should cover all the 
complainants to find the reality of human right violations and the root causes of People’s War 
as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. Unless the TRC of Nepal functions in proper 
and effective ways, it will not accomplish its mandate to provide justice to the victims and 
perpetrators and will not help to establish peace successfully in Nepal. 
10.5 Advice for future research:   
This research project studied the background of the insurgency and the role of the TRC in 
Nepal through the case studies of three different countries. The presence of deep-rooted 
poverty, inequality, suppression, caste system, structural violence, unemployment, corruption 
and bad governance boosted the insurgency in Nepal. Similarly, the study found corrupt 
politics and power sharing amongst key parties in Nepal have impacted the work of the TRC. 
Thus, a comprehensive study needs to be conducted focusing on how to overcome these 
deep-rooted problems. The study should investigate how the political parties can play a vital 
role to uproot the problems of the country and establish a permanent peace to facilitate the 
development of Nepal.  
Key areas to conduct future research include:  
i.    The political economy of peace building. 
ii.    The role of political parties in peace building. 
iii.    Management of post-conflict peace and development of Nepal. 
iv.    Development of Nepal. 
v.    Addressing the root causes of conflict in Nepal. 
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ 
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